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Abstract
This dissertation consists of three independent chapters analyzing the role that infor-
mation and credit frictions play in goods and financial markets. Within these chapters, I
develop dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models to study the implications
of these frictions on the macroeconomy, both at the national and international level. In the
first chapter, I provide a novel explanation for the observed large and persistent fluctuations
in real exchange rates using a model with noisy, dispersed information among price-setting
firms. Chapter two studies how entrepreneurs’ attitudes towards risk affect business cycles
in a framework with agency frictions between borrowers and lenders. Finally, chapter three
introduces a liquidity channel in a business cycle model with agency frictions to rationalize
the highly volatile behavior of default recovery rates observed in the data.
Real exchange rates have been extremely volatile and persistent since the end of the Bret-
ton Woods system. For many developed economies, real exchange rates are as volatile as
nominal exchange rates, and their fluctuations exhibit a half-life in the range of three to five
years. Traditional sticky-price models struggle to jointly account for these features under
plausible nominal rigidities (Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan, 2002). Is it possible to reconcile,
in a single framework, the enormous short-term volatility of the real exchange rate with its
extremely long half-life? The first chapter of this dissertation addresses this question within
a framework in which information is noisy and heterogeneous among price-setting firms. In
this context, the continuing uncertainty that firms face about the state of the economy
and about the beliefs of their competitors, slows down the price adjustment in response to
nominal shocks, generating large and long-lived real exchange rate movements. I estimate
the model using real output and output deflator data from the US and the Euro Area and
show, as an out-of-sample test, that the model successfully explains the observed volatility
and persistence of the Euro/Dollar real exchange rate. In a Bayesian model comparison, I
show that the data strongly favor the dispersed information model relative to a sticky-price
model a` la Calvo. The model also accounts for the persistent effects of monetary shocks on
the real exchange rate that I document using a structural vector autoregression.
The second chapter, joint with Mikhail Dmitriev, studies how entrepreneurs’ attitudes to-
wards risk affect business cycles in a model with agency frictions. Entrepreneurs are in-
evitably exposed to non-diversified risk, which likely affects their willingness to borrow and
to invest in risky projects. Nevertheless, the financial friction literature has paid little at-
tention to how entrepreneurs’ desire to take on this risk affects their investment choices in
a general-equilibrium setting. Indeed, business cycle models with credit market frictions
that feature idiosyncratic risk assume, for tractability, that entrepreneurs are risk neutral
(Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist, 1999, BGG). In this chapter, we generalize the BGG
framework to the case of entrepreneurs with constant-relative-risk-aversion preferences. In
doing so, we overcome the aggregation challenges of this setup and maintain an analyti-
cally tractable, log-linear framework. Our main result is that higher risk aversion stabilizes
business cycle fluctuations in response to financial shocks, such as wealth redistribution or
risk shocks, without significantly affecting the dynamic responses to technology and mone-
tary shocks. Our findings suggest that, within this class of models, the ability of financial
shocks to account for a large portion of short-run output fluctuations found in previous work
(e.g., Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2014)) crucially hinges on borrowers’ risk neutrality.
The third chapter, joint with Mikhail Dmitriev, examines the implications of the cyclical
properties of default recovery rates for aggregate fluctuations. We document that recovery
rates after default in the United States are highly volatile and strongly pro-cyclical. These
facts are hard to reconcile with the existing financial friction literature. Indeed, models
with limited enforceability a` la Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) do not feature defaults and
recovery rates in equilibrium, while agency costs models following Bernanke, Gertler, and
Gilchrist (1999) underestimate the volatility of recovery rates by one order of magnitude.
In this chapter, we extend the standard agency costs model allowing liquidation costs for
creditors to depend on the tightness of the market for physical capital. Creditors do not have
expertise in selling entrepreneurial assets, but when buyers are plentiful, this disadvantage
is minimal. Instead when sellers are abundant, the disadvantage of being an outsider is
higher. Following a negative shock, entrepreneurs sell capital and liquidation costs for
creditors increase, driving down recovery rates. With higher liquidation costs, creditors cut
lending and cause entrepreneurs to sell even more capital. This liquidity channel works
independently from standard balance sheet effects, and amplifies the impact of financial
shocks on output by up to 50 percent.
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Chapter 1
Information Frictions and Real Exchange
Rate Dynamics
1.1 Introduction
Real exchange rates have been extremely volatile and persistent since the end of the Bretton
Woods system (Mussa, 1986). For many developed economies, real exchange rates are
roughly four times as volatile as output, and their fluctuations exhibit a half-life in the range
of three to five years. Moreover, real and nominal exchange rates are highly correlated.1
In principle, sticky-price models can explain this correlation and the high volatility: if
price levels fail to adjust, changes in nominal exchange rates following monetary shocks will
readily translate in real exchange rate movements. However, such models cannot produce
1Empirical evidence for these facts is presented in Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2002) and Steinsson
(2008).
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the observed persistence under plausible nominal rigidities, as demonstrated by Bergin and
Feenstra (2001) and Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2002).2 Is it possible to reconcile, in
a single framework, the enormous short-term volatility of the real exchange rate with its
extremely long half-life?
I study this classic open economy question in a two-country, flexible-price model in which
firms have noisy, dispersed information about the economic environment. I show analytically
that when firms face strategic complementarities in price-setting, uncertainty about other
firms’ beliefs results in sluggish price adjustments that can generate large and long-lived real
exchange rate fluctuations. The model is estimated on output and output deflator data for
the US and the Euro Area using Bayesian methods. I evaluate the quantitative success of the
framework by asking whether it reproduces the dynamics of the Euro/Dollar real exchange
rate, which were not targeted in the estimation. I find that the estimated model successfully
explains these dynamics, as captured by the unconditional volatility and half-life of the real
exchange rate, as well as its correlation with the nominal exchange rate. In addition, the
model accounts for the persistent effects of monetary shocks on the real exchange rate that I
document using a structural VAR. Finally, I conduct a Bayesian model comparison and find
that the data strongly favor the dispersed-information framework relative to a sticky-price
model a` la Calvo.
The main contribution of the paper is to provide a novel explanation for the observed
2Subsequent research addresses the persistence anomaly by introducing strategic complementarities
(Bouakez, 2005), inertial Taylor rules (Benigno, 2004) and real shocks (Steinsson, 2008; Iversen and
So¨derstro¨m, 2014). While these features increase the persistence of the exchange rate, they are not suf-
ficient to jointly explain the observed half life of the real exchange rate as well as its relative volatility
to consumption and output.
2
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real exchange rate dynamics, by showing that the estimated dispersed-information model
captures remarkably well the volatility and persistence of the real exchange rate. Closed-
economy models in which agents are imperfectly informed are known to be quantitatively
successful for explaining the highly persistent effects of monetary disturbances on output
and inflation (Melosi, 2014) documented by VAR studies (e.g., Christiano, Eichenbaum, and
Evans, 2005). However, little is known about these models’ ability to explain the behavior
of international relative prices. This paper fills this gap. First, it shows analytically that the
model with dispersed information can deliver highly volatile and persistent real exchange
rates. Second, it demonstrates quantitatively that the estimated model successfully accounts
for the observed real exchange rate behavior. The model’s success stems from its ability to
generate endogenous persistence in the real exchange rate fluctuations that follow monetary
shocks.
The second contribution lies in the quantitative comparison between the dispersed-information
model and an alternative benchmark sticky-price model, a comparison currently missing in
the open economy literature. To this end, I also estimate a two-country sticky price model
a` la Calvo. The Bayesian model comparison suggests that the output and output deflator
data strongly favor the dispersed-information model relative to the sticky-price model. In
sample, the dispersed-information model is already clearly preferred to the Calvo model, but
the model with information frictions fares even better in the out-of-sample test, generating
far more realistic real exchange rate dynamics.
The information friction that I model is motivated by the mounting evidence about
3
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heterogeneity in beliefs among decision makers. To illustrate, Figure 1.1 depicts the times
series of the interquartile range of two types of forecasts: the professional analysts’ one-
year ahead forecasts of CPI inflation and real GDP growth, as taken from the Federal
Reserve’s Survey of Professional Forecasts. The time series show that there is considerable
dispersion in these forecasts. Dispersion in beliefs is pervasive in the economy. Indeed,
recent survey data show that there is also widespread dispersion in firms’ beliefs about
both past and future macroeconomic conditions (Coibion, Gorodnichenko, and Kumar,
2015). This evidence suggests that firms have their own “window on the world” (Amato
and Shin, 2006). In this environment, defending a firm’s market share will entail some
degree of second-guessing competitors’ pricing strategies. This second-guessing game might
prove particularly challenging in an open economy, in which firms face competition not only
from domestic firms but also from foreign exporters.
I follow Woodford (2002) and Melosi (2014) in modeling this heterogeneity in beliefs.
Specifically, firms in the model observe private, idiosyncratic signals about nominal aggre-
gate demand and aggregate productivity in the two countries. They also face strategic
complementarity in price-setting, which implies that a firm’s optimal price depends posi-
tively on the prices set by competitors. With private information, strategic complementarity
requires firms to respond to higher-order beliefs i.e., beliefs about other firms’ beliefs about
underlying economic conditions. Beliefs update slowly, as the private signals a firm receives
provide relatively little information about other firms’ signals. Notwithstanding the absence
of nominal rigidities, slow movements in beliefs translate into endogenously slow-moving
4
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prices. Therefore, while nominal shocks generate swings in the nominal exchange rate, the
slow price dynamics can trigger large and persistent real exchange rate fluctuations.
Despite prices’ dependence on an infinite hierarchy of beliefs, I can show analytically that
the volatility and persistence of the real exchange rate are higher (i) the lower the preci-
sion of firms’ signals about aggregate demand and (ii) the higher the degree of strategic
complementarity. Intuitively, when signals are not very precise, firms learn slowly about
changes in nominal aggregate demand and sluggishly update their prices. When strategic
complementarities are strong, firms fail to adjust prices quickly in an effort of keeping their
own prices in line with those of their rivals. Both of these channels slow down the price
adjustment, delivering volatile and persistent real exchange rates following nominal shocks.
Notably, strategic complementarity depends on the degree of the economies’ openness and
on the substitutability between domestic- and foreign-produced goods. Thus, foreign com-
petition provides a channel through which the adjustment of prices might be delayed, one
that is naturally absent in closed-economy models.
In the empirical part of the paper, I assess whether the model can quantitatively explain
the dynamics of the Euro-Dollar real exchange rate in the period 1971-2011. In the model,
low enough signal precisions would be able to generate a highly volatile and persistent real
exchange rate, but it is unclear which values should be considered empirically relevant, given
the scarce existing evidence on these parameters. To address this shortcoming, I estimate
the model parameters via Bayesian methods using real GDP and GDP deflator data for the
US and the Euro Area. These data do not directly contain information on the real exchange
5
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rate, which is instead defined as the nominal exchange rate adjusted by consumption price
indices.
The exclusion of the real exchange rate from the estimation allows me to conduct an out-
of-sample test for my model. Specifically, I simulate the model at the estimated parameter
values and ask whether it reproduces the dynamics of the Euro/Dollar real exchange rate,
which were not targeted in the estimation. I show that the model successfully explains
these dynamics, as measured by the volatility, persistence, and half-life of the real exchange
rate. The model also delivers the hump-shaped dynamics that are a salient feature of the
Euro-Dollar real exchange rate and are central to the observed half life of about 4.5 years.
Additionally, the estimated signal-to-noise ratios suggest that firms’ signals about nominal
aggregate conditions are less precise than signals about productivity, which generates per-
sistence of the real exchange rate from nominal shocks. Using a structural VAR approach,
I show that these persistent effects of monetary shocks on real exchange rates are indeed a
feature of the data.
I compare these predictions with those of a standard sticky-price model, which I estimate
using the same data on real GDP and GDP deflators. The sticky-price model deviates from
the dispersed-information model in only two respects: (i) all agents are perfectly informed,
and (ii) firms can optimally adjust their prices only in random periods, as in Calvo (1983).
Two sets of results emerge. First, the dispersed-information model fits the data significantly
better than the sticky-price model, as suggested by the Bayesian model comparison. Second,
the model with information frictions is more successful at explaining the out-of-sample
6
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dynamics of the real exchange rate. The estimated Calvo model generates low real exchange
rate persistence following monetary shocks, confirming the intuition behind the results of
Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2002). When technology shocks are added to the picture,
the model produces a half-life of the real exchange rate that is twice as large as in the data.
Intuitively, this happens because the estimated Calvo model requires large technology shocks
to account for the volatility and persistence of output and domestic price indices. However,
the size of these technology shocks and their internal propagation in the sticky-price model
generates counterfactual predictions for the real exchange rate.
Finally, I investigate the robustness of the predictions of the dispersed-information model
to changes in the firms’ information set. Specifically, I allow firms to observe noisy signals
about equilibrium prices, which are relevant for their price-setting decisions. A re-estimation
of the model suggests that these additional signals are relatively noisy, and therefore they
carry a low weight in the firms’ signal-extraction problem. The implications are that the
presence of these additional signals does not substantively ameliorate the fit of the model
to the data and, leaves the real exchange rate dynamics unchanged.
This paper contributes to the growing literature that focuses on the aggregate implica-
tions of dispersed information among price setters, such as Woodford (2002), Mac´kowiak
and Wiederholt (2009), Nimark (2008), and Melosi (2014), which builds on the seminal
contributions of Phelps (1970) and Lucas (1972). In contrast to most of this literature,
which is developed in closed economies and focuses on inflation dynamics, this paper stud-
ies the implications for international prices, where uncertainty about foreign demand as
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well as foreign competitors’ actions, plays an important role. My analysis lends further
empirical support to the dispersed-information theory, by testing its natural predictions in
an open-economy environment. The paper is also naturally related to the literature that
studies real exchange rate dynamics in the context of monetary models, such as Johri and
Lahiri (2008) and Carvalho and Nechio (2011), in addition to the works already mentioned.
Relative to this literature, this paper highlights the importance of a source of endogenous
persistence in real exchange rates—dispersed information in environments with strategic
complementarities—that has so far been ignored in this context.
Finally, the present study adds to the small literature that focuses on information frictions
in open economies. Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2006, 2010) combine information frictions
with a finance approach to study other puzzles in international macroeconomics, such as
the exchange-rate disconnect and the the forward-discount puzzle. Crucini, Shintani, and
Tsuruga (2010) introduce sticky information a` la Mankiw and Reis (2002) in a sticky-price
model to explain the volatility and persistence of deviations from the law of one price. They
find that such a model can explain the empirical half life of eighteen months if information
updates occur every 12 months. In contrast, this paper seeks to explain the substantially
longer half-life of aggregate real exchange rates by relying only on dispersed information
and Bayesian updating, which is consistent with the recent evidence on firms’ behavior, as
documented by Coibion, Gorodnichenko, and Kumar (2015).
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops the dispersed-information model.
Section 3 provides some analytical results. Section 4 discusses the solution method. Section
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5 analyzes the model’s impulse responses. Section 6 contains the empirical analysis. Section
7 draws a comparison with the sticky-price model. Section 8 studies the sensitivity of the
results to the information structure. Section 9 offers some concluding remarks.
1.2 The Model
The framework is a two-country open-economy monetary model that follows the interna-
tional macroeconomic tradition initiated by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995). The setup is similar
to Corsetti, Dedola, and Leduc (2010). The world economy consists of two countries of unit
mass, denominated H (Home) and F (Foreign), each populated by households, a continuum
of monopolistically competitive producers, and a monetary authority. Each country spe-
cializes in the production of one type of tradable goods, produced in a number of varieties
or brands, with measure equal to the population size. All goods produced are traded and
consumed in both countries. Prices are set in the currency of the producer; therefore, the
law of one price holds. Deviations of the real exchange rate from purchasing-power parity
arise because households exhibit home bias in consumption preferences.
All information is, in principle, available to every agent; however, firms can only pay
limited attention to the information available, owing to finite information-processing capac-
ity (Sims, 2003). Following Woodford (2002) and Melosi (2014), this idea is modeled by
assuming that firms do not perfectly observe current and past realization of the variables
in the model, but rather only observe private noisy signals about the state of nominal ag-
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gregate demand and technology.3 Firms use these signals to draw inferences about other
model variables. Households and the monetary authorities are assumed, for tractability,
to observe the current and past realization of all the model variables. Below I present the
structure of the Home economy in more detail. The Foreign economy is symmetric, and
foreign variables will be denoted with an asterisk.
1.2.1 Preferences and Households
The utility function of the representative household in country H is
Et
{ ∞∑
t=0
βt
[
C1−σt − 1
1− σ −
∫ 1
0
L
1+1/ψ
ht
1 + 1/ψ
di
]}
(1.1)
The representative household has full information, E(.) denotes the statistical expectations
operator, and β < 1 is the discount factor. Households receive utility from consumption Ct
and disutility from working, where Lht indicates hours of labor input in the production of
domestic variety h ∈ [0, 1]. Risk is pooled internally, to the extent that all domestic agents
receive the same consumption level. The parameter ψ > 0 represents the Frisch elasticity of
labor supply. Following Woodford (2003, Ch. 3), each of the home varieties (indexed by h
over the unit interval) uses a specialized labor input in its production. As noted by Wood-
ford, this type of differentiated labor markets generates more strategic complementarities
in price-setting.4
3The implications of relaxing this assumption are explored in Section 1.8.
4Pricing decisions are strategic complements if, when other firms raise their prices, a given firm i wishes
to raise its price as well. It is closely related to the concept of “real rigidity”, in that it depends solely
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Households consume both types of traded goods. The consumption of these goods is
denoted by CHt and CFt. For each type of goods, one brand or variety is an imperfect
substitute for all the other brands, and γ is the elasticity of substitution between brands.
Mathematically, consumption baskets of Home and Foreign goods by Home agents are a
CES aggregate of Home and Foreign brands, respectively:
CHt ≡
(∫ 1
0
Ct(h)
γ−1
γ dh
) γ
γ−1
CFt ≡
(∫ 1
0
Ct(f)
γ−1
γ df
) γ
γ−1
γ > 1
The overall consumption basket, Ct, is defined as
Ct ≡
[
α
1
ω (CHt)
ω−1
ω + (1− α) 1ω (CFt)
ω−1
ω
] ω
ω−1
ω > 0
where α is the weight of the home consumption good and ω is the elasticity of substitution
between home and foreign goods, which I alternatively refer to as the trade elasticity. The
utility-based consumption price index (CPI) is
Pt =
[
αP 1−ωHt + (1− α)P 1−ωFt
] 1
1−ω
where PHt and PFt are the price sub-indices for the home- and foreign-produced goods,
upon real factors: the structure of production costs and of demand. Strategic complementarities arise
also in the presence of decreasing returns or input-output structures in production (Basu, 1995). For a
discussion, see Ball and Romer (1990) and Woodford (2003, Ch. 3).
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expressed in domestic currency
PHt =
(∫ 1
0
pt(h)
1−γdh
) 1
1−γ
PFt =
(∫ 1
0
pt(f)
1−γdf
) 1
1−γ
Foreign prices are similarly defined. The Foreign CPI is
P ∗t =
[
(1− α)(P ∗Ht)1−ω + α(P ∗Ft)1−ω
] 1
1−ω
LetQt denote the real exchange rate, that is, the relative price of consumption: Qt ≡ tP
∗
t
Pt
,
where t is the nominal exchange rate expressed in domestic currency per foreign currency.
Even if the law of one price holds at the individual good level (i.e., Pt(h) = tPt(h)
∗,
which implies PHt = tP
∗
Ht), the presence of home bias in consumption—that is α > 1/2—
implies that the price of consumption may not be equalized across countries. Put differently,
purchasing-power parity (Qt = 1) will generally not hold. The terms of trade are defined
as the price of imports in terms of exports: Tt = PFttP ∗Ht . If the law of one price holds, the
real exchange rate will be proportional to the terms of trade
qt = (2α− 1)tt (1.2)
where, throughout the paper, lower-case letters denote percentage deviations from steady
state.5 Equation (1.2) implies that an improvement in the terms of trade always appreciates
5This result assumes symmetric initial conditions.
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the real exchange rate. This is consistent with the empirical evidence (Obstfeld and Rogoff,
2000). Minimizing expenditure over brands and over goods, one can derive the domestic
household demand for a generic good h, produced in country H, and the demand for a good
f , produced in country F:
Ct(h) =
(
Pt(h)
PHt
)−γ (PHt
Pt
)−ω
αCt Ct(f) =
(
Pt(f)
PFt
)−γ (PFt
Pt
)−ω
(1− α)Ct
Assuming that the law of one price holds, total demand for a generic home variety h or
foreign variety f may be written as
Y dt (h) =
(
Pt(h)
PHt
)−γ (PHt
Pt
)−ω
[αCt + (1− α)Qωt C∗t ] (1.3)
Y dt (f) =
(
Pt(f)
∗
P ∗Ft
)−γ (P ∗Ft
P ∗t
)−ω [
(1− α)Q−ωt Ct + αC∗t
]
(1.4)
1.2.2 Budget Constraint
The generic home household’s budget constraint can be written as
PtCt +
∫
qH,t(st+1)BH,t(st+1)dst+1 ≤
∫ 1
0
WhtLhtdh+ BH,t + Pt
∫ 1
0
Πhtdh (1.5)
BH,t(st+1) is the holding of state-contingent claims that pay off one unit of domestic currency
if the realized state of the world at time t + 1 is st+1 and qH,t(st+1) is the time-t price of
such an asset. Wht is the wage for the h-th type of labor input and Πht are the real profits
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of domestic firm h. Maximizing (3.6) subject to (1.5) gives the static first-order condition:
Cσt L
1/ψ
ht = Wht/Pt (1.6)
and the following Euler equation
1 = β(1 +Rt+1)Et
[(
Ct+1
Ct
)−σ Pt
Pt+1
]
(1.7)
where Rt+1 is the net risk-free rate of return between t and t+ 1.
1.2.3 Monetary Policy
Following Woodford (2002) and Carvalho and Nechio (2011), I leave the specification of
monetary policy implicit, and assume that the growth rate of nominal aggregate demands
Mt = PtCt and M
∗
t = P
∗
t C
∗
t follows exogenous autoregressive processes
∆mt = ρm∆mt−1 + umt (1.8)
∆m∗t = ρm∗∆m
∗
t−1 + u
m∗
t (1.9)
where ∆mt ≡ lnMt − lnMt−1 and the monetary shocks umt and um
∗
t are i.i.d., distributed
as N (0, σ2m) and N (0, σ2m∗) and uncorrelated across countries.6 I refer to these shocks
as nominal demand shocks or monetary shocks, with the understanding that they capture
6This formulation of aggregate demand can also be justified by the presence of a cash-in-advance constraint.
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structural shocks that move nominal aggregate demand. The variable Mt can be interpreted
as a measure of money supply, such as M1 or M2, or more broadly as a measure of aggregate
demand, such as nominal GDP. This specification is widely used in the monetary literature
and has been shown to be a good approximation of the process that implements estimated
Taylor rules of the types studied in Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1998).
1.2.4 Exchange Rate Determination
Asset markets are assumed to be internationally complete. Complete markets implies the
following risk-sharing condition
(
Ct
Ct+1
)σ Pt
Pt+1
=
(
C∗t
C∗t+1
)σ tP ∗t
t+1P ∗t+1
This equation relates the cross-country differential in the growth rate of consumption to
the depreciation of the exchange rate. Assuming symmetric initial conditions, this can be
rewritten as
tP
∗
t
Pt
=
(
Ct
C∗t
)σ
(1.10)
Equation (1.10) is an efficiency condition that equates the marginal rate of substitution be-
tween home and foreign consumption to their marginal rate of transformation, expressed as
equilibrium prices, i.e., the real exchange rate. A key consequence is that home consump-
tion can rise relative to foreign consumption only if the real exchange rate depreciates.7
7This implication is known to be at odds with the the data, where real exchange rates and consumption
differentials exhibit low or negative correlation (Backus and Smith, 1993). This counterfactual implication
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Equation (1.10), combined with the processes for nominal aggregate demand and optimal
prices, determines real and nominal exchange rates under complete markets.
1.2.5 Price-setting Decisions
Firms do not perfectly observe the state of aggregate demand and their marginal cost, but
at each date they receive private signals about economic conditions. Prices are set in the
producer’s currency and there are no barriers to trade, so the law of one price always holds.
Firm h’s expected real profits in period t, conditional on the history of signals observed by
that firm at time t, are given by
Πht = Eht
[
Pt(h)
Pt
Y dt (h)−
Wht
Pt
Lht
]
(1.11)
where Eht is the expectation operator conditional on firm h’s information set, Ith. The
production function is given by
Yt(h) = AtLht (1.12)
Total factor productivity, At, in the two countries follows the processes
lnAt = ρa lnAt−1 + uat (1.13)
could be fixed by assuming incomplete asset markets or by making preference assumptions that break
the tight link between marginal utilities and current consumption (e.g., introducing habit formation or
non-separable utility). Previous work on this topic suggests that, if anything, these modifications would
increase the volatility and persistence of the real exchange rate, thus strengthening my results. For
tractability, I proceed with the assumption of complete markets.
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lnA∗t = ρa∗ lnA
∗
t−1 + u
a∗
t (1.14)
The shocks u are mean zero and have variances σ2a and σ
2
a∗ , respectively.
Each firm in the home country receives the following signals:
Zh,t =

zmh,t
zm
∗
h,t
zah,t
za
∗
h,t

=

mt
m∗t
at
a∗t

+

σ˜m 0 0 0
0 σ˜m∗ 0 0
0 0 σ˜a 0
0 0 0 σ˜a∗


vmh,t
vm
∗
h,t
vah,t
va
∗
h,t

(1.15)
where vmh,t, v
m∗
h,t , v
a
h,t, v
a∗
h,t ∼ N (0, 1), at = lnAh,t and a∗t = lnA∗t . mt = lnMt and m∗t = lnM∗t
represent the nominal aggregate demands (or money supplies), and the signal noises are
assumed to be independently and identically distributed across firms and over time. Foreign
firms receive similar signals drawn from the same distributions. In every period t, firms
observe the history of their signals Zth (that is, their information set is Iht = {Zh,τ}tτ=−∞)
and maximize (1.11) subject to (1.12) and (1.4). The first-order condition yields
Pt(h) =
γ
γ − 1
Eht
[(
1
PHt
)−γ (
PHt
Pt
)−ω CWt
Pt
Wht
PtAt
]
Eht
[(
1
PHt
)−γ (
PHt
Pt
)−ω CWt
Pt
] (1.16)
where CWt ≡ αCt+ (1−α)Qωt C∗t . Equation (1.16) states that a firm optimally sets its price
to a markup, γγ−1 , over its perceived marginal cost. Following the tradition in this literature,
I log-linearize the price-setting equation around the deterministic steady state so that the
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transition equations of average prices are linear. I assume that firms use the log-linearized
model, rather than the original nonlinear model when addressing their signal-extraction
problem. This assumption greatly simplifies the analysis, because it allows for the use of
the Kalman filter to characterize the dynamics of firms’ beliefs. Finally, I assume that at
the beginning of time, firms are endowed with an infinite history of signals. This implies
that the Kalman gain matrix is time-invariant and identical across firms.
1.2.6 Real Exchange Rate Dynamics
In this section I characterize the solution for the real exchange rate. To simplify the algebra
and convey intuition, I henceforth assume log utility for consumption (σ = 1). Appendix
A.1 shows how the model can be solved also for a generic value of σ. As also shown in
Appendix A.1, under the producer currency pricing (PCP) assumption, the log-linearized
first-order condition for a generic h and f firm, combined with equation (1.2), reads
pt(h) = Eht
[
(1− ξ)pHt + 2α(1− α)(ω − 1)
(γ + ψ)
tt + ξ(mt − at)
]
(1.17)
p∗t (f) = Eft
[
(1− ξ)p∗Ft −
2α(1− α)(ω − 1)
(γ + ψ)
tt + ξ(m∗t − a∗t )
]
(1.18)
where ξ = 1+ψγ+ψ . These equations show the interdependence of the optimal price with their
foreign counterpart through the terms of trade. In particular, if home and foreign goods
are substitutes (ω > 1), other things equal, a rise in the price of foreign goods (that is, a
rise in tt) causes expenditure switching away from foreign goods toward home goods. The
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increased demand for home goods increases firm’s h marginal cost and makes it optimal to
raise pt(h). If goods are instead complements (ω < 1), a rise in tt decreases demand both
for foreign and home output, hence the optimal price for a home good pt(h) falls.
The parameter 1−ξ is related to the degree of strategic complementarities in price-setting,
i.e., it tells by how much the optimal price of an individual firm changes when all the other
domestic competitors are changing their prices. Because γ > 1, then 0 < ξ < 1. Integrating
(1.17) over domestic agents and (1.18) over foreign agents and noting that the log-linear
price indices read as pHt =
∫ 1
0 pt(h)dh and p
∗
Ft =
∫ 1
0 p
∗
t (f)df , I obtain
pHt = E¯
(1)
t
[
(1− ξ)pHt + 2α(1− α)(ω − 1)
(γ + ψ)
tt + ξ(mt − at)
]
(1.19)
p∗Ft = E¯
(1)
t
[
(1− ξ)p∗Ft −
2α(1− α)(ω − 1)
(γ + ψ)
tt + ξ(m∗t − a∗t )
]
(1.20)
where E¯(1)t (·) =
∫ 1
0 E¯it(·)di for i = h, f denotes a first-order average expectation. Note
that
∫ 1
0 E¯ht(·)dh =
∫ 1
0 E¯ft(·)df follows from the symmetry of the information structure.
Equations (1.19) and (1.20) can be disentangled following the tradition of the “sum” versus
“differences” approach in general equilibrium open-economy models (Aoki, 1981). Specifi-
cally, I can take the sum of (1.19) and (1.20) to obtain
pHt + p
∗
Ft = E¯
(1)
t [(1− ξ)(pHt + p∗Ft) + ξ(mt +m∗t )− ξ(at + a∗t )] (1.21)
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which yields the solution
pHt + p
∗
Ft = ξ
∞∑
k=1
(1− ξ)k−1E¯(k)t (mWt − aWt ) (1.22)
where for any variable xt, I define x
W
t ≡ xt + x∗t and xDt ≡ xt − x∗t . Additionally E¯(k)t (·) =∫ 1
0 E¯
(k−1)
it (·)di denotes the k-th-order average expectation. By taking the difference between
(1.19) and (1.20) and substituting the solution for the terms of trade, I obtain
pHt − p∗Ft = E¯(1)t [(1− ϕ)(pHt − p∗Ft) + ϕ(mt −m∗t )− ξ(at − a∗t )] (1.23)
where ϕ ≡ (1+ψ)+4α(1−α)(ω−1)γ+ψ . The solution to the above equation yields
pHt − p∗Ft = ϕ
∞∑
k=1
(1− ϕ)k−1E¯(k)t mDt − ξ
∞∑
k=1
(1− ϕ)k−1E¯(k)t aDt (1.24)
The solution for pHt and p
∗
Ft can be found by taking sums and differences of equations
(1.22) and (1.24). Proposition 1 follows.8
Proposition 1 Under the assumption of log-utility and complete asset markets, the real
exchange rate is given by
qt = (2α− 1)
(
mDt − ϕ
∞∑
k=1
(1− ϕ)k−1E¯(k)t mDt − ξ
∞∑
k=1
(1− ϕ)k−1E¯(k)t aDt
)
(1.25)
8Detailed derivations are in Appendix A.1.
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where 1− ϕ ≡ 1− (1+ψ)+4α(1−α)(ω−1)γ+ψ governs the degree of strategic complementarity.
The intuition behind this equation is straightforward. Focus for a moment on the first two
terms on the right-hand side of (1.25) and consider a relative shock to nominal demands,
mDt . Under full-information rational expectations, we expect the shock to have no effect on
the real exchange rate, because nominal prices should adjust one for one with the nominal
demands. Indeed, with full information E¯(k)t mt = mt and E¯
(k)
t m
∗
t = m
∗
t for every k so that
mDt = ϕ
∑∞
k=1(1− ϕ)k−1E¯(k)t mDt , and the real exchange rate responds only to real shocks.
Under imperfect information instead, as long as we have home bias, the real exchange rate
also responds to nominal shocks to the extent that higher-order expectations deviate from
full-information rational expectations. Equation (1.25) shows also that the persistence of the
response of the real exchange rate to relative monetary shocks depends on how quickly the
weighted average of higher-order expectations ϕ
∑∞
k=1(1−ϕ)k−1E¯(k)t mDt adjusts. As shown
in section 1.3, the speed of adjustment depends on the degree of strategic complementarities
(ϕ for relative variables) and on the signal-to-noise ratios σm/σ˜m and σm∗/σ˜m∗ . Specifically,
the signal-to-noise ratios determine how quickly the different order of expectations in the
summation will adjust to shocks. The strategic-complementarity parameter determines the
weights attached to the different orders. For instance, the average first-order expectation
about mDt receives a weight ϕ, the second order receives a weight ϕ(1 − ϕ), the third
ϕ(1− ϕ)2, and so on.
The last term on the right-hand side of (1.25) indicates that the real exchange rate always
responds to relative technology shocks or, in the presence of dispersed information, to the
21
Chapter 1 Information Frictions and Real Exchange Rate Dynamics
weighted-average of higher-order beliefs about the shock.
1.2.7 Strategic Complementarities in the Open Economy
As discussed above, the strategic-complementarity parameter (1 − ϕ) is an important de-
terminant of the dynamics of the real exchange rate, as it affects the weights attached to
different orders of expectations. In this section I explain how this parameter crucially de-
pends on the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods. In the case of log
utility we have
(1− ϕ) = 1− (1 + ψ) + 4α(1− α)(ω − 1)
γ + ψ
= 1− ξ [1 + 2ζ] (1.26)
where I define ζ = 2α(1−α)(ω−1)1+ψ . To build intuition let us focus on the case of a closed
economy first, obtainable by setting the home-bias parameter α to one (which implies
ζ = 0). In this case, the optimal pricing equations (1.17) and (1.18) would read
pt(h) = Eht [(1− ξ)pHt + ξ(mt − at)] (1.27)
p∗t (f) = Eft [(1− ξ)p∗Ft + ξ(m∗t − a∗t )] (1.28)
Here the degree of strategic complementarity is governed by 1 − ξ = 1 − 1+ψγ+ψ ∈ (0, 1).
Consider the experiment of increasing pHt, keeping everything else constant. A domestic
firm h responds to a increase in the average price pHt by increasing its own price. This
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happens because the increase in pHt shifts demand away from competitors toward firm’s h
output, and with specialized labor markets firm’s h marginal cost is increasing in its own
output. The strength of the increase in pt(h), measured by (1−ξ), depends on the size of the
change in firm’s h demand, as captured by the elasticity of substitution between domestic
goods γ, and on the slope of the labor supply curve, governed by the Frisch elasticity ψ.
Now consider the same experiment as above in the case in which the economies are open.
Rewriting the pricing equations (1.17) and (1.18) using the solution for the terms of trade
yields
pt(h) = Eht {[1− ξ(1 + ζ)]pHt + ξζ(p∗Ft +m∗t −mt) + ξ(mt − at)} (1.29)
p∗t (f) = Eft {[1− ξ(1 + ζ)]p∗Ft − ξζ(m∗t −mt − pHt) + ξ(m∗t − a∗t )} (1.30)
Now the response of pt(h) to an increase in the average domestic price, pHt, is determined
by the strategic-complementarity parameter [1 − ξ(1 + ζ)], which will have the same sign
as (1− ϕ) in (1.26). Note that this response might be smaller or larger than in the closed-
economy case, depending on whether the value of ω is above or below unity. The intuition
goes as follows. Under our maintained assumption of log utility in this Section, when ω > 1,
home and foreign goods are net substitutes. This diminishes strategic complementarity
relative to the closed economy, because an increase in pHt now shifts demand away from
all the other domestic goods, partly toward firm h’s good and partly toward foreign goods.
Thus, firm h experiences a milder increase in marginal cost and changes its price by a
smaller amount than if it were to operate in a closed economy. Conversely, when ω < 1,
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home and foreign goods are net complements. An increase in pHt induces a larger increase
in firm’s h marginal cost relative to the closed-economy case, and firm h raises its price
by a larger amount. These additional effects are captured in the strategic-complementarity
parameter 1 − ϕ via ζ. Thus the substitutability between home and foreign goods has
important implications for the degree of strategic complementarity, which in turns affects
the dynamics of the real exchange rate through the channels described in Section 1.3.
1.3 Analytical Results
To gain intuition about the cyclical properties of the real exchange rate in response to
monetary shocks, let us abstract from technological shocks and study the simple case in
which money supplies follow a random walk. Precisely, for this section I assume that
at = a
∗
t = a and
mt = mt−1 + umt (1.31)
m∗t = mt−1 + u
m∗
t (1.32)
which is obtained as a special case from equation (1.8) setting ρm = ρm∗ = 0. With random
walks in nominal spending and linear updating implied by the signal-extraction problem, I
can establish Proposition 2.
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Proposition 2 Assuming random-walk processes for nominal spending and complete asset
markets (CM), the real exchange rate follows an AR(1) process
qt = νqt−1 + (2α− 1)ν(ut − u∗t )
where ϕ ≡ (1+ψ)+4α(1−α)(ω−1)γ+ψ , 1 − ν = ϕ × κ1 + (1 − ϕ) × κ2 ∈ (0, 1), and κ1, κ2 are the
non-zero elements of the Kalman gains matrix. The autocorrelation and variance of the real
exchange rate are
ρQˆ = ν σ
2
Qˆ = (2α− 1)2
(
ν
1− ν
)2
(σ2u + σ
2
u∗)
Proof. In Appendix A.2.
Proposition 2 shows that, under the above assumptions, the real exchange rate follows an
AR(1) process. The Proposition highlights how its persistence, ν, depends on the relevant
degree of strategic complementarity, ϕ, and the precision of the signals that determine the
weights κ1 and κ2 in the Kalman gain matrix. Larger noise and more strategic comple-
mentarity increase the persistence of the exchange rate. This is illustrated in Figure 1.2,
which depicts the iso-persistence of the real exchange rate as a function of ϕ and the inverse
signal-to-noise ratios σ˜2m/σ
2
m, assumed to be identical for mt and m
∗
t .
A lower ϕ indicates a higher degree of strategic complementarities, which means that
agents put a larger weight on their beliefs about others’ actions (and beliefs about others’
beliefs about others’ actions) relative to their own belief about the current state of nominal
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demand. This implies that higher-order beliefs receive a higher weight than lower-order
beliefs. With high-order beliefs moving more sluggishly than low-order beliefs9, prices adjust
more sluggishly, which in turn implies slower movements in the real exchange rate following
a money shock. Additionally, when the relative precision of the signal falls (σ˜2m/σ
2
m ↓),
agents will weight their prior more than their signals, failing to change prices and only
slowly updating their beliefs when monetary shocks hit the economy. While the shock
immediately affects the nominal exchange rate, the slow movement in prices again triggers
slow reversion of the real exchange rate to purchasing-power parity.
Finally, notice from Propositions 2 that the a higher ν not only affects the persistence of
the exchange rate, but also its volatility. To understand this, consider the response of prices
when a monetary shock hits the Home economy. The higher the value of ν, the smaller the
adjustment of home prices at the impact of the shock, for the same reasons discussed above.
The small impact response of prices drives the amplification of monetary shocks onto the
real exchange rate.
1.4 Model Solution
Models with dispersed information and strategic interactions are hard to solve because they
feature the “infinite regress” problem in which agents are required to forecast the forecast
of others, which results in an infinite dimensional state space (Townsend, 1983). A number
of approaches have been developed to solve this class of models. A numerical approach
9See Woodford (2002) or Melosi (2014) for further explanation and graphical examples.
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consists of guessing and verifying the laws of motion for the vector of higher-order beliefs.
Since this vector is infinite-dimensional, in practice it is truncated at a sufficiently high
order.10 Another approach—used, for instance, in Lorenzoni (2009) and which will be used
in some extensions below—uses a truncation in the time dimension.
In some cases, one can exploit the fact that only a particular weighted average of higher-
order expectations matters for the solution of the model (Woodford, 2002; Melosi, 2014).
The advantage of this approach is that the state vector has a finite dimension and there is
no need to truncate it. The model developed here meets the conditions for the applicability
of this method. By looking at equations (1.22) and (1.24), it is clear that determining
the dynamics of ϕ
∑∞
k=1(1 − ϕ)k−1E¯(k)t xDt and ξ
∑∞
k=1(1 − ξ)k−1E¯(k)t xDt for x = a,m is
sufficient to determine the endogenous prices pHt and p
∗
Ft. In turn, one can use these
two variables together with the nominal exchange rate to solve for the rest of the model.
Hence, to solve the model I guess that the state of the system includes the exogenous
state variables plus the two specific weighted averages of high-order expectations implied
by equations (1.22) and (1.24). In particular, I define Fξ,t ≡ ξ
∑∞
k=1(1− ξ)X(k)t and Fϕ,t ≡
ϕ
∑∞
k=1(1− ϕ)X(k)t where Xt = [mt,mt−1,m∗t ,m∗t−1, at, a∗t ]′ is the vector of exogenous state
variables. X
(k)
t is shorthand notations for E¯
(k)
t Xt. The transition equation for the model
can be shown to be
X¯t = B¯X¯t−1 + b¯ut (1.33)
10For an example, see Nimark (2011).
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where
X¯t =

Xt
Fξ,t
Fϕ,t
 B¯ =

B6×6 0 0
Γξ,x6×6 Γ
ξ,ξ
6×6 0
Γϕ,x6×6 0 Γ
ϕ,ϕ
6×6
 b¯ =

b6×4
Γξ,u6×4
Γϕ,u6×4
 ut =

umt
um
∗
t
uat
ua
∗
t

Equation (1.33) is the state transition equation of the system. Firms in the model use
the observation equation (1.15) and its foreign counterpart to form expectations about
the state vector. The zeros in the B¯ matrix reflect the fact that in this model, “sums”
variables evolve independently of “differences” variables. The matrices B and b are given
by the exogenous processes for monetary policy, whereas matrices Γ are to be determined
by solving the signal-extraction problem of the firms using the Kalman filter. One can
show that these matrices are functions of the parameters of the model and the Kalman
gain matrix associated with the firms’ signal-extraction problem. The algorithm used in
Woodford (2002) can be easily extended to solve this model.
1.5 Impulse Responses
In this section I study the properties of the model in the more general case in which monetary
processes can be autocorrelated (ρm 6= 0) and the economies are also hit by technology
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shocks.11
1.5.1 Monetary Shocks
Figure 1.3 shows the impulse responses of key variables to a positive monetary shock in the
home country for a value of ρm = 0.5 and different signal-to-noise ratios. Prices for goods
produced in the home country increase, but—because price adjustment is incomplete with
imperfect information—domestic output also rises. Foreign output falls because, according
to the parameterization used, home and foreign goods are net substitute. Consumption rises
in both countries, more so in Home given the presence of home bias. The nominal exchange
rate (not shown) depreciates as a result of the monetary expansion. The difference between
home and foreign goods’ prices rises by less than the nominal exchange rate, resulting in a
worsening (upward movement) of the terms of trade. The real exchange rate depreciates, as
it is proportional to the terms of trade. Finally, domestic inflation rises as the prices of both
home goods and foreign goods rise in domestic currency. Conversely, foreign inflation falls,
as foreign goods’ prices are unchanged, and home goods’ prices fall in domestic currency.
The introduction of persistent monetary shocks results in hump-shaped responses for most
key macro variables, including the real exchange rate. The hump in the response of the real
exchange rate is consistent with the empirical literature (Steinsson, 2008). Interestingly, do-
mestic producer-price inflation displays a hump for persistent monetary shocks. Hence, this
model is consistent with the inertial behavior of inflation observed in the data(Christiano,
11In this section, the model is parameterized using the calibration and prior means described in Section
1.6.2, unless otherwise noted.
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Eichenbaum, and Evans, 2005).
An increase in private signal noise delivers more volatility and persistence in the exchange
rate. The intuition for this result is the same as that highlighted in the previous section,
whereby with noisy signals, firms put little weight on new information and adjust prices
very slowly. Figure 1.4 shows that higher strategic complementarity also contributes to
increased volatility and persistence in the exchange rate, as it increases the weight put on
other firms’ beliefs in price-setting decisions.
1.5.2 Technology Shocks
Figure 1.5 shows the impulse responses to a home technology shock with persistence ρa =
0.95 for different signal-to-noise ratios. A home technology shock raises domestic output
and lowers the prices of home-produced goods. The shock is transmitted internationally
via a depreciation of the real exchange rate. Consumption rises in both countries but more
markedly in the home country. Varying the signal-to-noise ratio, we observe that more noise
tends to dampen the effect of technology shocks, although it contributes to somewhat higher
persistence. The intuition behind these result relies on the fact that in this model, output
can rise in response to technology shocks only if prices fall, because nominal expenditure is
fixed by the levels of money supplies.12 When signals are more precise firms change prices
quickly and output can rise substantially. When signals are noisier, firms fail to lower prices
enough, and therefore output increases by a smaller amount.
12This corresponds to the case in which monetary authorities do not accommodate technology shocks.
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An interesting feature of this model compared to a sticky-price model a` la Calvo is that
it potentially allows for slow responses to nominal shocks and quicker responses to supply
shocks if technology shocks are observed with relatively high precision. A sticky-price model
would instead imply a more similar speed of adjustments to different shocks, governed by
a single parameter: the exogenous probability of resetting prices.
1.6 Empirical Analysis
This section contains the econometric analysis that evaluates whether the dispersed-information
model can account for the empirical properties of the Euro Area/Dollar real exchange rate.
The analysis will proceed as follows. First, I will estimate the model parameters using
Bayesian techniques. The estimation will help me pin down values for the parameters of
the model, in particular the signal-to-noise ratios, for which empirical micro evidence is
scarce. I will then use the estimated model to test how well it captures the dynamics of the
real exchange rate.
1.6.1 Data and Empirical Strategy
I estimate the parameters of the dispersed-information model using data on the US and
Euro Area. The US data comes the FRED database, while the European data comes
from the Area Wide Model database.13 I use the time series of the growth rate of GDP
and GDP deflators that I map to the variables [ΠHt ,Π
F
t ,∆Y
H
t ,∆Y
F
t ] in the model, where
13I am grateful to my advisor, Susanto Basu, for granting me access to the Euro Area data.
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ΠHt =
PHt
PH,t−1 and Π
F
t =
P ∗Ft
P ∗F,t−1
. For the US, I construct GDP growth by taking the log-
difference of real GDP (GDPC96 ) divided by the civilian non institutional population over
16 (CNP16OV ). The growth rate of the GDP deflator is the log-difference of GDPDEF.
For the Euro Area, I take the log difference of the real GDP (YER) divided by population.
Population data for the 17 countries in the Euro Area, consistent with the GDP series, is
taken from the OECD database.14 The sample period goes from 1971:I to 2011:IV. All
series are demeaned to be consistent with the model. The US is considered to be the home
country. Before estimation the model is stationarized (details are in Appendix A.3).
My empirical strategy is as follows. I estimate the parameters of the dispersed-information
model using data on real GDP and GDP deflators for the US and the Euro Area. Using
these four observables allows me to pin down the key parameters of the model, including the
signal-to-noise ratios related to monetary and technology shocks, for which there is scarce
micro evidence. Given the estimated parameters, I subsequently test whether the dispersed
information model is quantitatively able to generate the volatility and persistence observed
in the Euro/Dollar real exchange rate. This empirical strategy is analogous in spirit to the
common practice of calibrating a model to fit certain moments (in this case, the moments
of real GDP growth and GDP-deflator inflation rates included in the likelihood function)
and testing how well the model reproduces other moments in the data (here, the moments
of the real exchange rate). This setup effectively allows me to conduct an out-of-sample
test on the real exchange rate, as none of its moments were directly used in the estimation
14Population data are available only at annual frequency. I use linear interpolation to obtain the quarterly
frequency.
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of the model parameters.
It is important to notice that the four series used in the estimation contain very little
information about the real exchange rate. First, the real exchange rate in the data is
constructed using CPIs rather than GDP deflators. The regressions reported in Table 1.2
show that the four series used in the estimation explain at most 17% of the variation in the
real exchange rate. Second, most of the variation in the real exchange rate in the data comes
from movements in the nominal exchange rate, which has not been used in the estimation.15
1.6.2 Fixing Parameters and Priors
I fix the values of the parameters that are not well identified in the estimation process.
Specifically, I set home bias α = 0.9 to match the average import-to-GDP ratio for the US
over the sample. The parameter γ is set to 7 following Mankiw and Reis (2010), which
implies a steady-state markup of 16.7%. Finally, I set σ to 4, a slightly lower value than
Steinsson (2008). The calibration is summarized in Table 3.1. I estimate the rest of the
parameters.16
The prior distributions for the estimated parameters are summarized in Table 1.3. The
priors for the standard deviation of shocks and noise terms follow Melosi (2014). There
is no clear evidence on the value of the trade elasticity ω, although macro studies usually
point toward low values.17 The prior mean is set to one. The parameter ξ = 1+ψγ+ψ is related
to strategic complementarities, and its prior mean is set to 0.4, implying a prior mean for
15Regressing the real exchange rate on the nominal exchange rate alone produces an R2 of 91%.
16The discount factor β does not appear in any linearized model equation.
17See Corsetti, Dedola, and Leduc (2008) for a discussion.
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ψ of 3. The persistence parameters for technology shocks are centered at 0.86 whereas the
persistence for monetary shocks is set at 0.5—although for these parameters, I let the data
guide the estimation by leaving priors fairly loose.
The model is estimated using Bayesian techniques, as explained in Herbst and Schorfheide
(2016). Specifically, I draw from the posterior distribution p(Θ|Y ), where Θ is the parameter
vector and Y the data, using a standard random walk Metropolis-Hasting algorithm. The
variance-covariance matrix of the proposal distribution, Σ, is set to the variance-covariance
matrix of the estimated parameters at the mode of the posterior distribution. I then draw
1,000,000 parameter vectors from the posterior distribution. With this procedure, I get an
acceptance rate of about 25%.
1.6.3 Posterior Distribution
In Table 1.4, I present the estimates for the benchmark economy. The table shows the
posterior median, together with a 90% posterior confidence band. The posterior of ξ is
relatively tight around 0.21, lower than the prior mean, suggesting that the data are in-
formative about this parameter. The posterior median for the persistence of technology
shocks in the two countries is 0.98, in line with many other studies. The persistence of
money growth processes is 0.45 for the US and 0.76 for the Euro Area. These values are
linked to the growth rate of nominal GDP over the sample period for the two countries.18
The median estimate for the trade elasticity ω is 0.49. While relatively low, this number
18Note that the observables ΠHt and ∆Y
H
t sum to the log of nominal GDP growth in the data and to ∆mt
in the model.
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is comparable to the estimates of other studies that use a likelihood approach on US and
Euro Area data. Lubik and Schorfheide (2006) estimate a trade elasticity of 0.43, while
Rabanal and Tuesta (2010)’s estimates are in the range of 0.16-0.94, depending on the
model specification. In the present context, low trade elasticity contributes to generating
strategic complementarity as discussed in Section 1.2.7.
The parameters that are most important for the present analysis are the signal-to-noise
ratios. For monetary or nominal demand shocks, the median estimates are σm/σ˜m = 0.08
and σ∗m/σ˜∗m = 0.07. For the technology shocks, σa/σ˜a = 0.57 and σa/σ˜a = 0.78. These
results indicate that firms are more informed about technology shocks than they are about
nominal demand shocks by a factor of seven. Melosi (2014), who estimates a closed-economy
model similar to the one used here, also finds that firms pay more attention to technology
than to nominal demand shocks, and shows that this is consistent with the predictions of a
rational inattention model (Sims, 2003), in which firms have to optimally choose how much
attention to allocate to the two types of shocks. In a posterior predictive check, Melosi
shows that the estimated signal-to-noise ratios are consistent with micro evidence on the
absolute sizes of price changes (Nakamura and Steinsson, 2008).
The presence of information frictions implies that firms do not generally set their price
equal to the profit-maximizing price, which is defined as the price a particular firm would
set if it had complete information. I further validate the estimates of the signal-to-noise
ratios by asking how much firms lose, in terms of profits, from being imperfectly informed.
Arguably, it would not be plausible to remain poorly informed about the state of the
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economy if that implied incurring large profit losses. In Appendix A.5, I show that the
estimated signal-to-noise ratios imply profit losses well below 1% of steady state revenues—
0.5% of steady state revenues for a US firm and 0.8% for a European firm. These profit
losses are small, and comparable in size to empirical estimates of the information cost of
price adjustment, which is 1.22% of a firm’s revenues according to the findings of Zbaracki
et al. (2004). The Appendix also shows that the losses in the dispersed-information model
are one order of magnitude smaller than the losses that would arise in a sticky-price model
a` la Calvo that generates similar real effects from monetary shocks.
1.6.4 How Well Does the Model Explain the Real Exchange Rate?
Here I test how well the estimated model captures the dynamics of the real exchange rate
observed in the data. The real exchange rate consists of the nominal exchange rate in U.S.
dollar per Euros, converted to the real exchange rate index by multiplying it by the Euro
area CPI (HICP) and dividing it by the U.S. CPI (CPIAUCSL). The “synthetic” US/Euro
nominal exchange rate prior to the launch of the Euro also comes from the the Area Wide
Model Database. As for the Bayesian estimation, the sample period runs from 1971:I to
2011:IV.
Following the empirical approach of Steinsson (2008) and Carvalho and Nechio (2011),
I calculate measures of persistence of the real exchange rate based on the estimates of an
36
Chapter 1 Information Frictions and Real Exchange Rate Dynamics
AR(p) process of the form.
qt = µ+ αqt−1 +
p∑
j=1
ψj∆qt−j + t (1.34)
where I calculate median unbiased estimates of µ, α, and ψ’s using the grid-bootstrap
method described by Hansen (1999). I set p = 5.
The first three columns of Table 1.5 report several measures of persistence and volatility
of the real exchange rate. In the top part of the table, I compute the half-life (HL), up-life
(UP), and quarter-life (QL) following a unitary impulse response. The half-life is defined as
the largest T such that the impulse response IR(T −1) > 0.5 and IR(T ) < 0.5. The up-life
and quarter-life are defined similarly, but with thresholds 1 and 0.25, respectively. All these
measures are useful in capturing the non monotonically decaying shape of the exchange rate
impulse response. I also consider the more traditional measures of persistence, such as the
sum of autoregressive coefficients (captured by α) and the autocorrelation of the HP-filtered
exchange rate. All the statistics are reported in years. The second part of Table 1.5 reports
measures of volatility and cross-correlation of the real exchange rate.
We can analyze the persistence of the real exchange rate by looking at its response to a
unitary impulse, depicted with a black line in Figure 1.6. The response displays a typical
hump-shaped behavior, peaking in the second quarter at about 1.3 and not falling below
the initial impulse—the up-life—for 9 quarters. The half-life of the exchange rate, the
most commonly used measure of persistence, is about 4.4 years, which is well in line with
37
Chapter 1 Information Frictions and Real Exchange Rate Dynamics
previous evidence. Finally, the quarter-life of the exchange rate is 6.7 years, which implies
that the time the exchange rate spends below one half of the initial response but above
one quarter of it is 2.3 years, suggesting a moderate acceleration in the rate of decay when
short-run dynamics start to die out. These findings are well in line with empirical evidence
from other countries (Steinsson, 2008), and point to the presence of a hump shape in the
impulse response of the exchange rate also for the US and Euro Area as well. Moreover,
Table 1.5 highlights that the real exchange rate is extremely volatile: 5.8 times as volatile
as consumption and 4.8 times as volatile as output. Finally, the correlation between the
real and nominal exchange rate is 0.99.
To assess the empirical success of the dispersed-information model, I use the following
algorithm to compute statistics that are comparable with the data:
• Step 1: Draw a parameter vector from p(Θ|Y ).
• Step 2: Simulate the dispersed-information model for n periods and discard the initial
n/2 observations. n is chosen such that n/2 is equal to the length of the actual data.
• Step 3: Estimate equation (1.34) on the simulated data and compute the relevant
statistics.
I repeat the procedure for 10,000 iterations and consider the 90% posterior band. The last
three columns of Table 1.5 report the results from the model.
The table shows that the model is notably successful in matching the moments from the
data, even though its parameters were not estimated by targeting these moments. The
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model predicts a median half-life of 5.17 years, which is close to the 4.38 years observed in
the data. The model implies a ratio of up-life to half-life that is somewhat larger than in the
data. Similar to what is found in the data, the rate of decay of the exchange rate moderately
accelerates in later periods, as can be seen in the difference between the half-life and the
quarter-life. Finally, the autocorrelation of the HP filtered exchange rate is also in line with
the empirical results. Figure 1.6 displays these results visually by superimposing the impulse
responses from the model and the data. While the model implies a slightly more pronounced
hump in the early quarters after the impulse, the dynamics farther out from the initial
impulse tend to be quite similar to the data. The simulated real exchange rates also exhibit
the high volatility and the strong correlation with the nominal exchange rate observed
in the data. Overall, the estimated dispersed-information model successfully replicates
the observed real exchange rate dynamics. These results are noteworthy, considering that
the model parameters were not pinned down to match the empirical moments of the real
exchange rate and that they imply reasonably small profit losses from limited attention.
1.6.5 Monetary Shocks and Persistent Real Exchange Rates
The previous section showed how the dispersed-information model, driven by monetary
shocks and technology shocks, is able to capture the large and persistent fluctuations in
real exchange rates. These are statements about the unconditional moments of the real
exchange rate. Two interesting questions that remain open are the following: does the
estimated model deliver persistent responses of the real exchange rate following monetary
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shocks alone? And are these dynamics consistent with the observed behavior of the real
exchange rate, conditional on monetary shocks?
To address the first question, I simulate the model at the median estimates under the
assumption that all fluctuations are due to monetary shocks. The corresponding properties
of the real exchange rate are reported in the last column of Table 1.5. The table shows
that the implied volatility of the real exchange rate, relative to consumption and output,
is similar to the the data. Additionally, the model still generates highly persistent real
exchange rate dynamics. The half-life of the exchange rate falls only to 4.13 from 5.17
years when both monetary shocks are productivity shocks were present. A half-life of 4.13
years is very well in line with the observed half life of 4.38 years. These results suggest
that monetary shocks in the dispersed information model are able to generate empirically
relevant volatility and persistence in real exchange rate dynamics.
I proceed to examine how the real exchange rate responds to monetary shocks in the data.
A vast literature attempts to identify the effects of monetary shocks on real exchange rates
(e.g., Clarida and Gali, 1994; Rogers, 1999; Eichenbaum and Evans, 1995). The literature
highlights the difficulty of the task. Following the empirical macro literature, I identity a
monetary shock in the data by means of a structural VAR.
I estimate a two-variable VAR using the real exchange rate and the CPI differential
between the US and the Euro Area. Specifically, the variables are collected in the vector
Xt = [∆ lnRERt,∆(lnCPI
US
t − lnCPIEUt )].To identify the monetary shock in the VAR,
I use the restriction that monetary shocks have no long-run effects on the real exchange
40
Chapter 1 Information Frictions and Real Exchange Rate Dynamics
rate (e.g., Blanchard and Quah, 1989). This identification scheme is consistent with the
dispersed-information model. In keeping with the Bayesian spirit of the paper, I follow Sims
and Zha (1998) in specifying the prior distribution for the VAR parameters. I obtain 10,000
posterior draws using the Gibbs sampler.
Figure 1.7 reports the impulse response of the level of the real exchange rate to a monetary
shock from the estimated VAR, along with the median impulse response to a home monetary
shock in the dispersed-information model.
The impulse response from the VAR highlights the fact that monetary shocks have per-
sistent effects on the real exchange rate. The real exchange rate peaks two quarters after
the impulse, displaying hump shaped dynamics, like in the unconditional dynamics. The
dispersed information model does really well in capturing these dynamics, as well as the
size of the response. The response from the model peaks three quarters after the impulse
and then decays at a slightly slower rate compared to the data, but well within the 70%
posterior credible set. Again, it should be noted that the parameters in the model were
estimated without any reference to real exchange rates.
1.6.6 Business-cycle Moments
To understand how the model performs along other dimensions of the international business
cycle, this subsection presents results for several business-cycle statistics commonly analyzed
in the literature. Table 1.6 reports the business-cycle moments obtained from the dispersed
information model and compares them with the analogous statistics obtained from the data.
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For the data, the statistics are based on logged and HP-filtered quarterly data for the period
1971:I to 2011:IV. For the model economy, I simulate time series of 158 quarters from the
model and HP-filter the simulated data. In the Table, I report the average statistics across
200 replications.
The table shows that the model produces reasonable results along most of the business-
cycle dimensions considered. In terms of volatilities, as in the data, the model predicts that
consumption is less volatile than GDP. The model also accurately predicts that nominal
exchange rates are more volatile than real exchange rates, which are in turn more volatile
than the foreign versus domestic price ratio. This is a considerable improvement relative to
the sticky-price model of Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2002), in which the price ratio is
much more volatile than in the data. The model also predicts quite volatile net exports.
As to the autocorrelations, the model generates considerable persistence in most of the
variables considered, delivering long-lasting dynamics not only in prices but also in quanti-
ties such as real GDP, consumption, and net exports, although not so much for employment.
In this respect, the dispersed-information model is more successful than the sticky-price
model developed by Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2002), which does not generate quite
as much persistence in output and consumption.
The model reproduces the positive correlation between home and foreign consumption,
output, and employment observed in the data. In terms of the constitutive “pieces” of
the real exchange rate, the model also predicts reasonably well the negative correlations
between real exchange rate and price ratio, and between nominal exchange rate and price
42
Chapter 1 Information Frictions and Real Exchange Rate Dynamics
ratio, in addition to the already noted strong positive correlation between nominal and real
exchange rates.
There are a few limitations to the model’s predictions, which relate to some of the as-
sumptions made in order to keep the model tractable enough to be estimated. The model
predicts a strong positive correlation between real exchange rates and relative consumption,
which is at odds with the data. This discrepancy is expected, given our assumption of com-
plete asset markets and the results of Backus and Smith (1993). Given the low estimate
for the trade elasticity, the findings of Corsetti, Dedola, and Leduc (2008) suggest that as-
suming incomplete international asset markets is likely to significantly reduce the positive
correlation in the model. As commonly found in international real business-cycle models
and in contrast to the data, Home and Foreign GDPs exhibit lower cross-correlations than
consumptions.19 Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2002) show that this issue can be addressed
by assuming that monetary shocks are correlated across countries.
Finally, the model predicts a pro-cyclical trade balance, while in the data it is counter-
cyclical. This is also expected because of the absence of investment in the model. Indeed, by
simple national accounting, one can show that if consumption is less volatile than output, the
trade balance must be pro-cyclical.20 Introducing capital accumulation can ameliorate the
predictions of the model along this dimension, provided that consumption and investment
move in the right direction.21
19See, for instance Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1994) and Heathcote and Perri (2002).
20By national accounting in this model, C = Y −NX. Hence V ar(C) = V ar(Y )+V ar(NX)−2Cov(Y,NX),
which implies that if V ar(C) < V ar(Y ) then Cov(Y,NX) > 0.
21For a discussion of the matter, see Raffo (2010).
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1.7 Comparison with Sticky-price Model
A natural question that arises in evaluating the empirical success of the imperfect-information
model is how well it performs relative to a more traditional sticky-price model a` la Calvo
(1983). In this section I address the question in two ways. First, I estimate a model with
sticky prices a` la Calvo and compare its fit to the data relative to the dispersed-information
model. Second, I compare the sticky-price model’s ability to reproduce the observed real
exchange rate dynamics relative to the model with information frictions.
1.7.1 The Calvo Model
Households and monetary authorities are modeled in the same way as in the benchmark
economy. Firms can perfectly observe the current and past realization of shocks, but can
only reset their prices with a random probability 1 − θ. The derivations of the model
are standard and can be found, for instance, in Corsetti, Dedola, and Leduc (2010). The
dynamics of inflation can be described by the New Keynesian Phillips Curves:
piHt = κ
[
σψ + 1
γ + ψ
yH,t − 2(1− α)αψ(σω − 1)
γ + ψ
τt − 1 + ψ
γ + ψ
at
]
+ βEtpiHt+1 (1.35)
piFt = κ
[
σψ + 1
γ + ψ
yF,t +
2(1− α)αψ(σω − 1)
γ + ψ
τt − 1 + ψ
γ + ψ
a∗t
]
+ βEtpiFt+1 (1.36)
where piHt = pH,t − pH,t−1, piFt = p∗F,t − p∗F,t−1 and κ = (1−βθ)(1−θ)θ . These two equations
replace equations (1.22) and (1.24) of the dispersed-information model.
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1.7.2 Bayesian Model Comparison
In this section I take a Bayesian approach to compare the dispersed-information model and
the sticky-price model. I start by parameterizing the Calvo model. The parameters α,γ,
and σ are calibrated to the same values used in the benchmark model. The discount factor
β and the Calvo parameter θ cannot be identified separately in the estimation, as they both
enter the slope of the Phillips Curve in a non linear fashion. I calibrate the discount factor β
to 0.99. I estimate the parameter κ = (1−βθ)(1−θ)θ . I set the prior of κ such that the median
implies a value of the Calvo parameter θ = 0.69, and the 5th and 95th percentile imply
values for θ of approximately 0.5 and 0.90. This range broadly covers the micro and macro
estimates for the frequency of price adjustment. The prior for the remaining parameters
shared across models is the same as in Section 6. I report my estimates in Table 1.7, along
with the median estimates from the dispersed-information model.
The most remarkable difference in posterior estimates across the two models is the esti-
mated standard deviation of productivity shocks. The Calvo model estimates are 3 times
as large those of the benchmark model. Note that the latter estimates are consistent with a
standard real business cycle calibration of these shocks, while the Calvo estimates are much
larger (Kydland and Prescott, 1982). The median estimate for κ implies a value for the
Calvo parameter θ of 0.67, and that prices change every three quarters.
The Bayesian approach used in this paper allows me to compare how the dispersed-
information and the sticky-price frameworks fit the data overall by computing the posterior
probability of each model. I refer to the dispersed-information and the Calvo model with
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MDI and MC , respectively. I denote the parameter vector associated with each model as
ΘDI and ΘC , respectively. The posterior probability of modelMi with i ∈ {DI,C} is given
by
piT,Mi =
pi0,Mip(Y |Mi)∑
s∈{DI,C} pi0,Msp(Y |Ms)
where pi0,Ms is the prior probability of model Ms and Y denotes the dataset used in the
estimation. p(Y |Ms) =
∫ L(Θs|Y,Ms)p(Θs|Ms)dΘs is the marginal data density (MDD)
or marginal likelihood of model Ms, where L(·) is the likelihood function and p(Θs|Ms)
denotes the prior distribution for the parameter vector Θs. As is standard, the prior prob-
abilities, pi0,Ms , are assumed to be the same across models, that is, pi0,Ms = 1/2 for all
s ∈ {DI,C}. Therefore, the model that attains the largest posterior probability is the one
with the highest MDD.
The last row of Table 1.7 reports the log of the MDD for the two models. The compari-
son reveals that the dispersed-information model has a larger posterior probability than the
sticky-price model by 43.4 log points. This difference is sizable. It implies that the prior
probability ratio in favor of the Calvo model would need to be larger than 7.05e18 in order
for the Calvo model to attain a higher posterior probability than the dispersed-information
model. The fact that the Calvo model has fewer parameters than the dispersed-information
model is not worrisome, because the MDD penalizes models for the number of their pa-
rameters. These findings suggest that the model with information frictions is considerably
better suited for explaining the joint dynamics of US and Euro Area key macro variables
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than the sticky-price model.
1.7.3 Real Exchange Rate Statistics
Now I compare the models’ ability to reproduce the real exchange rate dynamics. I focus on
the ability of the two models to generate the volatility and the persistence of the exchange
rate. Table 1.9 presents statistics for the real exchange rate in the two models uncondition-
ally or conditionally on monetary shocks. Results reported are the median estimates from
200 simulations, using the same methodology described in Section 1.6.4. All statistics are
reported in years.
Comparing columns 2 and 4 reveals that the estimated Calvo model delivers both low
volatility and low persistence conditional on monetary shocks. The half-life of the real
exchange rate in the model is just above 2 years. These results provide additional support
for Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2002)’s claim that monetary shocks in sticky price model
cannot explain the persistence of the real exchange rate found in the data. While the models
considered differ in some assumptions, the result obtained by those authors in a calibration
exercise are qualitatively similar to the results obtained here, where the model is instead
estimated. Additionally, while the model is able to explain fairly well the volatility of the
exchange rate relative to output or consumption, it explains only about half of the absolute
volatility of the real exchange rate. Column 4 shows that the dispersed information model
is more successful in all these dimensions as already discussed in Section 1.6.4.
In column 3, we observe that when technology shocks are added to the picture, the sticky
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price model still delivers too little volatility in the real exchange rate, but now it generates
counterfactually high persistence. The half life of the exchange rate increases from 2.07
years with only monetary shocks to more than 10 years with both shocks. Hence, the
model predicts a half-life that is twice as large as that observed in the data. Additionally,
the median quarter-life is around 15 years, about 8 years longer than the quarter life observed
in the data. In contrast, column 5 shows that the dispersed-information model delivers a
half-life and quarter-life that are only marginally higher than with monetary shocks alone,
keeping the real exchange rate dynamics in line with the data. The dispersed-information
model also explains more than three quarters of the volatility observed in the data, compared
to the 56% explained by the Calvo model.
The difference in the performance of the two models comes from (i) the different size
of the estimated technology shocks in the two models and (ii) the different response to
technology shocks across model. To the first point, we have seen above that the Calvo
model estimates for technology shocks is 3 to 4 times larger than the estimates from the
dispersed-information model. Intuitively, this happens because the estimated Calvo models
requires large technology shocks to account for the volatility and persistence of output
and domestic price indices while the dispersed-information model relies more on monetary
shocks to explain that feature of the data.
The second point can be understood by examining the impulse-response function of the
real exchange rate to monetary and technology shocks in the two models. The left panels of
Figure 1.8 compare the response of the real exchange rate to a home monetary shock across
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the two models. For ease of comparison, the sizes of the shocks are set to the estimated
standard deviations for the dispersed-information model reported in Table 1.7. The panel
shows how the dispersed-information model delivers substantially more persistence from
these shocks and a much more pronounced hump shape. This different response explains
the difference between columns 2 and 4 of Table 1.9.
The right panels show the response of the exchange rate to productivity shocks. A few
results emerge. First, the impact response of the real exchange rate is larger in the model
with information friction than in the Calvo model. This happens because the presence of
sticky prices substantially dampens the effect of productivity in the Calvo model relative to
the efficient response. On the other hand, productivity shocks in the dispersed-information
model are observed relatively precisely by firms, making the response to these shocks look
more like an efficient response. Second, for similar reasons productivity shocks in the
Calvo model damp out more slowly relative to the dispersed-information model. One can
intuitively see from the picture that the half-life of these shocks is significantly greater in
the sticky-price model.
This last fact and the different sizes of estimated technology shocks in the two models
are responsible for the considerable difference in unconditional persistence found in the two
models in columns 3 and 5 of Table 1.9.
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1.7.4 Discussion
The results of this section highlight a number of differences between traditional sticky-
price models and models in which slow price adjustment is the endogenous response to
information frictions. First, estimation of the two models suggests that the dispersed-
information model fits the data on output and output deflators better than the sticky-price
model. The former also delivers estimates for the size of productivity shocks that are
consistent with real business-cycle calibrations of these shocks. The sticky-price model
instead requires substantially larger productivity shocks to explain the data.
Second, comparing the two models’ ability to reproduce the empirical properties of the
real exchange rates demonstrates the strength of the information-friction model relative to
frameworks that model the nominal rigidity exogenously. In this particular case, assuming
that prices can be reset with an exogenous probability irrespective of the shocks hitting the
economy limits the model’s ability to match the data. In the class of model with exoge-
nous nominal rigidities considered here, there is a trade-off between obtaining amplification
from nominal shocks and obtaining large effects from real shocks. This trade-off does not
necessarily arise in models with dispersed information of the kind considered here, in which
prices can respond differently to different kinds of shocks. Indeed the estimation results
from the model with information frictions pushes exactly in this direction when seeking to
fit the output and prices data, trying to obtain a slow response to monetary shock and a
quick response to real shocks. It turns out that that this feature is important when it comes
to predicting the real exchange rate.
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In contrast, the Calvo model delivers too little persistence with only monetary shocks and
too much persistence when both shocks are present. The result that monetary shocks cannot
explain the persistence of the real exchange rate is qualitatively reminiscent of the results
of Bergin and Feenstra (2001) and Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2002). Differently from
those, these findings are obtained in the context of an estimation exercise. The fact that
real shocks cannot explain jointly the volatility and persistence of the exchange rate is also
discussed in Iversen and So¨derstro¨m (2014) in the context of a calibrated two-country model.
There are modeling differences between the model considered here and theirs. Nonetheless,
both models produce the result that with low elasticity of substitution between home and
foreign goods, the presence of real shocks, while helping explain the volatility of the exchange
rate relative to output and consumption, exaggerates the up-life, half-life, and quarter-life
of the real exchange rate.
Taken together, these results suggest that the dispersed-information model outperforms
the sticky-price model not only in explaining domestic variables, such as domestic output
and prices, but it also better explains international price movements. I further validate this
point by including the real exchange rate series among the observables and re-estimating
both models. To accommodate the additional observable variable and avoid stochastic
singularity, I add a measurement error to the real exchange rate equation. With these mod-
ifications, the dispersed-information model and the Calvo model deliver MDDs of 2518.45
and 2479.02, respectively. The difference of about 40 log points is sizable and points to the
stronger ability of the model with information frictions to fit the data, consistently with
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other results in this section.
1.8 Sensitivity to Information Structure
In this section I investigate the role of the information structure in generating the persistence
of the real exchange rate. The assumptions that firms observe signals about aggregate
nominal demand and technology with finite precision is a simple way of capturing the idea
that there is a cost in acquiring and processing information. In this context, the lower the
cost of acquiring information, the higher the precision of the signals.
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that different signals may carry different information
about the variables that matter for firms’ decisions. In particular, the literature started by
Grossman (1976) and Hellwig (1980) stresses the idea that, under certain conditions, prices
may aggregate disparate information that different economic agents have. When making
optimal pricing decisions, an important variable for the firms in the model are the aggregate
price levels in the two countries. This can be seen from the first-order conditions (1.19) and
(1.20), which I repeat here for convenience:
pt(h) = Eht
[
(1− ξ)pHt + 2α(1− α)(ω − 1)
(γ + ψ)
tt + ξ(mt − at)
]
p∗t (f) = Eft
[
(1− ξ)p∗Ft −
2α(1− α)(ω − 1)
(γ + ψ)
tt + ξ(m∗t − a∗t )
]
These two equations make clear that a firm’s optimal price depends on its expectation about
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the aggregate price level for domestically produced goods and a measure of relative prices.
Here I entertain the hypothesis that firms observe signals about these prices. Specifically,
in addition to the four signals observed in the benchmark model, firms in both the Home
and Foreign country now have access to the following two signals:
zp
H
i,t = pH,t + xt + v
pH
i,t
zp
F
i,t = p
∗
F,t + xt + v
pF
i,t
for i = h, f . The signals about aggregate prices contain an aggregate noise component, xt,
and an idiosyncratic noise component vi,t. All the noise terms are iid, normally distributed
with mean zero and variances σ2x, σ˜
2
pH
and σ˜2
pF
, respectively. To assess the robustness of
my results, I re-estimate the model allowing for the presence of these two additional signals
and compare the real exchange rate between my benchmark model and this augmented
model. I use flat priors for the additional parameters so as to let the data entirely guide
the estimation.
It is worth noting that these new signals are endogenous, and they depend on equilib-
rium prices. This feature breaks the finite state-space representation of the model solution
described in Section 1.4. Hence, I adapt the solution method used in Lorenzoni (2009),
allowing it to handle two countries. The details of the algorithm are provided in the Ap-
pendix A.6. To solve the model, I write the state-space as the history of the time-t state
variables used in the firm’s inference problem: [mt,m
∗
t , at, a
∗
t , pH,t, p
∗
F,t] and I truncate it at
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t− T . I choose T sufficiently high, so that by increasing T the impulse response functions
of the model do not change.
Table 1.8 presents the posterior mode of the new estimates vis-a`-vis the benchmark
estimates. Most of the parameters that are common across the two model have similar
estimates in the two cases. The aggregate noise and the idiosyncratic noises have estimated
standard deviations of 25, 46, and 24, respectively. These values are larger then the standard
deviations of the signals about monetary shocks, indicating that the data favor the idea
that signals about aggregate prices are fairly noisy. The value of the posterior at the mode
changes only marginally, suggesting that this extended model is not significantly superior
in fitting the data relative to the benchmark model.
How does this affect the main results? Standard signal-extraction theory suggests that an
agent should optimally put little weight on more imprecise signals. Hence we can already
expect agents to put little weight on these new signals. Figure 1.9 shows the impulse re-
sponse of the real exchange rate in the benchmark model and in the model with endogenous
signals. There are only minor differences between the two, indicating that the dynamics of
the model are not quantitatively affected by the presence of endogenous signals on prices
once the model is re-estimated. Finally, Table 1.10 confirms these results by comparing the
up-life, half-life, and quarter-life of the exchange rate in the two versions of the model and
find no significant differences.
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1.9 Conclusion
Existing New-Keynesian models with sticky prices struggle to deliver the persistence in the
real exchange rate observed in the data under plausible nominal rigidities. In this paper,
I argue that the persistence of the real exchange rate, together with its other empirical
features, can be explained by a model with strategic complementarity and dispersed in-
formation among price-setting firms. In this environment, firms’ beliefs about economic
conditions and about other firms’ expectations become endogenous state variables that re-
sult in increased persistence in real exchange rates. Once taken to the data, the model is
shown to successfully explain the volatility and persistence of the real exchange rate. The
model also generates persistent real exchange rate dynamics following monetary shocks,
which is consistent with the empirical evidence documented by a structural VAR. Taken
together, my findings suggest that dispersed information is a quantitatively important chan-
nel for real exchange rate dynamics that should be taken into account in future research on
this topic.
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Table 1.1: Calibrated Parameters
Name Description Value
γ Elasticity of substitution between domestic goods 7
α Home bias 0.9
σ−1 Intertemporal elasticity of substitution 1/4
Table 1.2: Real Exchange Rate Predictability
∆RERt ∆RERt RERt RERt
∆RGDPUSt -0.471 -0.456 -2.616 -2.988
∗
(-1.00) (-1.00) (-1.73) (-2.00)
∆RGDPEUt 0.832 0.656 -1.579 -2.198
(1.39) (1.14) (-0.82) (-1.16)
∆DEFLUSt -1.455 -3.428
∗ 15.28∗∗∗ 6.523
(-1.40) (-2.53) (4.60) (1.47)
∆DEFLEUt 0.533 2.251
∗∗ -10.32∗∗∗ -9.872∗∗∗
(0.78) (2.68) (-4.69) (-3.59)
∆CPIUSt 2.737
∗∗∗ 7.591∗∗
(3.41) (2.88)
∆CPIEUt -2.735
∗∗ -0.216
(-3.13) (-0.08)
N 163 163 163 163
R2 0.025 0.121 0.173 0.216
Adj. R2 0.000 0.087 0.152 0.187
Notes : t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 1.3: Priors
Name Description Shape Median 0.05 0.95
ξ Strategic complementarity B 0.40 0.24 0.57
ω Trade elasticity N 1.00 0.5 1.5
ρa Persistence of technology shock (H) B 0.86 0.70 0.96
ρ∗a Persistence of technology shock (F) B 0.86 0.70 0.96
ρm Persistence of monetary shock (H) B 0.50 0.25 0.75
ρ∗m Persistence of monetary shock (F) B 0.50 0.25 0.75
100σa Std of technology shock (H) IG 0.68 0.53 0.92
100σ∗a Std of technology shock (F) IG 0.68 0.53 0.92
100σm Std of monetary shock (H) IG 1.80 0.60 6.03
100σ∗m Std of monetary shock (F) IG 1.80 0.60 6.03
σa/σ˜a Signal-to-noise — technology shock (H) NA 0.73 0.31 2.33
σ∗a/σ˜∗a Signal-to-noise — technology shock (F) NA 0.73 0.31 2.33
σm/σ˜m Signal-to-noise — monetary shock (H) NA 0.11 0.07 0.15
σ∗m/σ˜∗m Signal-to-noise — monetary shock (F) NA 0.11 0.07 0.15
Notes : The letters B,N , IG denote the beta, normal, and inverse gamma distributions. NA is
used for implied priors, which do not belong to any family of theoretical distributions.
Table 1.4: Posterior Estimates
Name Description Median 0.05 0.95
ξ Strategic complementarity 0.21 0.16 0.29
ω Trade elasticity 0.50 0.39 0.62
ρa Persistence of technology shock (H) 0.98 0.97 0.99
ρ∗a Persistence of technology shock (F) 0.98 0.97 0.99
ρm Persistence of monetary shock (H) 0.41 0.29 0.52
ρ∗m Persistence of monetary shock (F) 0.74 0.67 0.83
100σa Std of technology shock (H) 0.97 0.76 1.19
100σ∗a Std of technology shock (F) 0.71 0.58 0.85
100σm Std of monetary shock (H) 0.89 0.80 0.98
100σ∗m Std of monetary shock (F) 0.77 0.70 0.85
σa/σ˜a Signal-to-noise — technology shock (H) 0.51 0.42 0.75
σ∗a/σ˜∗a Signal-to-noise — technology shock (F) 0.97 0.61 1.01
σm/σ˜m Signal-to-noise — monetary shock (H) 0.11 0.05 0.12
σ∗m/σ˜∗m Signal-to-noise — monetary shock (F) 0.10 0.04 0.11
Notes : The table reports the median, the 5th, and 95th percentile of the estimates for
the parameters of the dispersed-information model.
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Table 1.5: Estimation Results
Data Model Model
Median 0.05 0.95 Median 0.05 0.95 Only M shocks
α 0.96 0.903 0.995 0.97 0.95 0.98 0.96
Half-life (HL) 4.38 2.05 38.54 5.17 3.68 7.43 4.13
Quarter-life (QL) 6.73 2.95 68.10 7.18 5.06 10.63 5.62
UL/UH 0.45 0.15 0.65 0.61 0.52 0.69 0.45
QL-HL 2.35 0.62 13.17 1.98 1.19 3.26 1.49
ρ(qhp) 0.84 0.75 0.87 0.89 0.87 0.92 0.89
σ(qhp)
σ(chp)
5.83 - - 4.24 3.71 4.76 4.13
σ(qhp)
σ(yhp)
4.83 - - 3.65 3.11 4.20 3.64
ρ(qhp, εhp) 0.99 - - 0.95 0.93 0.97 0.96
Notes : Half-life (HL): the largest T such that IR(T − 1) ≥ 0.5 and IR(T ) < 0.5. Quarter-life (QL):
the largest T such that IR(T − 1) ≥ 0.25 and IR(T ) < 0.25. Up-life (UL): the largest time T such that
IR(T − 1) ≥ 1 and IR(T ) < 1. ρ and σ correspond to first-order autocorrelation/cross-correlation and
standard deviation, respectively. Only M shocks refer to the model driven only by monetary shocks.
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Table 1.6: Business Cycle Statistics
Statistic Data Model
Standard deviations
relative to GDP
Consumption 0.82 0.86
Employment 0.89 1.17
Nominal Exchange Rate 4.94 4.54
Real Exchange Rate 4.73 3.55
Price Ratio 0.74 1.58
Net Exports 0.38 0.67
Autocorrelations
GDP 0.87 0.83
Consumption 0.88 0.84
Employment 0.94 0.75
Nominal Exchange Rate 0.84 0.87
Real Exchange Rate 0.83 0.87
Price Ratio 0.89 0.92
Net Exports 0.86 0.85
Cross-correlations
Home and Foreign GDP 0.52 0.10
Home and Foreign Consumption 0.36 0.57
Home and Foreign Employment 0.46 0.09
Net Exports and GDP -0.53 0.52
RER and GDP 0.09 0.57
RER and Net Exports 0.18 0.92
RER and Relative Consumption -0.14 1.00
Real and Nominal Exchange Rate 0.99 0.95
Nominal Exchange Rate and Price Ratio -0.36 -0.73
RER and Price Ratio -0.22 -0.50
Notes : With the exception of net exports, standard deviations and cor-
relations in the table are based on logged and HP-filtered US and Euro
Area data for the period 1971:I-2011:IV. Net exports are measured as
the HP-filtered ratio of real net exports to real GDP. Thus, the standard
deviation of net exports is simply the standard deviation of this ratio.
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Table 1.7: Posterior Estimates
Name Description DI Model Calvo Model
κ (1− βθ)(1− θ)/θ — 0.16
ξ Strategic complementarity 0.21 0.15
ω Trade elasticity 0.49 0.58
ρa Persistence of technology shock (H) 0.98 0.97
ρ∗a Persistence of technology shock (F) 0.98 0.96
ρm Persistence of monetary shock (H) 0.45 0.28
ρ∗m Persistence of monetary shock (F) 0.76 0.66
100σa Std of technology shock (H) 0.86 2.14
100σ∗a Std of technology shock (F) 0.81 2.62
100σm Std of monetary shock (H) 0.90 0.87
100σ∗m Std of monetary shock (F) 0.77 0.75
σa/σ˜a Signal-to-noise — technology shock (H) 0.57 —
σ∗a/σ˜∗a Signal-to-noise — technology shock (F) 0.78 —
σm/σ˜m Signal-to-noise — monetary shock (H) 0.08 —
σ∗m/σ˜∗m Signal-to-noise — monetary shock (F) 0.07 —
MDD Log Marginal Data Density 2461.9 2418.5
Notes : The table reports the median estimates for the parameters of the dispersed-information
(DI) model and the Calvo model.
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Table 1.8: Posterior Estimates Comparison
Name Description Benchmark Endo Signals
ω Trade elasticity 0.50 0.45
ρa Persistence of technology shock (H) 0.99 0.99
ρ∗a Persistence of technology shock (F) 0.99 0.99
ρm Persistence of monetary shock (H) 0.42 0.41
ρ∗m Persistence of monetary shock (F) 0.74 0.72
100σa Std of technology shock (H) 1.47 1.38
100σ∗a Std of technology shock (F) 1.06 1.11
100σm Std of monetary shock (H) 0.87 0.90
100σ∗m Std of monetary shock (F) 0.75 0.77
100σ˜a Std noise — technology shock (H) 2.45 2.38
100σ˜∗a Std noise — technology shock (F) 0.88 1.84
100σ˜m Std noise — monetary shock (H) 9.55 11.93
100σ˜∗m Std noise — monetary shock (F) 6.87 7.71
100σx Std of aggregate noise - 25.96
100σvH Std of idiosyncratic noise (H) - 46.49
100σvF Std of idiosyncratic noise (F) - 23.73
p(θ|Y ) Log Posterior at the Mode 2505.2 2510.7
Notes : The table reports the mode the parameters of the dispersed-information model
(Benchmark) and the model with endogenous signals (Endo Signals).
Table 1.9: Real Exchange Rate Statistics Comparison
Data Calvo Calvo DI DI
Only M Only M
Half-life (HL) 4.38 10.25 2.07 5.17 4.13
Up-life (UL) 1.99 5.15 0.97 3.05 2.56
Quarter-life (QL) 6.73 14.96 3.06 7.18 5.62
ρ(qhp) 0.84 0.86 0.81 0.89 0.89
100σ(qhp) 72.8 40.5 32.6 57.2 55.3
100σ(yhp) 15.7 12.8 10.0 15.5 15.4
100σ(chp) 13.0 10.5 8.2 13.5 13.4
Notes : DI refers the dispersed-information model. Only M refers to the
model driven only by monetary shocks.
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Table 1.10: Exchange Rate Persistence
Data Baseline Endogenous
Signals
α 0.96 0.97 0.97
Half-life (HL) 4.38 5.17 5.82
Up-life 1.99 3.06 3.26
Quarter-life (QL) 6.73 7.18 8.34
ρ(qhp) 0.84 0.89 0.88
σ(qhp)
σ(chp)
5.83 4.24 4.02
σ(qhp)
σ(yhp)
4.83 3.65 3.54
Log Posterior - 2505.2 2510.7
Notes : Half-life (HL): the largest T such that IR(T − 1) ≥ 0.5
and IR(T ) < 0.5. Quarter-life (QL): the largest T such that
IR(T − 1) ≥ 0.25 and IR(T ) < 0.25. Up-life (UL): the largest
time T such that IR(T − 1) ≥ 1 and IR(T ) < 1. ρ and σ cor-
respond to first-oder autocorrelation and standard deviation,
respectively.
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Figure 1.1: Dispersion in Beliefs
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Figure 1.2: Iso-persistence Curves of the Real Exchange Rate
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Figure 1.3: Impulse Responses to a Home Monetary Shock — ρ = 0.5
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the shock (σu).
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Figure 1.4: Imperfect Information and Strategic Complementarities
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Notes: The figure depicts the impulse responses of the real exchange rate to a Home mone-
tary shock for different values of noise in the signals (σv) relative to the standard deviation
of the shock (σu) and for different values of the strategic-complementarity parameter (1−ξ).
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Figure 1.5: Impulse Responses to a Home Technology Shock
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Figure 1.6: Response of the Real Exchange Rate in the Data and in the Model
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Notes: The black lines depict the median response and the associated 90% confidence band
of the exchange rate from the data. The blue lines represent analogous objects from the
simulated dispersed-information model, as explained in Section 1.6.4.
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Figure 1.7: Response to a Monetary Shock in the VAR and in the Model
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Notes: the black lines depict the median response of the exchange rate to a one standard
deviation Home monetary shocks in the model. The blue lines represent the median response
and the 70% credible set of the real exchange rate to a one standard deviation monetary
shock in the VAR.
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Figure 1.8: Impulse Responses of the Real Exchange Rate
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Notes: The figure depicts the response of the real exchange rate to the four structural
shocks. For all the panels, the shock sizes have been normalized to the median estimate of
the standard deviation from the dispersed-information model.
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Figure 1.9: Impulse Response Comparison with Endogenous Signals
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Notes: The figure depicts the response of the real exchange rate to the four structural
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signals. The impulse responses are simulated using the posterior mode of the parameter
estimates.
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Risk Aversion and the Financial
Accelerator
2.1 Introduction
According to Knight (1921), bearing risk is one of the defining features of entrepreneurship.
Entrepreneurs are inevitably exposed to non-diversified risk, which affects their willingness
to borrow and invest in risky projects. Nevertheless, the financial frictions literature has
paid little attention to how entrepreneurs’ desire to take on this risk affects their choices
in a general equilibrium setting. Indeed, business cycle models with credit market frictions
assume either no idiosyncratic risk (Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997), risk-neutral entrepreneurs
(Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist, 1999, BGG), or full diversification (Forlati and Lamber-
tini, 2011; Liu and Wang, 2014).
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The objective of this paper is to study how entrepreneurs’ attitudes towards undiversi-
fiable risk affect business cycles in a model with financial frictions. To this end, we gener-
alize the BGG framework to the case of entrepreneurs with constant-relative-risk-aversion
(CRRA) preferences, yet maintaining an analytically tractable, log-linear framework. No-
tably, our linearization does not result in certainty equivalence because our steady state,
while being deterministic in the aggregate sense, still features non-zero volatility of idiosyn-
cratic productivity. In the steady state of our model, every entrepreneur is still exposed to
significant idiosyncratic risk, which has a first-order effect.
Our main results are as follows. First, risk-averse borrowers choose a lower leverage in
steady state than their risk-neutral counterparts, ceteris paribus. Intuitively, risk-averse
agents try to reduce the volatility of their returns, which in the model is achieved by
cutting leverage. Second, in partial equilibrium, when entrepreneurs are risk averse, leverage
becomes more sensitive to fluctuations in excess returns to capital and to shocks to the
variance of idiosyncratic productivity — so called “risk shocks” following Christiano, Motto,
and Rostagno (2014). This finding is consistent with the results of Chen, Miao, and Wang
(2010), who study investment and financing decisions for entrepreneurial firms in a dynamic
capital structure model with incomplete markets. The higher sensitivity of leverage to excess
returns has important general equilibrium implications and tends to stabilize business cycle
fluctuations. Indeed, we find that the response of output to financial shocks such as risk
and wealth shocks is 60 to 70 percent smaller when entrepreneurs are risk-averse than
when they are risk-neutral. Finally, the responses of key macro variables to technology
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and monetary shocks are more similar for risk-averse and risk-neutral borrowers, although
about 20 percent smaller in the former case.1
In our framework, as well as in BGG, a risk shock increases defaults and the cost of
borrowing, inducing entrepreneurs to borrow less and to reduce their purchases of capital
goods. In general equilibrium, lower demand for capital depresses the price of capital,
triggering two additional effects. First, it generates the BGG financial accelerator: a lower
capital price reduces net worth, which lowers investment demand leading to further decreases
in the price of capital, net worth and demand for capital. Second, a low price of capital
increases the expected returns to capital because the price is expected to revert back up to
steady state. Higher expected returns tend to increase borrowing and investment demand.
Since the leverage chosen by risk-averse entrepreneurs is more sensitive to expected re-
turns to capital, this second effect tends to increase investment more when entrepreneurs
are risk averse relative to when they are risk neutral. Thus, even though the risk shock
causes borrowing to decrease in partial equilibrium, higher future returns to capital almost
entirely offset the fall in general equilibrium, when entrepreneurs are risk averse. With al-
most no change in credit, demand for capital does not fall as much. As a result, investment
and output decline much more moderately when entrepreneurs are risk averse compared to
when they are risk neutral. The effect of expected returns to capital on borrowing also ex-
plains the muted effects of wealth shocks for risk-averse entrepreneurs, as we discuss below.
1We find that the response of key macro variables to government spending shocks is very similar for risk-
averse and risk-neutral borrowers, although about 15% smaller in the risk-averse case. We do not report
these results in the simulations.
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Instead, the response of endogenous variables to technology and monetary shocks differs less
between the risk-averse and the risk-neutral case, since the credit channel described above
is not the primary channel of transmission for these shocks. However, as before, the credit
channel still delivers more amplification for risk-neutral vis-a`-vis risk-averse borrowers.
On the methodological side, we are the first to our knowledge to incorporate risk aversion
in a model of idiosyncratic, uninsurable risk such as BGG, while keeping the analytical
tractability of a log-linear framework. Modeling costly state verification problems with
risk-averse borrowers has several difficulties which we need to address. To begin with, the
optimal contract is no longer a debt contract, as for the case of risk neutrality (Townsend,
1979). Under a standard debt contract, in case of default the lender confiscates all the
net worth of the borrower. Such an arrangement is no longer optimal for the risk-averse
borrower because it would imply a zero-consumption scenario. We build on the results by
Gale and Hellwig (1985) and Tamayo (2014) in the costly state verification literature who
show that, in a static, partial-equilibrium setting, risk-averse entrepreneurs would offer a
different optimal contract to the lender. This contract ensures that the borrower retains
some of his net worth even in the case of default. We extend Tamayo’s financial contract
to a general equilibrium framework that features optimal history-independent loans with
predetermined returns for lenders.2
The second difficulty lies in the aggregation of individual histories in the presence of
2Precisely, we derive the optimal one-period contract with deterministic monitoring. For CSV in partial
equilibrium, the literature has also focused on dynamic contracts with deterministic monitoring (Wang,
2005), dynamic contracts with stochastic monitoring (Monnet and Quintin, 2005) and self-enforcing
stochastic monitoring (Cole, 2013).
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uninsurable idiosyncratic risk and non-linear preferences, whose combination implies that
every entrepreneur chooses a different leverage. This form of heterogeneity normally requires
giving up the traditional frameworks with a limited number of agents in favor of a more
computational approach, e.g., Krusell and Smith (1998). We instead allow entrepreneurs
to be risk-averse and make two assumptions that lead to identical leverage choices for
potentially different entrepreneurs. Specifically, we allow only newborn entrepreneurs to
work, so that labor income does not affect the financial decision of entrepreneurs. Moreover,
we assume that all net worth is reinvested in every period and entrepreneurs consume only in
the case of death, which occurs with an exogenous probability. These two assumptions keep
the aggregation of individual histories simple, and ensure, as in BGG, that only aggregate
net worth matters for the economy dynamics.
Our results contribute to the literature of costly state verification in DSGE models where
frictions arise because of information asymmetries. The CSV framework brings into the
business cycle picture the possibility of endogenous defaults, endogenous spreads and cross-
sectional variation among borrowers, therefore naturally accommodating questions regard-
ing risk.3 Recent applications include Chugh (2013), who studies risk shocks in a model
with costly state verification and finds that cross-sectional firm-level evidence provides little
empirical support for the presence of large risk shocks. On the other hand, Ferreira (2014)
identifies risk shocks using sign restrictions in a VAR and finds that these shocks explain
3Financial frictions can also be rationalized using other mechanisms. Recent examples with enforce-
ment/collateral constraints include Jermann and Quadrini (2012), Gertler and Karadi (2011), Gertler
and Kiyotaki (2010). House (2006) studies financial frictions in a model with adverse selection in the
spirit of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). For an excellent survey of the literature see Brunnermeier, Eisenbach,
and Sannikov (2012).
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a sizable portion of the fall in economic activity during the Great Recession. Dmitriev
and Hoddenbagh (2013) study risk shocks in a BGG model with optimal state-contingent
contracts and find that they have little effects. Martinez-Garcia (2014) finds that the BGG
model is producing too countercyclical and large spread between Baa corporate bond yield
and the 20-year Treasury bill rate since the Great Moderation. As we show below, the
presence of risk-averse entrepreneurs decreases the volatility of excess returns to capital,
suggesting that our model generates spreads dynamics more in line with the data. Finally,
in contrast with all these papers, risk shocks in our framework affect not only the cost of
lending by changing bankruptcy costs, but also the entrepreneur’s willingness to borrow.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 derives the static optimal contract in partial
equilibrium. Section 3 introduces aggregate risk and dynamics. Section 4 incorporates the
resulting contract into the general equilibrium framework. Section 5 contains our quantita-
tive analysis and results. Section 6 concludes.
2.2 Static Optimal Contract in Partial Equilibrium
In this section we study the optimal contract between a risk-averse borrower (the en-
trepreneur) and a risk-neutral lender. In the financial frictions literature popularized by
BGG, borrowers are assumed to be risk neutral and hence indifferent to aggregate or id-
iosyncratic risk. In the present context instead, the borrower is a risk-averse agent who
is subject to uninsurable risk. Lenders are risk-neutral with respect to the idiosyncratic
(i.e. entrepreneur-specific) risk because, as will be true in the general equilibrium model
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developed below, they can diversify their lending activity across a large number of projects.
The static contract between the lender and borrower follows the traditional CSV frame-
work and resembles the optimal contract developed by Tamayo (2014).4 Entrepreneurs
invest in a risky asset (capital) in the amount of QK, where K denotes the quantity of
capital purchased and Q its relative price. The return on the investment is QKRkω, where
Rk indicates aggregate returns to capital and log(ω) ∼ N (−12σ2ω, σ2ω) the idiosyncratic re-
turn component that is specific to the entrepreneur with pdf φ(ω). ω is independently
distributed across entrepreneurs. We assume that the lender cannot observe the realization
of the idiosyncratic shock to the entrepreneurs unless he pays monitoring costs µ which
are in fixed percentage of total assets. In each state of the world ω ∈ Ω, the risk-averse
entrepreneur chooses to report s(ω) and the report is verified in the verification set ΩV ⊂ Ω.
Following the literature, we assume that reports are always truthful so that s(ω) = ω for
all ω ∈ Ω, which implies that the repayment function depends only on ω.5
Definition 1 A contract under CSV is an amount of borrowed funds B, a repayment func-
tion R(ω) in the state of nature ω and a verification set ΩV , where the lender chooses to
verify the state of the world.
4For earlier treatments of the contracting problem see Townsend (1979) and Gale and Hellwig (1985).
5See Tamayo (2014) for details.
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The static problem in the presence of only idiosyncratic risk ω can be formulated as
max
K,R()
∫∞
0 [QKR
k(ω −R(ω))]1−ρφ(ω)dω
1− ρ (2.1)
BR ≤ QKRk
∫ ∞
0
R(ω)φ(ω)dω − µQKRk
∫
ω∈ΩV
ωφ(ω)dω (2.2)
QK = B +N (2.3)
0 ≤ R(ω) ≤ ω ∀ω (2.4)
The first equation is the expected utility of the entrepreneur from the investment return.
The second equation is a participation constraint for the lender; it says that he should be
paid on average the gross safe rate of return, R. The third equation just says that the
entrepreneur uses the loan (B) and his own net worth (N) for acquiring capital. The final
inequality constraint states that repayments should be non-negative and cannot exceed the
total value of assets. The following Proposition is a special case of Tamayo’s Theorem 1
case iii).
Proposition 3 Under the optimal contract that solves the problem (2.1) subject to (2.2),
(2.3), (2.4), the repayment function R(ω) can be written as that
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• ∃ ω¯ and ω, such that
R(ω) =

0 if ω < ω
ω − ω if ω ≤ ω ≤ ω¯
R¯ if ω > ω¯,where ω¯ ≥ R¯ ≥ ω¯ − ω
ΩV = [0, ω¯)
Proof See Appendix B.1.
The optimal contract is illustrated in Figure 2.1. When the lender monitors the borrower
(ω ≤ ω¯), he does not seize all assets. If the borrower’s returns are very small (ω < ω),
the lender receives no repayment; if the borrower is a little more successful (ω < ω < ω¯),
he keeps a fixed amount ω of resources, while the lender seizes the rest. As in Townsend
(1979)’s debt contract, when the borrower is not monitored, the lender receives a flat payoff.
The structure of the optimal contract in the defaulting region is the result of the borrower’s
attempt to smooth his return across different states of the world.6 Therefore, optimal risk
sharing requires that the borrower be initially prioritized in the repayment. At the same
time the lender is indifferent to the structure of the repayment function, as long as his net
payment covers the opportunity cost of his funds on average.
6Effectively, in the region ω ∈ (ω, ω¯) the borrower always receives ω.
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Figure 2.1: Optimal Contract With Risk-averse Entrepreneurs
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Corollary 1 When ρ→ 0 then ω → 0, R¯ → ω¯, so that the optimal contract replicates the
original BGG contract.
Corollary 1 states that when the borrower becomes risk-neutral, the optimal contract con-
verges to the debt contract of BGG. In this case the repayment function is completely
characterized by ω¯, as R¯ becomes equal to ω¯ and ω goes to zero. In other words, the
debt contract of BGG is a special case of the richer risk-sharing agreement described in
Proposition 1.
An interesting implication of Proposition 1 is that, notwithstanding the complexity of the
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problem under risk-aversion, the repayment function R(ω) is completely characterized by
the thresholds (ω, ω¯) and by the non-default repayment R¯. This allows us to reformulate
the contracting problem as follows:
L = max
ω¯,ω,R¯,κ,λ
(κRk)1−ρg(ω¯, ω, R¯)
1− ρ + λ
(
κRkh(ω¯, ω, R¯)− (κ− 1)R
)
where κ ≡ QKN , g(ω¯, ω, R¯) and h(ω¯, ω, R¯) are correspondingly:
g(ω¯, ω, R¯) =
∫ ω
0
ω1−ρφ(ω)dω + ω1−ρ
∫ ω¯
ω
φ(ω)dω +
∫ ∞
ω¯
(ω − R¯)1−ρφ(ω)dω (2.5)
h(ω¯, ω, R¯) = (1− µ)
∫ ω¯
ω
ωφ(ω)dω − ω
∫ ω¯
ω
φ(ω)dω + R¯
∫ ∞
ω¯
φ(ω)dω − µ
∫ ω
0
ωφ(ω)dω (2.6)
The optimal κ, ω¯, ω, R¯ are only functions of exogenous variables Rk, R and parameters
σω, µ. The first-order conditions for this problem are reported in Appendix B.1.
Figure 2.2 shows the relationship between the (annualized) discounted returns to capital
(Rk/R) and leverage κ. The relationship is positive as higher returns to capital lower
expected defaults, thereby reducing agency costs and allowing entrepreneurs to borrow
more. From the Figure we also see that for any given excess return to capital, as risk-
aversion increases, leverage decreases. This is what we should expect as, when risk aversion
rises, entrepreneurs will try to reduce the volatility of their returns by cutting leverage. In
other words, a precautionary motive arises that reduces the equilibrium leverage.
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Figure 2.2: Optimal Leverage
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2.3 Dynamic Optimal Contract in Partial Equilibrium With
Aggregate Risk
In this section we extend the contract to a dynamic setting where entrepreneurs maximize
their expected consumption path and returns to capital are subject to aggregate risk. For
the moment, aggregate returns to capital and the risk-free rate are still exogenous. We
largely use notation from Dmitriev and Hoddenbagh (2013).
At time t, the entrepreneur j purchases capital Kt(j) at a unit price of Qt, which he will
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rent to wholesale goods producers in the next period. The entrepreneur uses his net worth
Nt(j) and a loan Bt(j) from the representative lender to purchase capital:
QtKt(j) = Nt(j) +Bt(j). (2.7)
In period t + 1, entrepreneur j is hit with an idiosyncratic shock ωt+1(j) and an ag-
gregate shock Rkt+1, so that he is able to deliver QtKt(j)R
k
t+1ωt+1(j) units of assets. The
idiosyncratic shock ωt+1(j) is a log-normal random variable with distribution log(ωt+1(j)) ∼
N (−12σ2ω,t, σ2ω,t) so that the mean of ω is equal to 1.7 The realizations of ω are indepen-
dent across entrepreneurs and over time. When the realization of ωt+1(j) exceeds ω¯t+1 the
entrepreneur is able to repay the loan at the contractual rate Zt+1. That is,
BtZt+1 = QtKtR
k
t+1R¯t+1 (2.8)
Following BGG, we assume that entrepreneurs die with constant probability 1− γ. It is
well known, for instance from the work of Krusell and Smith (1998), that if agents are risk-
averse and subject to uninsurable idiosyncratic risk, there is no simple way of aggregating
individual histories and one would need to keep track of the wealth distribution of all
the entrepreneurs. Consider the case where entrepreneurs receive a wage income in every
period. In this case, different entrepreneurs would choose different leverages, depending
on their net worth. For example, entrepreneurs with a very low net worth would realize
7The timing is meant to capture the fact that the variance of ωt+1 is known at the time of the financial
arrangement, t.
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that, even in the case of very low idiosyncratic returns to capital, if they survive to the
next period, they would be able to make up for their losses with their wages. Given their
low net worth today, the variance of their net worth tomorrow is still pretty low even for a
high leverage, therefore it will be optimal to choose a high leverage. Consider instead an
entrepreneur with a very high net worth today. In case of a low idiosyncratic realization
tomorrow, he would lose almost all his wealth and end up consuming only his wage. This
entrepreneur will choose a lower leverage than the low-net-worth entrepreneur. The issue of
different leverages does not arise in BGG because entrepreneurs are risk-neutral and thus
are indifferent to the variance of their future wealth.
To resolve the aggregation problem, we assume that entrepreneurs work only in the first
period of their lives and that they consume all their net worth only upon the event of death.
If entrepreneurs survive they do not consume anything and reinvest all their proceeds. In
order to keep aggregate dynamics of net worth the same of BGG, we assume that in the
first period entrepreneurs provide 11−γ units of labor, so that total labor income is identical
in both models. Entrepreneur j’s value function is
V et (j) = (1− γ)
∞∑
s=1
γsEt
(Cet+s(j))
1−ρ
1− ρ (2.9)
where Cet+s(j) is the entrepreneur j’s consumption in case of his death,
Cet (j) = Nt(j) (2.10)
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defined as wealth accumulated from operating firms. The timeline for entrepreneurs is
plotted in Figure 2.3.
Figure 2.3: Timeline for Entrepreneurs
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The dynamic problem can be formulated recursively as follows:
max
Kt,R¯t+1,ω¯t+1,ωt+1
Et
[
(κtRk,t+1)
1−ρg(ω¯t+1, ωt+1, R¯t+1, σω,t)Ψt+1
1− ρ
]
(2.11)
s.t.Ψt = 1 + γEt
[
(κtRk,t+1)
1−ρg(ω¯t+1, ωt+1, R¯t+1, σω,t)Ψt+1
]
(2.12)
s.t.βκtRk,t+1h(ω¯t+1, ωt+1, R¯t+1, σω,t) = (κt − 1)Rt (2.13)
As in BGG, Rt is the safe rate known at time t. Lenders require to be paid Rt on average,
which implies that the contract must specify a triplet {ωt+1, ω¯t+1, R¯t+1} contingent on
Rkt+1.
8 This assumption about the repayment to the lenders makes entrepreneurs effectively
bear the aggregate risk. The following Proposition summarizes the solution to the dynamic
contracting problem.
8Later in the general equilibrium model Rt will be equal to the inverse of the household’s stochastic factor.
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Proposition 4 Solving problem (2.11)-(2.13) and log-linearizing the solution gives the fol-
lowing relationship between leverage and the expected discounted return to capital
κˆt = νp(EtRˆkt+1 −Rt) (2.14)
where νp > 0. Moreover, when the standard deviation of idiosyncratic productivity varies
over time, the relationship becomes
κˆt = νp(EtRˆkt+1 −Rt) + νσσˆω,t (2.15)
with νσ < 0.
Proof Equations (2.14) and (2.15) are obtained in Appendix B.2.
Following our assumptions about entrepreneurial wage and consumption, all entrepreneurs
choose the same leverage regardless of their net worth, so that aggregate leverage κt will
simply be equal to the leverage chosen by each entrepreneur. Moreover, to a first-order
approximation, the complex financial agreement between borrowers and lenders boils down
to the single equation (2.14) that links leverage to the expected excess return or the capital
wedge. Note that equation (2.14) is identical in form to the one in BGG (equation (4.17)
in their paper). The presence of risk-aversion only changes the elasticity of leverage to the
excess returns νp and to the volatility of idiosyncratic productivity νσ, if σω is allowed to
change over time. In this sense, our framework fully nests the BGG framework, and this is
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what allows us to compare the two models in a meaningful way.
When borrowers are risk averse (ρ > 0) the values of the elasticities νp and νσ will be
different from the risk-neutral case. For all the calibrations that we considered we have that
∂νp
∂ρ
> 0
∣∣∣∂νσ
∂ρ
∣∣∣ > 0
To understand this result it is useful to think about how ρ affects steady-state leverage
and marginal monitoring costs. Marginal monitoring costs represent the marginal cost of
increasing leverage and, importantly, they are a convex function of leverage itself. There-
fore, when leverage is lower, marginal monitoring costs are also lower and less sensitive to
leverage. An increase in risk aversion reduces steady-state leverage, as explained in Section
2.2. Lower leverage means that the steady state is in a region where marginal monitoring
costs are flatter relative to the risk neutral case. Hence, the response of κt to a given change
in excess returns to capital (νp) will be larger when steady state leverage is lower because
in that region marginal monitoring costs are less sensitive to changes in κt.
Proposition 2 indicates that, for a given change in prices, leverage is more volatile when
entrepreneurs are risk averse. If leverage varies more also in general equilibrium we might
expect investment and output to be more volatile, so that risk aversion would constitute
an additional channel of amplification of shocks through the financial accelerator. However,
in general equilibrium, excess returns to capital adjust endogenously to changes in the
economic environment and it might well be that this adjustment acts as a stabilizer rather
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than as an amplifier of shocks. Hence, we proceed with the analysis by embedding the
optimal contract just derived in the BGG general-equilibrium framework. This allows us to
study the effect of the financial accelerator with risk-averse entrepreneurs when expected
discounted returns to capital are determined endogenously.
2.4 The Model in General Equilibrium
We now embed our partial equilibrium framework in a standard dynamic New Keynesian
model, where returns to capital and returns to lenders are determined endogenously. There
are six agents in our model: households, entrepreneurs, financial intermediaries, capital
producers, wholesalers and retailers.
2.4.1 Households
The representative household maximizes its utility by choosing the optimal path of con-
sumption, labor and money
maxEt
{ ∞∑
s=0
βs
[
C1−σt+s
1− σ − χ
H1+ηt+s
1 + η
]}
, (2.16)
where Ct is household consumption, and Ht is household labor effort. The budget constraint
of the representative household is
Ct = WtHt − Tt + Πt +Rt−1Dt −Dt+1 +Rnt−1
Bt
Pt
− Bt+1
Pt
(2.17)
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where Wt is the real wage, Tt is lump-sum taxes, Πt is lump-sum profits received from final
goods firms owed by the household, Dt are deposits in financial intermediaries (banks) that
pay a real non-contingent gross interest rate Rt−1 and Bt are nominal bonds that pay a
gross non-contingent interest rate Rnt−1.
Households maximize their utility (2.16) subject to the budget constraint (2.17) with
respect to consumption, labor, bonds, and deposits, yielding the following first order con-
ditions:
C−σt = βEt
{
C−σt+1
}
Rt, (2.18)
C−σt = βR
n
t Et
{
C−σt+1
pit+1
}
(2.19)
WtC
−σ
t = χH
η
t . (2.20)
We define the gross rate of inflation as pit+1 = Pt+1/Pt.
2.4.2 Retailers
The final consumption good consists of a basket of intermediate retail goods, which are
aggregated together in a CES fashion by the representative household:
Ct =
(∫ 1
0
c
ε−1
ε
it di
) ε
ε−1
. (2.21)
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The demand for retailer i’s unique variety is
cit =
(
pit
Pt
)−ε
Ct, (2.22)
where pit is the price charged by retail firm i. The aggregate price index is defined as
Pt =
(∫ 1
0
p1−εit
) 1
1−ε
. (2.23)
Retailers costlessly differentiate the wholesale goods and sell them to households at a
markup over marginal cost. They have price-setting power and are subject to Calvo (1983)
price rigidities. With probability 1−θ each retailer is able to change its price in a particular
period t. Retailer i maximizes the following stream of real profits:
max
p∗it
∞∑
s=0
θsEt
{
Λt,s
p∗it − Pwt+s
Pt+s
(
p∗it
Pt+s
)−ε
Yt+s
}
, (2.24)
where Pwt is the wholesale goods price and Λt,s ≡ β UC,t+sUC,t is the household’s (i.e. share-
holder’s) stochastic discount factor. The first order condition with respect to the retailer’s
price p∗it is
∞∑
s=0
θsEt
{
Λt,s
(
p∗it
Pt+s
)−ε
Yt+s
[
p∗it
Pt+s
− ε
ε− 1
Pwt+s
Pt+s
]}
= 0. (2.25)
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From this condition, it is clear that all retailers that are able to reset their prices in period
t will choose the same price p∗it = P
∗
t ∀i. The price level will evolve according to
Pt =
[
θP 1−εt−1 + (1− θ)(P ∗t )1−ε
] 1
1−ε . (2.26)
Dividing the left and right hand side of (2.26) by the price level gives
1 =
[
θpiε−1t−1 + (1− θ)(p∗t )1−ε
] 1
1−ε , (2.27)
where p∗t = P ∗t /Pt. Using the same logic, we can normalize (2.25) and obtain:
p∗t =
ε
ε− 1
∑∞
s=0 θ
sEt−1
{
Λt,s(1/pt+s)
−εYt+spwt+s
}∑∞
s=0 θ
sEt−1 {Λt,s(1/pt+s)1−εYt+s} , (2.28)
where pwt+s =
Pwt+s
Pt+s
and pt+s = Pt+s/Pt.
2.4.3 Wholesalers
Wholesale goods are produced by perfectly competitive firms and then sold to monopolis-
tically competitive retailers who costlessly differentiate them. Wholesalers hire labor from
households and entrepreneurs in a competitive labor market at real wage Wt and W
e
t , and
rent capital from entrepreneurs at rental rate Rrt . Note that capital purchased in period
t is used in period t + 1. Following BGG, the production function of the representative
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wholesaler is given by
Yt = AtK
α
t−1(Ht)
(1−α)Ω(Het )
(1−α)(1−Ω), (2.29)
where At denotes aggregate technology, Kt is capital, Ht is household labor, H
e
t is en-
trepreneurial labor, and Ω defines the relative importance of household labor and en-
trepreneurial labor in the production process. Entrepreneurs inelastically supply one unit
of labor, so that the production function simplifies to
Yt = AtK
α
t−1H
(1−α)Ω
t . (2.30)
One can express the price of the wholesale good in terms of the price of the final good.
In this case, the price of the wholesale good will be
Pwt
Pt
= pwt =
1
Xt , (2.31)
where Xt is the variable markup charged by final goods producers. The objective function
for wholesalers is then given by
max
Ht,Het ,Kt−1
1
XtAtK
α
t−1(Ht)
(1−α)Ω(Het )
(1−α)(1−Ω) −WtHt −W et Het −RrtKt−1. (2.32)
Here wages and the rental price of capital are in real terms. The first order conditions with
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respect to capital, household labor and entrepreneurial labor are
1
Xtα
Yt
Kt−1
= Rrt , (2.33)
Ω
Xt (1− α)
Yt
Ht
= Wt, (2.34)
Ω
Xt (1− α)
Yt
Het
= W et . (2.35)
Given that equilibrium entreprenerial labor in equilibrium is 1, we have
Ω
Xt (1− α)Yt = W
e
t . (2.36)
2.4.4 Capital Producers
While entrepreneurs hold capital between periods, perfectly competitive capital producers
hold capital within a given period, and use available capital and final goods to produce new
capital. Capital production is subject to adjustment costs, according to
Kt = It + (1− δ)Kt−1 − φK
2
(
It
Kt−1
− δ
)2
Kt−1, (2.37)
where It is investment in period t, δ is the rate of depreciation and φK is a parameter that
governs the magnitude of the adjustment cost. The capital producer’s objective function is
max
It
KtQt − It, (2.38)
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where Qt denotes the price of capital. The first order condition of the capital producer’s
optimization problem is
1
Qt
= 1− φK
(
It
Kt−1
− δ
)
. (2.39)
2.4.5 Lenders
One can think of the representative lender in the model as a perfectly competitive bank
which costlessly intermediates between households and borrowers. The role of the lender is
to diversify the household’s funds among various entrepreneurs. The bank takes nominal
household deposits, Dt, and lends out the nominal amount Bt to entrepreneurs. In equi-
librium, deposits will equal loanable funds (Dt = Bt). Households receive a predetermined
real rate of return Rt on their deposits.
2.4.6 Entrepreneurs
We have already described the entrepreneur’s problem and timing in detail in Section 3. At
the beginning of each period entrepreneurs rent out the capital they bought at the end of
the previous period to perfectly competitive wholesalers. Later, wholesalers return to the
entrepreneurs depreciated capital and pay them the rental rate. After that, entrepreneurs
sell their capital and settle their position with the banks, either by repaying their loans
or by defaulting. Following the arrangements with the banks, nature decides which en-
trepreneurs are going to survive, and which entrepreneurs are going to die and consume
all of their net worth. Subsequently, new entrepreneurs are born with zero net worth and
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supply inelastically one unit of labor in the aggregate. Then, newborn and surviving old
entrepreneurs borrow money from banks and buy capital from capital producers.
Wholesale firms rent capital at rate Rrt+1 =
αYt
XtKt−1 from entrepreneurs. After production
takes place entrepreneurs sell the undepreciated capital back to capital goods producers for
the unit price Qt+1. Aggregate returns to capital are then given by
Rkt+1 =
1
Xt
αYt+1
Kt
+Qt+1(1− δ)
Qt
. (2.40)
Consistent with the partial equilibrium specification, entrepreneurs die with probability
1− γ, which implies the following dynamics for aggregate net worth:
Nt+1 = γ
(
QtKtR
k
t+1 − (QtKt −Nt)Rt − µQtKtRkt+1
∫ ω¯t+1
0
ωφ(ω)dω
)
+W et+1. (2.41)
The terms inside the brackets reflect the aggregate returns to capital to entrepreneurs, net
of loan repayments and monitoring costs. Aggregate entrepreneurial consumption is given
by
Cet = (1− γ)(N et −W et ) (2.42)
Given that each entrepreneur chooses the same leverage, we can define leverage as the ratio
of aggregate capital expenditure to aggregate net worth
κt = QtKt/Nt. (2.43)
96
Chapter 2 Risk Aversion and the Financial Accelerator
2.4.7 Goods Market Clearing
The goods market clearing condition is
Yt = Ct + It +Gt + C
e
t + µQt−1Kt−1R
k
t
∫ ω¯t
0
ωφ(ω)dω (2.44)
where the last term reflects aggregate monitoring costs.
2.4.8 Monetary Policy
As in BGG, we assume that there is a central bank which conducts monetary policy by
choosing the nominal interest rate Rnt according to the following rule
log(Rnt )− log(Rn) = ρR
n
(
log(Rnt−1)− log(R)
)
+ ξpit−1 + R
n
t (2.45)
where ρR
n
and ξ determine the relative importance of the past interest rate and past inflation
in the central bank’s interest rate rule. Shocks to the nominal interest rate are given by
R
n
. It should be noted that the interest rule in BGG differs from the conventional Taylor
rule, where current inflation rather than past inflation is targeted.
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2.4.9 Shocks
The shocks in the model follow a standard AR(1) process. The AR(1) processes for tech-
nology, government spending and idiosyncratic volatility are given by
log(At) =ρ
A log(At−1) + At , (2.46)
log(Gt/Yt) =(1− ρG) log(Gss/Yss) + ρG log(Gt−1/Yt−1) + Gt , (2.47)
log(σω,t) =(1− ρσω) log(σω,ss) + ρσω log(σω,t−1) + σωt (2.48)
where A, G and σω denote exogenous shocks to technology, government spending and id-
iosyncratic volatility, and (Gss/Yss) and σω,ss denote the steady state values for government
spending relative to output and idiosyncratic volatility respectively. Recall that σ2ω is the
variance of idiosyncratic productivity, so that σω is the standard deviation of idiosyncratic
productivity. Nominal interest rate shocks are defined by the BGG Rule in (2.45).
2.4.10 Equilibrium
The nonlinear model has 26 endogenous variables and 26 equations. The endogenous vari-
ables are: R, Rn, H, C, pi, p∗, pw, X , Y , W , W e, I, Q, K, Rk, N , Ce, k, ω¯, ω, R¯,
Ψ, λ, G, A, σω, where the new variable λ corresponds to the Lagrange multiplier for the
optimality conditions used in the Appendix. The equations defining these endogenous vari-
ables are: (2.18), (2.19), (2.20), (2.27), (2.28), (2.30), (2.31), (2.34), (2.36), (2.37), (2.39),
(2.40), (2.41), (2.42), (2.43), (2.44), and financial contract participation (2.13), discounting
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condition (2.12) and optimality conditions (B.17), (B.18), (B.19), (B.20). The exogenous
processes for technology, government spending and idiosyncratic volatility follow (2.46),
(2.47) and (2.48) respectively. Nominal interest rate shocks are defined by the Taylor rule
in (2.45).
2.4.11 Log-linear Model
The log-linear model has 19 equations and 19 variables, because algebraic manipulations
with the Calvo model allow to replace (2.27), (2.28) and (2.31) with (2.52), and drop p∗ and
pw, while simplifying the financial contract allows to replace (2.12), (2.13), (B.17), (B.18),
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(B.19), (B.20) with (2.62) and drop ω¯, ω, R¯,Ψ. The equations are
− σ
(
EtCˆt+1 − Cˆt
)
+ Rˆt = 0, (2.49)
Rˆnt = Rˆt + Etpˆit+1, (2.50)
Yˆt − Hˆt − Xˆt − σCˆt = ηHˆt, (2.51)
pˆit = −(1− θ)(1− θβ)
θ
Xˆt + βEtpˆit+1, (2.52)
Yˆt = Aˆt + αKˆt−1 + (1− α)(1− Ω)Hˆt, (2.53)
Kˆt = δIˆt + (1− δ)Kˆt−1, (2.54)
Qˆt = δφK(Iˆt − Kˆt−1), (2.55)
Rˆkt+1 = (1− )(Yˆt+1 − Kˆt − Xˆt+1) + Qˆt+1 − Qˆt, (2.56)
Y Yˆt = CCˆt + IIˆt +GGˆt + C
eCˆet + φN(φˆt + Nˆt−1), (2.57)
φˆt = Qˆt−1 + Kˆt−1 − Nˆt−1 + νmσ σˆω,t−1 + νmp (Et−1Rk,t − Rˆt−1), (2.58)
κˆt = Kˆt + Qˆt − Nˆt, (2.59)
CeCˆet = (1− γ)(NNˆt −W eWˆ et ), (2.60)
Wˆ et = Yˆt − Xˆt, (2.61)
κˆt = νp(EtRˆkt+1 − Rˆt) + νσσˆω,t, (2.62)
Rˆnt = ρ
RnRˆnt−1 + ξpˆit + ρ
Y Yˆt + 
Rn
t , (2.63)
Nˆt = γ
(
κRk(κˆt−1 + Rˆk,t)− κRκˆt−1 − (κ− 1)RRˆt−1 − φφˆt
)
+
W e
N
(Wˆ et ) +
N −W e
N
Nˆt−1,
(2.64)
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Aˆt = ρ
AAˆt−1 + At , (2.65)
Gˆt = ρ
GGˆt−1 + Gt , (2.66)
σˆω,t = ρ
σω σˆω,t−1 + σωt (2.67)
2.5 Quantitative Analysis
In section 2.3 we discussed the role of risk aversion in determining the elasticities of leverage
with respect to the expected discounted returns to capital and to the standard deviation
of idiosyncratic productivity. In particular, we have highlighted the fact that in partial
equilibrium leverage becomes more responsive to the latter with higher risk aversion, as
marginal monitoring costs build up more slowly. While the partial equilibrium analysis
suggests higher sensitivity of leverage and, hence, higher amplification under risk aversion,
the general equilibrium effect depends on the endogenous adjustment of prices and returns.
In this section we investigate quantitatively the general equilibrium effects of technology,
monetary, idiosyncratic volatility, and wealth shocks for different coefficients of risk aversion.
2.5.1 Calibration and Benchmarks
Our baseline calibration largely follows BGG. We set the discount factor β = 0.99, the risk
aversion parameter σ = 1, so that the utility of households is logarithmic in consumption,
and the elasticity of labor supply to 3 (η = 1/3). The share of capital in the Cobb-
Douglas production function is α = 0.35. Capital adjustment costs are φk = 10, to generate
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an elasticity of the price of capital with respect to the investment capital ratio of 0.25.
Quarterly capital depreciation is δ = .025. Monitoring costs are µ = 0.12. The death rate
of entrepreneurs is 1 − γ = .0275, yielding an annualized business failure rate of eleven
percent. The weight of household labor relative to entrepreneurial labor in the production
function is Ω = 0.99.
For price setting, we set the Calvo parameter θ = 0.75, so that 25% of firms can reset
their prices in each period, meaning the average length of time between price adjustments
is four quarters. As our baseline, we follow the BGG monetary policy rule and set the
autoregressive parameter on the nominal interest rate to ρR
n
= 0.9 and the parameter
on lagged inflation to ξ = 0.11. We set the persistence of the shocks to technology at
ρA = 0.99, and keep the standard deviation at 1 percent. Following BGG, for monetary
shocks we consider a 25 basis point shock (in annualized terms) to the nominal interest rate
with persistence ρRn = 0.9.
For our purposes, the most important part of the calibration regards the volatility to
idiosyncratic productivity and the risk-aversion parameter. We want to compare the impulse
responses of the model with risk-averse entrepreneurs to those of the benchmark model
with risk-neutral ones. Following Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2014, CMR), we set
the persistence of idiosyncratic volatility at ρσω = 0.9706. As to the standard deviations
of idiosyncratic volatility shocks σω, we choose two different values for each coefficient of
risk-aversion. If we set σω to be the same for the different coefficients of risk-aversion, the
model with the smaller ρ would imply a higher steady-state leverage. It follows that a shock
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of a given size would have a stronger effect on impact, since similar movements in prices
and returns to capital would induce larger fluctuations in net worth when leverage is higher.
Thus, when we increase risk-aversion, we decrease the idiosyncratic volatility to numerically
align the steady-state leverage and the excess returns to capital in two models.9
Following BGG, when entrepreneurs are risk-neutral we set σω to 0.28, which implies a
steady-state leverage 2.1 and a value of RK/R of 1.0084, corresponding to an annualized
excess return of 3.3 percent. In the case of risk-averse entrepreneurs, we set ρ = 0.5 and
σω = 0.085, which generate leverage of 2.1 and R
K/R of 1.0076, corresponding to annualized
excess returns of 3 percent. Why this particular coefficient of risk aversion and level of
idiosyncratic volatility? If we look at the literature on cross-sectional volatility of sales
growth, Castro, Clementi, and Lee (2010) obtain a value for firm-specific volatility of TFP
between 0.04 and 0.12. Comin and Mulani (2006), Davis, Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda
(2007) and a more recent study by De Veirman and Levin (2014) report the volatility for
the annual growth of sales to be between 0.24 and 0.3, however that volatility corresponds
to a much smaller standard deviation of quarterly idiosyncratic productivity. We simulate
our model in the steady state, where aggregate shocks are absent, but idiosyncratic shocks
still affect firms and find that σω = 0.08 and σω = 0.1 imply a value of volatility of annual
sales of 0.24 and 0.3, which is the range observed in the data. We settle for a value of σω
of 0.085 and subsequently choose a value for ρ that delivers a leverage of two. The results
9We do not report the results for the two models with different risk-aversion and other identical parameters.
In the model with higher risk-aversion and lower leverage the effect on the endogenous variables on impact
is smaller for all shocks.
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reported in our simulations are robust to the choice of ρ and σω, as long as we select these
two parameters to match the leverage and the average excess returns observed in the data.
2.5.2 Leverage, Capital Returns and Amplification
Our calibration implies that the two cases we consider — risk-averse and risk-neutral en-
trepreneurs — have very similar steady states in terms of leverage and capital returns.
The first two columns of Table 1 show that in the risk-neutral calibration, the steady-state
leverage and Rk are 2.1 and 1.0186, respectively. The risk-averse calibration delivers similar
values — leverage of 2.1 and Rk equal to 1.0176 — using a higher risk aversion and a lower
volatility of idiosyncratic productivity. We do not report the other steady-state variables
but they are very similar across the two models.10
Table 2.1: Steady-state Comparison
κ Rk νp νσ
Risk-neutral case (σω=0.28, ρ= 0.0) 2.098 1.0186 18.74 -0.71
Risk-averse case (σω=0.085, ρ= 0.5) 2.084 1.0176 125.36 -1.94
κˆt = νp(EtRˆkt+1 − EtRˆt+1) + νσσˆω,t
Despite the fact that steady states are similar, entrepreneurial risk-aversion still affects
the way in which the economy reacts to shocks. This different sensitivity is captured by the
different values of the two elasticities νp and νσ in equation (2.15) for the two calibrations.
10From the model equations one can see that if leverage, capital returns and defaults are identical, then the
two steady states will coincide. Although with higher risk aversion defaults are smaller, they are in both
cases very small compared to GDP so that in practice the steady states are almost identical.
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Table 1 shows that these elasticities are higher in absolute value for the risk-averse case.
As we discussed in section 2.3, an increase in ρ increases both elasticities in absolute value.
The decrease in σω further increases νp and decreases νσ although most of the change in
the elasticities between our two preferred scenarios is really driven by the increase in ρ.11
Notably, in our risk-averse calibration the elasticity νp grows by about seven times whereas
the elasticity νσ grows only by about three times relative to our risk-neutral calibration.
How would higher sensitivity of leverage to excess returns and to the volatility of id-
iosyncratic productivity affect business cycles? In partial equilibrium, for a given change in
prices or idiosyncratic volatility, the larger fluctuations in leverage should strengthen am-
plification. However, in general equilibrium the impact of νp and νσ is less obvious because
the movement of prices is endogenous and it differs with and without risk-aversion.
To predict the outcome it is helpful to think about the elasticity νp in two extreme cases:
the frictionless case and the risk-neutral case. In a world without financial frictions νp →∞.
Even the smallest increase in expected capital returns makes entrepreneurs be willing to hold
an infinite amount of capital, owing to constant returns, so that in equilibrium returns to
capital are equal to the safe rate. At the opposite end of the spectrum, when entrepreneurs
are risk-neutral, νp is small, reflecting the fact that even if capital returns rise, borrowing
cannot increase much because marginal borrowing costs increase very quickly with leverage.
In this case large swings in excess returns are required to generate movements in leverage.
11Starting from σω = 0.28 and ρ = 0 and reducing σω to 0.085 only increases νp from 18.74 to 43.17 and
decreases νσ from -0.71 to -0.89. Therefore, most of the change in the elasticities is due to the change in
ρ, rather than to the change in σω.
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Given that νp in the risk-averse case is larger than in the risk-neutral case, we should expect
excess returns in the risk-averse case to still react to shocks (because financial frictions are
still present), but more mildly than in the risk-neutral case. With smaller movements in
the returns to capital and, therefore, the price of capital, we expect smaller fluctuations in
net worth and less volatile business cycles. The simulations in the following section confirm
our intuition.
2.5.3 Simulations
In this section we simulate our model and study the impulse responses of key macroeco-
nomic variables to different shocks, comparing the case of risk aversion and the case of risk
neutrality.
Risk and Wealth Shocks
After a risk shock, the probability of a low realization of ω increases, thus banks increase the
interest rates charged on loans to cover the higher costs of default. Entrepreneurs respond
by borrowing less and by reducing the quantity demanded of capital goods, given the fewer
resources available to them. In general equilibrium, the drop in investment demand reduces
the price of capital, which has two additional effects. On the one hand, the lower price of
capital reduces the net worth of the entrepreneur, which further decreases the demand for
capital goods through the standard financial accelerator mechanism described in BGG. On
the other hand, there is an additional general equilibrium effect, which partially offset the
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fall in credit, as explained in CMR. Precisely, when the price of capital falls, it is expected
to revert to steady state in the future. Other things equal, this raises the expected returns
to capital, increasing credit received by entrepreneurs and the demand for capital. For this
reason, the decline in credit is smaller than the decline in net worth.
Figure 2.4 shows the impulse responses to a risk shock for risk-neutral and risk-averse
entrepreneurs. In both cases, these dynamic responses are consistent with the intuition
given above. Credit falls, net worth falls even more, resulting in an increase in leverage.
Investment declines as a result of lower demand, caused by the lack of entrepreneurial
financial resources. The fall in investment is greatly responsible for the drop in output.
Even thought the responses are qualitatively similar in the two cases, they are very different
quantitatively, with the presence of risk-averse entrepreneurs greatly buffering the fall in
investment and output. The difference in the dynamic responses is due to the different
response of credit across the two cases. In the risk neutral case, the positive effect on
borrowing of higher future returns to capital is weak (given the low value of νp) and only
mildly offsets the negative impact of the risk shock on borrowing. As a result credit,
falls significantly when entrepreneurs are risk neutral. Instead when entrepreneurs are risk
averse, their demand for investment goods is much more sensitive to changes in prospective
returns to capital (this is captured by the higher value of νp). Thus, even though the
risk shock causes credit to decrease in partial equilibrium, higher future returns to capital,
almost entirely offset the fall in general equilibrium. With almost no change in credit,
demand for capital does not fall as much. As a result investment and output decline much
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more moderately when entrepreneurs are risk averse.
Figure 2.5 shows the impulse responses to a wealth shock that transfers in a lump-sum
fashion 1% of the initial net worth of entrepreneurs to households. The intuition for these
responses is similar to the intuition for the risk shock. A drop in wealth reduces the net
worth of entrepreneurs, and the analysis of the debt contract suggests that this reduces
borrowing. With fewer credit, entrepreneurs reduce the demand for capital goods, driv-
ing down their price. The change in the price of capital triggers the general equilibrium
effects described above. As noted by CMR, after a wealth shock, the positive effect on
credit—which works through the increase in expected returns to capital—is stronger than
the financial accelerator effect, resulting in an increase in credit in equilibrium.12 Nev-
ertheless the increase in credit is not sufficient to cover the fall in net worth, hence the
resources available to entrepreneurs fall. For this reason the wealth shock causes a decline
in investment and output. Similarly to the case of the risk shock, our analysis suggests that
the expected-returns-to-capital effect is even stronger when entrepreneurs are risk averse,
because these types of entrepreneurs are more sensitive to changes in returns to capital. As
a result, credit rises by more, net worth falls by less and, hence, the investment and output
drops are considerably smaller.
12CMR’s shock is an equity shock rather than a wealth shock. In particular they assume a stochastic process
for the parameter γ, the fraction of entrepreneurs who survive. An unexpected fall in γ reduces net worth
immediately. Their equity shock and our wealth shock are essentially equivalent.
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Technology and Monetary Shocks
Figure 2.6 plots the impulse responses of the two models under risk-neutrality and risk-
aversion to a technology shock. In both cases the direction of the responses is the same and
follows the intuition of BGG. In particular, the productivity shock immediately stimulates
the demand for capital, leading to an investment boom. The increase in investment raises
asset prices, which raises net worth and reduces the capital wedge. The decline in the
wedge further stimulates investment and the financial accelerator mechanism arises: an
initial increase in investment increases asset prices and net worth, which further stimulates
investment. The financial accelerator model also delivers more persistence than standard
New Keynesian models because net worth reverts to steady state very slowly, as can be seen
from the Figure. As usual for all models with sticky prices, a one percent increase in total
factor productivity leads to less than one percent response of GDP for both models, since
marginal costs go down, while prices do not adjust completely on impact, and as a result
markups in the economy increase.
The responses of output, investment, consumption and other macroeconomic variables is
similar across the two scenarios. The output response is almost identical because consump-
tion and investment behave very similarly in the two cases. As we expected, the response
of excess returns to capital is much milder in the risk-averse case, about one fifth of the
response of the risk-neutral case. Movements in net worth and leverage are somewhat larger
in the risk-averse case but the price of capital increases in a very similar fashion across the
two scenarios, which leads to similar responses in investment.
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One of the appealing feature of general equilibrium models with costly state verifica-
tion and risk-neutral borrowers is that they amplify monetary shocks and they make the
responses of macro variables more persistent, thanks to the endogenous dynamics in net
worth. Figure 2.7 shows the impulse responses of the two models with varying degrees
of risk-aversion with respect to 25 basis-point shock to the interest rate. The model with
higher risk aversion and more precautionary behavior displays responses to monetary shocks
that are about twenty percent smaller on impact vis-a-vis the risk-neutral case. As for the
technology shock, excess returns to capital go down much less in the case of risk-aversion.
Nevertheless, because of the higher sensitivity of leverage to this wedge, the response of
leverage and net worth is quantitatively similar - only about 20% smaller in the risk-averse
scenario. The price of capital and investment go up to a smaller extent in the risk-aversion
case, therefore, we observe a somewhat smaller reaction of output to the same shock. Nev-
ertheless, the responses are similar in the two cases. The endogenous adjustment of excess
returns to capital is such that the financial accelerator mechanism is fundamentally robust
to the presence of risk-averse entrepreneurs in response to technology and monetary shocks.
2.6 Conclusion
In this paper we extend the BGG framework to allow borrowers to have constant relative
risk-aversion preferences instead of being risk neutral. This new framework is tractable as
the popular BGG model of financial frictions but allows us to address new questions regard-
ing risk that were not answerable in the original model. We use this new framework to ask
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the most natural of the questions, that is whether traditional macroeconomic shocks as well
as recently popularized shocks have different effects when entrepreneurs are risk averse as
opposed to risk neutral. We find that the model with risk-averse borrowers compared to the
model with risk-neutral borrowers demonstrates similar responses for technology and mon-
etary shocks, but significantly weaker responses for shocks to the volatility of idiosyncratic
productivity or “risk-shocks” and for wealth shocks. These results relate to the literature
that stresses the importance of changes in uncertainty or idiosyncratic risk in explaining
salient features of business cycles, such as Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2014) and
Gilchrist, Sim, and Zakrajˇsek (2014). Our simulations suggest that the quantitative impor-
tance of financial shocks such as risk shocks or wealth shocks is sensitive to the risk attitude
of the entrepreneurs in the model.
For subsequent research our framework can be extended in several directions. It is pos-
sible to have several types of entrepreneurs with different preferences and leverage, while
maintaining analytical tractability. Such specification would allow the average level of
risk-aversion to be time-varying, since positive shocks would redistribute resources towards
agents with higher leverage and lower risk-aversion. In this case, a sequence of good shocks
would decrease average risk-aversion and increase leverage, which might make economy
more fragile to negative shocks.
Our framework also allows for contracts with optimal risk-sharing of aggregate risk be-
tween lenders and borrowers. In the current framework returns to lenders are predeter-
mined, and entrepreneurs effectively carry all aggregate risk, so it would be interesting
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to investigate, whether the amplification of monetary and technology shocks is robust to
the trade of state-contingent claims on the aggregate state of the world. From Dmitriev
and Hoddenbagh (2013), Carlstrom, Fuerst, Ortiz, and Paustian (2014), and Carlstrom,
Fuerst, and Paustian (2016) we know that the financial accelerator is not robust to the
presence of state-contingent contracts for risk-neutral entrepreneurs. Dmitriev and Hod-
denbagh (2014) demonstrate that amplification is not robust to state-contingent contracts
in costly enforcement environment, developed by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and extended
by Iacoviello (2005) to risk-averse agents environment. The robustness of the accelerator
to state-contingent contracts in costly state verification framework with risk-averse agents
remains an important question for future research.
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Figure 2.4: Impulse Response to Risk Shock
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Figure 2.5: Impulse Response to Wealth Shock
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Figure 2.6: Impulse Response to Technology Shock
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Figure 2.7: Impulse Response to Monetary Shock
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Implications of Default Recovery Rates
for Aggregate Fluctuations
3.1 Introduction
Default recovery rates for corporate bank loans in the United States are strongly procyclical
and highly volatile, ranging from 53 to 88 percent over the last 25 years. This finding
does not seem surprising at first. Shleifer and Vishny (1992) pointed out that during a
recession it is harder for a bank to sell the assets of a firm in financial distress, since the
most productive use of these assets would be exercised by similar firms, which are likely
to experience comparable financial difficulties. Furthermore, in times of recession, other
financial institutions are trying to sell similar assets due to widespread bankruptcies. All
of these factors make markets less liquid and cause recovery rates to deteriorate sharply
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during economic downturns.
General equilibrium models with financial frictions since Kiyotaki and Moore (1997),
Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) and Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999, BGG) have so
far focused on explaining the dynamics of spreads and defaults, but put little emphasis
on the behavior of recovery rates. By itself this is not an issue, since these models might
be able to generate realistic patterns of recovery rates without explicitly trying to match
them. However, we demonstrate that in the existing models recovery rates are almost flat
over the cycle and rarely move by more than two percent from their average value.1 This
suggests that current models tend to underestimate the cost of bankruptcy in a recession and
overestimate them in a boom. So long as bankruptcy costs impede the flow of funds from
lenders to borrowers, these results imply that current frameworks might be understating
the severity of financial frictions and their effects on macroeconomic aggregates.
The natural research question of this paper is how can existing models be modified in
order to explain the behavior of the recovery rates and other business cycle variables. One
of the simplest and most natural approaches consists in incorporating the Shleifer and
Vishny (1992) insight into a dynamic general equilibrium model. Indeed, if liquidating an
asset requires a match with a potential buyer, then during a recession when markets are
illiquid, finding a corresponding match becomes harder, which would make liquidation costs
countercyclical and recovery rates procyclical. When markets are very liquid and buyers are
1Here we mean costly state verification approach following Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) and Bernanke,
Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) , Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2014) and others, since models following
the costly state enforcement approach after Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) do not have default or recovery
rates.
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plentiful, liquidation costs should decrease, while illiquidity should make it more difficult to
find a match, driving liquidation costs upward. We denote this effect by liquidity channel
and we embed it into a state-of-the-art model of financial frictions.
Formally, we extend a standard agency cost model by allowing liquidation costs for cred-
itors to depend on the tightness of the market for physical capital. Building on Blanchard
and Gal´ı (2010), we assume that banks pay liquidation costs that depend on the ratio of the
capital sold to capital purchased by entrepreneurs. These costs are small when the majority
of entrepreneurs are trying to buy capital; in this case banks can sell liquidated assets rela-
tively easy. On the other hand, when most of entrepreneurs sell physical capital, liquidation
costs for banks increase. Naturally in the agency cost framework, most entrepreneurs are
net buyers of capital in a boom and net sellers in a recession, making liquidation costs
countercyclical. It turns out that this additional friction allows us to successfully explain
the existing dynamics of defaults, spreads and balance sheets, as well as recovery rates.
In a related paper, Choi and Cook (2012) study the effect of a concave production function
for liquidation services in a small-scale financial accelerator model, and show that this
concavity can generate higher volatility of recovery rates. We differ from their work in
three respects. First, we use a different approach to modeling liquidation, which relies on
the tightness of the market for capital goods. Second, we build on the medium-scale DSGE
model by Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2014), which explains the joint behavior of
macroeconomic and financial variables. Third, we use Moody’s dataset instead of FDIC’s,
which focuses on corporate debt and grants a tighter link between spreads, defaults, and
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recoveries in the data.
We make several contributions to the literature. First, we show that standard nominal
rigidities and balance sheet channels in agency costs models are not sufficient to generate
the pattern of recovery rates observed in the data. Second, we introduce a liquidity channel
to the agency costs model, which allows us to reconcile the model and the data. Third, we
demonstrate that the liquidity channel strengthens the effect of financial shocks on output
and asset prices. Indeed, when a negative shocks hits the economy, not only do markups
go up and balance sheets deteriorate, but markets also become less liquid due to the fact
that most entrepreneurs are trying to sell physical capital. As a result, banks become more
reluctant to lend to entrepreneurs even if the latter have strong balance sheets, since, even
if the probability of default for the entrepreneur is the same, the illiquidity of the markets
drives down the potential recovery rate for the bank. In other words, expected bankruptcy
costs go up for all borrowers, regardless of their balance sheets. We find that the liquidity
channel amplifies the impact of financial shocks by a factor that is between 25 and 50
percent, depending on the nature of the shock. Finally, we find these additional negative
effects to be persistent and present up to 20 quarters after the shock has hit the economy.
3.2 Recovery Rates and the Business Cycle
In this section we document the cyclical properties of recovery rates and investigate whether
current macroeconomic models with financial frictions are able to explain them. Recovery
rates measure the extent to which the creditor recovers the principal and accrued interest
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due on a defaulted debt. Our data come from Moody’s (2016) “Annual Default Study: Cor-
porate Default and Recovery Rates”, which contains information about defaulted corporate
bonds and loans recoveries, measured by the market value of defaulted debt as a percent-
age of par one month after default. The aggregate data are available at annual frequency
from 1990 until 2014 and reflect the experience of over 20,000 corporate issuers in Moody’s
proprietary database. Figure 3.1 shows the dynamics of the recovery rate on first-lien loans
along with those of real GDP growth for the United States.2
As the Figure shows, recovery rates tend to vary systematically over time. Recovery
rates on first-lien loans exhibit substantial volatility, ranging from 53.4 percent in 1993 to
87.7 percent in 2004 within our sample. The Figure also makes clear that recovery rates
closely track the business cycle. Loan recovery rates rose above 80 percent in the early
2000s while the economy was booming. As the financial crisis unravelled, recoveries started
plummeting, reaching about 53 percent in the midst of the Great Recession. These findings
are consistent with previous evidence by Frye (2000a,b) and Schuermann (2004), who show
that in a recession, recovery is about a third lower than in an expansion. Over our sample
period, recoveries and GDP growth exhibit a contemporaneous correlation of 0.41.3
Aggregate recovery rates exhibit a systematic relationship with defaults, as documented
by Altman et al. (2005). As one may expect, recovery rates are lower when the aggregate
2While the recovery rates are available for different types of assets, including secured and unsecured bonds,
in this study we focus on bank loans, which have been the traditional focus of the financial accelerator
literature. Nevertheless, other types of assets’ recovery rates exhibit strong pro-cyclicality and even
higher volatility. In this sense, we take a conservative stance on volatility of recovery rates both in terms
of frequency and type of assets.
3The correlation between recoveries and HP-filtered GDP is 0.30.
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default rate increases. In Figure 3.2 we provide some evidence of this relationship by
showing the pattern of recoveries and the delinquency rates on business loan for the United
States.4 Between 2006 and 2009, delinquency rates increased from 1.27 to 3.91 percent,
while recovery rates fell from 83.6 to 53.6 percent. The two time series are negatively
correlated with a correlation coefficient of -0.42, while the correlation of delinquencies with
real GDP growth is -0.33. Our evidence on default and recoveries is in line with previous
research which highlights a similar macroeconomic dependence of recovery rates (Mora,
2012).
We now examine the behavior of aggregate recovery rates through the lens of a general
equilibrium model with financial frictions. A strand of the macroeconomic literature has
focused on the ability of these models to explain the behavior of spreads and defaults over
the business cycle but so far their implications for recoveries remains unexplored. For our
analysis we use the model of Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2014, CMR), which builds
on the seminal contribution of BGG in the financial accelerator literature. Our choice is
guided by two facts. First, this class of models features equilibrium defaults and associated
bankruptcy costs. Hence, it is straightforward to construct a measure of the aggregate
recovery rate in the model that can be compared with the data. Second, the estimated
model of CMR is successful at explaining the time-variation in defaults observed in the
data. Indeed, in one of their posterior predictive checks, the authors show that this model
successfully accounts for the dynamics of delinquency rates for the United States over the
4This data correspond to the series “Delinquency Rate On Business Loans, All Commercial Banks” on the
FRED database.
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last two decades. Therefore it is natural to ask whether the model is able to explain
the dynamics of recovery rates, conditional on its success in accounting for fluctuations in
defaults.
To answer this question, we compute the aggregate implied recovery rate from CMR using
their publicly available codes and compare it against the data.5 In their paper, the authors
do not try to match recovery rates, but they do a good job at explaining other financial
variables such as credit, spreads, net worth and the slope from the term structure, as well
as a set of traditional macroeconomic variables. As can be seen from the results presented
in Figure 3.3, the implied recovery rate from CMR do not exceed 72 percent or fall below
68 percent even during 2008-2009 Great Recession. On the other hand, the recovery rate
from the Moody’s dataset features a much higher volatility.
These findings suggest that current models of financial frictions tend to underestimate the
cost of bankruptcy in a recession and overestimate them in a boom. So long as bankruptcy
costs impede the flow of funds from lenders to borrowers, these results imply that current
frameworks might be understating the severity of financial frictions and their effects on
macroeconomic aggregates. In the next sections we introduce a new channel in the financial
accelerator model that is able to explain the behavior of recoveries and we study its effect
on aggregate fluctuations.
5We derive a formula for the model-implied recovery rate in the Appendix.
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3.3 The Liquidity Channel
In this section we introduce the contracting problem between financial intermediaries on the
lending side and entrepreneurs on the borrowing side, and we demonstrate how the contract
is affected by liquidity of the markets. While the contracting problem closely follows BGG,
bankruptcy costs per unit of asset (or capital) are going to be affected by the liquidity of
capital markets. Here the price of capital goods and the expected returns to capital are
taken as given by lenders and borrowers. The subsequent section will endogenize these
prices and returns in our general equilibrium environment.
3.3.1 Entrepreneurs
There is a continuum of entrepreneurs indexed by j. Entrepreneurs are the only agents
accumulating capital in the model. At time t, entrepreneur j purchases raw capital, K¯t+1(j),
at a unit price of Qt. The entrepreneur uses his net worth, Nt(j), and a one-period loan
Bt+1(j) from a financial intermediary (or bank) to purchase his desired level of capital:
QtK¯t+1(j) = Nt(j) +Bt+1(j). (3.1)
After the purchase, the entrepreneur converts the raw capital into effective capital services.
At the beginning of period t+1, the entrepreneur is hit with an idiosyncratic shock that the
lender cannot directly observe. Entrepreneur j earns income by supplying capital services
and from capital gains; he then goes to another bank and gets a new loan in order to
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refinance his previous loan. The new bank perfectly observes the balance sheet of the
entrepreneur, as the entrepreneur reveals his private information to the potential creditor.
If a new loan is not extended and the entrepreneur is not able to refinance, he defaults, the
old banks seizes his assets and tries to sell them in the market for physical capital. On the
contrary, if the entrepreneur is able to refinance, he repays the loan to the old bank and
uses his residual resources to buy the additional capital. Sometimes the new loan is not
sufficient to repay the old loan, and in this case the entrepreneur covers the difference by
selling some units of physical capital.
There are two differences relative to the standard agency cost frameworks in macroeco-
nomic models. First, in our model most of the physical capital stays with entrepreneurs, who
go to the market to buy or sell only the additional units. In the standard framework, physi-
cal capital moves back and forth between households or capital agencies and entrepreneurs.
The assumption that entrepreneurs keep and accumulate capital is important for the no-
tion of liquidity. In bad states of the world the majority of entrepreneurs are selling capital
and are making markets very illiquid, which puts additional pressure on banks, that try
to sell seized assets. In the standard framework, this effect would be much weaker, since
the continuous movement of the entire capital stock between households and entrepreneurs
would make capital markets always liquid. Our assumption also matches more closely real
life phenomena. Indeed, the stock of capital moves very slowly with business cycles, while
the flows of capital are very pro-cyclical and volatile, which perfectly serves the concept of
liquidity in our framework.
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Second, we assume that when the entrepreneur refinances the loan, he reveals his private
information to the new lender, but not to the old lender. We consider this assumption
highly plausible, since the borrower has a strong motivation to reveal his situation ex-ante
in order to get the loan and to respond to all information requests from the lender, otherwise
the lender could simply reject the loan application. On the other hand, once the loan is
approved, entrepreneur has smaller incentives ex-post to provide the lender with his private
information. Under these assumptions, we have a standard costly state verification setup
and we follow the contracting problem between lenders and borrowers after BGG.
3.3.2 The Loan Contract
The contracting between the entrepreneur and the financial intermediary is subject to a
typical agency problem. In period t+ 1, entrepreneur j is hit with an idiosyncratic shock,
ωt+1(j), and an aggregate shock, R
k
t+1, so that he is able to deliver QtKt(j)R
k
t+1ωt+1(j)
units of assets. The idiosyncratic shock ωt+1(j) is a log-normal random variable with
distribution log(ωt+1(j)) ∼ N (−12σ2ω,t, σ2ω,t) so that the mean of ω is equal to 1. We denote
by ft = f(ω, σω,t) and by Ft = F (ω, σω,t) the probability density function and cumulative
distribution function of ωt, respectively.
6 The realizations of ω are independent across
entrepreneurs and over time. We assume that the lender cannot observe the realization of
the idiosyncratic shock to the entrepreneurs unless he pays monitoring costs µt+1 which are
expressed in percentage of total assets. The loan obtained by the entrepreneur takes the
6The timing is meant to capture the fact that the variance of ωt+1 is known at the time of the financial
arrangement, t.
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form of a standard debt contract, where Zt+1 denotes the promised gross rate of return on
the loan. Let, ω¯t+1, be the value of ω below which an entrepreneur is not able to repay the
principal and the interest on the loan. This cutoff is defined by
Bt+1(j)Zt+1 = QtK¯t+1(j)R
k
t+1ω¯t+1 (3.2)
Entrepreneurs with ω < ω¯ are not able to refinance and, hence, declare bankruptcy. In this
case, the lender seizes the entrepreneurial assets and tries to find a match on the market
in order to sell these assets. The ex-post t + 1 payoff to the entrepreneur with net worth
Nt(j) is given by
∫ ∞
ω¯t+1
[QtK¯t+1(j)R
k
t+1ω −Bt+1(j)Zt+1]dFt(ω) = [1− Γt(ω¯t+1)]Rkt+1κtNt(j) (3.3)
where
κt ≡ QtK¯t+1(j)
Nt(j)
Γt(ω¯t+1) ≡ [1− Ft(ω¯t+1)]ω¯t+1 +Gt(ω¯t+1)
Gt(ω¯t+1) ≡
∫ ω¯t+1
0
ωdFt(ω)
and κt denotes leverage, from which we have dropped the index j in anticipation of the
result that leverage is independent of net worth (see below).
Financial intermediaries collect deposits from the household, to which they promise a
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competitively determined, non-state contingent, nominal interest rate Rt. The financial
intermediary diversifies his lending across a large number of entrepreneurs. Thus, its par-
ticipation constraint can be written as
[1− Ft(ω¯t+1)]Zt+1Bt+1(j) + (1− µt+1)
∫ ω¯t+1
0
Kt+1(j)QtR
k
t+1ωdFt(ω) ≥ RtBt+1(j) (3.4)
where the left hand-side of (3.4) is the expected gross return on the loan and the right hand
side is the opportunity cost of lending for the financial intermediary. This equation states
that returns to lenders consist of the payoff from firms that did not default, and from the
seized assets of entrepreneurs that could not repay their loans net of liquidation costs.
Using the definition of leverage and equation (3.2), the participation constraint can be
re-written as
Rkt+1[Γt(ω¯t+1)− Ft(ω¯t+1)] =
κt − 1
κt
Rt (3.5)
Following BGG, we assume that entrepreneurs go out of business with exogenous prob-
ability (1− γt). In this event, after collecting their earnings from renting their capital, the
entrepreneur sells his capital, pays back his loan and consumes his residual net worth. The
exiting entrepreneurs are replaced by an inflow of new entrepreneurs that receive an initial
start-up transfer from the household, W et . Therefore, the entrepreneurial objective function
is described by
Et
{ ∞∑
s=0
[(
Πsi=0γt+i
)
Nt+s(j)
]}
(3.6)
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The law of motion for aggregate net worth, Nt, is given by
Nt = γt[1− Γt−1(ω¯t)]RktQt−1K¯t +W et (3.7)
The debt contract specifies a pair (Bt+1(j), Zt+1) that maximizes the utility of the en-
trepreneur given by (3.6) subject to the participation constraint of lenders defined by (3.5).
As it is evident, the problem of choosing Bt+1 is equivalent to choosing κt, independently
of net worth. Furthermore, using (3.2) we can re-express Zt+1 in terms of ω¯t+1, so that
our contract is described by the pair (κt, ω¯t+1). Dmitriev and Hoddenbagh (2013) show
that maximization of inter-temporal utility with linear preferences is identical to the max-
imization of the next period expected payoff in (3.3) to the first order approximation. As
in BGG, in this model we can solve for the aggregate variables Nt, κt and ω¯t+1 without
keeping track of the distribution of net worth.
3.3.3 Financial Intermediaries
Financial intermediaries accept deposits from households and provide one-period loans to
entrepreneurs. While able to diversify the idiosyncratic risk by lending to a large number
of entrepreneurs, financial intermediaries are still subject to aggregate risk. Financial in-
termediaries play also an important role in liquidating the assets of entrepreneurs who go
bankrupt. The liquidation cost that they face, µt, is going to be proportional to the market
value of the assets.
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Liquidating assets is costly for banks. Banks specialize in financial intermediation, not
in selling distressed assets, hence they lack sufficient skills to properly assess the value of
capital goods. When markets are very liquid, the lack of skills is not very problematic and
banks can easily find buyers who would pay competitive prices. When markets are very
illiquid and banks need to liquidate assets they are instead forced to take a discount on the
true market value.
The notion of asset market liquidity that we consider, θt, is defined as the ratio of aggre-
gate net sales over net purchases of capital by entrepreneurs in the capital goods market
θt =
∫ 1
0 max[K¯t(j)− K¯t+1(j), 0]dj∫ 1
0 max[K¯t+1(j)− K¯t(j), 0]dj
(3.8)
An analytical expression for θt is derived in the Appendix. In equation (3.8) the term
max[K¯t(j) − K¯t+1(j), 0] in the numerator defines the net sales of capital units by en-
trepreneur j. When the entrepreneur is a net purchaser of capital on the market, this
term becomes zero. Correspondingly, the term max[K¯t+1(j) − K¯t(j), 0] in the denomi-
nator denotes net purchases of physical capital by entrepreneur j. In the steady state
entrepreneurs with high idiosyncratic productivity realizations become net buyers of cap-
ital, while unproductive entrepreneurs become net sellers. However, during recessions the
fall in asset prices reduces aggregate returns, and makes most of entrepreneurs start selling
capital. This effect will make markets very illiquid for banks that try to sell seized assets.
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We assume that liquidation cost of the banks are a decreasing function of market liquidity
µt = µ
(
θt/θss
)ϕ
(3.9)
where ϕ > 0 and θss is the steady state value of θt. This approach parallels Blanchard
and Gal´ı (2010), who model frictions in labor markets by assuming that hiring costs are
an increasing function of labor market tightness. Our formalization implies that banks
can liquidate assets immediately, as long as they are willing to pay the liquidation cost,
µt, which is a function of the liquidity of the market for capital goods. An alternative
formulation of the problem would see banks paying a search cost to find a match with
a potential buyer. In this case some of the capital will not be matched and stay on the
balance sheets of the banks, which would add a lot of complexity by making the problem
of financial intermediaries dynamic in the presence of agency costs. Moreover, the gains of
developing such a model are limited by the absence of data on “vacancies” for capital, which
make the matching approach less attractive in capital markets relative to labor markets.
Nevertheless, both approaches share the idea that the cost of liquidating the capital is a
decreasing function of the liquidity in the capital market. Our approach has the advantage
of keeping the model much more tractable and compatible with the current generation of
agency costs setups.
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3.4 General Equilibrium
Our general equilibrium model extends CMR, allowing liquidation cost to vary with the
business cycle, as developed in the previous section. This medium-scale DSGE model has
been shown to be well suited to explain the joint co-movement of financial and traditional key
macroeconomic variables. The New Keynesian backbone of the model follows Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005), augmented with technology shocks in the production of
installed capital, following the contribution of Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2010).
The agency problem between lenders and entrepreneurs comes from BGG. Our framework
is isomorphic to CMR’s model when we set ϕ = 0.
3.4.1 Final Goods Producers
Perfectly competitive firms produce a homogeneous final good, Yt, from a continuum of
intermediate goods, Yj,t, j ∈ [0, 1] using the following Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator
Yt =
(∫ 1
0
Y
1
λf,t
j,t dj
)λf,t
, 1 < λf,t <∞ (3.10)
where λf,t is a price markup shock. All the shocks processes will be described below.
Maximization of profits, together with the zero-profit condition, implies that the price of
the final good, Pt, is the familiar CES aggregate of intermediate goods’ prices.
The homogenous final good can be converted into consumption goods, Ct, one for one. A
different technology converts ΥtµΥ,t units of final goods into one unit of investment goods,
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where µΥ,t is an investment-specific technology (IST) shock. These two technologies are
operated by perfectly competitive firms so that the equilibrium price of investment goods
is Pt/(Υ
tµΥ,t).
3.4.2 Intermediate Goods Producers
Each intermediate good j is produced by a monopolist using the following production func-
tion
Yj,t = max[tK
α
j,t(ztlj,t)
1−α − Φz∗t , 0] (3.11)
where Kj,t and lj,t denote the amount of effective capital and labor employed by firm j. t
is a stationary technology shock, while the variable zt follows a process with a stationary
growth rate. Φ is a fixed cost in production chosen so that profits are zero in steady state
and z∗t = ztΥ
( α1−α)t to ensure the existence of a balanced growth path. Supplier j sets his
price to maximize his profits subject to Calvo-style frictions (Calvo, 1983). In particular,
in every period t a random subset ξp of suppliers cannot optimally set its price, but adjusts
it according to Pj,t = p˜itPj,t−1, where the indexation follows p˜it = (pi
target
t )
ι(pit−1)1−ι and
pit−1 ≡ Pt−1/Pt−2. pitargett represents a target inflation rate for the monetary policy rule,
described below. The complementary set of suppliers 1−ξp re-optimizes prices to maximize
the profit function:
Et
∞∑
s=0
βsξsp
Λt+s
Λt
[
Pj,t
(
s∏
k=1
(pitargett+k )
ι(pit+k−1)1−ι
)
Yj,t+s −Wt+slj,t+s − Pt+srkt+sKj,t+s
]
(3.12)
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where the demand for the intermediate product Yj,t comes from the final goods producers,
Wt indicates the nominal wage and Λt is the marginal utility of nominal income for the
representative household.
3.4.3 Capital Goods Producing Sector
Perfectly competitive firms purchase investment goods and transform them into new capital.
The technology used by these firms takes It units of investment goods and transforms them
into (1− S(ζI,tIt/It−1))It units of new capital. Thus, the flow profit function for a capital
good producer is given by
Qt(1− S(ζI,tIt/It−1))It − Pt/(ΥtµΥ,t)It (3.13)
The function S(x) captures the presence of adjustment costs in investment, and is such that
S(x) = S′(x) = 0 and S′′(x) = S′′, where x denotes the steady-state value of ζI,tIt/It−1
and S′′ will be a model parameter. ζI,t is a shock to the marginal efficiency of investment
(MEI) in producing capital goods.
3.4.4 Labor Market
The structure of the labor market follows Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000). The spe-
cialized labor types, hi,t, are combined by perfectly competitive employment agencies into
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a homogenous labor input using the following technology:
lt =
(∫ 1
0
(hi,t)
1
λw di
)λw
, 1 < λw <∞ (3.14)
The homogenous labor input is then sold to the intermediate firms. The wage paid by these
firms for the homogenous labor input
Wt =
(∫ 1
0
(W it )
1
1−λw di
)1−λw
(3.15)
can be obtained by solving the profit maximization problem of the employment agencies.
3.4.5 Households
The representative household maximizes its lifetime utility by choosing the optimal path of
consumption and labor input
Et
∞∑
s=0
βsζc,t+s
{
log(Ct+s − bCt+s−1)−ΨL
∫ 1
0
h1+σLi,t+s
1 + σL
di
}
b, σL > 0 (3.16)
where Ct denotes household consumption, b parameterizes the degree of consumption habits
and ζc,t indicates a preference shock. The household provides a continuum of differentiated
labor inputs, hi,t ∈ [0, 1].
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We can write the flow budget constraint for the household as
(1 + τ c)PtCt +Bt+1 ≤ (1− τ l)
∫ 1
0
W ithi,tdi+RtBt + Πt (3.17)
The left-hand side of the budget constraint encompasses the sources of expenditure. The
household purchases consumption goods, Ct, that are taxed at a rate τ
c,at price Pt, and
bonds, Bt+1. The household sources of revenues are the earnings from labor and from bonds.
Πt denotes lump-sum payments to the household, including profits from intermediate goods,
transfers from entrepreneurs, and lump-sum transfers from the government net of lump-sum
taxes. Following Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000), we assume that there is a monopoly
union for each type of labor input that sets the wage rate, W it , according to a Calvo-style
friction. Specifically, in every period a random subset of unions 1 − ξw sets their wage
optimally by maximizing
Et
∞∑
s=0
βsξsw
{
Λt+sW
i
thi,t+s − ζc,t+sΨL
h1+σLi,t+s
1 + σL
}
(3.18)
subject to the labor demand function coming from the intermediate goods producers. The
complementary set of unions adjusts their wage according toW it = (µz∗,t)
ιµ(µz∗)
1−ιµ p˜iw,tW it−1,
where µz∗ is the growth rate of z
∗
t in the non-stochastic steady state and
p˜iw,t = (pi
target
t )
ιw(pit−1)1−ιw , 0 < ιw < 1. (3.19)
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3.4.6 Aggregate Returns and Law of Motion for Capital
While the entrepreneur’s problem and timing were described in the previous section, here we
explicitly determine the aggregate returns, Rkt+1, and the law of motion for capital. At the
beginning of period t+ 1, after observing the aggregate rate of returns and prices in period
t + 1, each entrepreneur determines the utilization rate, ut+1, of its capital and supplies
effective capital services ut+1ωK¯t+1(j) for a competitive market rental rate, r
k
t+1.
7 At the
end of period t+1 the entrepreneur is left with (1−δ)ωKt+1(j), which is sold in a competitive
market for the price Qt+1. Hence, the aggregate component of the entrepreneurs’ return,
Rkt+1, is given by
Rkt+1 ≡
(1− τk)[ut+1rkt+1 − a(ut+1)]Υ−(t+1)Pt+1 + (1− δ)Qt+1 + τkδQt
Qt
(3.20)
where a is an increasing and convex function capturing the cost of capital utilization and
τk indicates the tax rate on capital income. The utilization rate is set to its optimal level,
which satisfies
Υ−(t+1)a′(ut+1) = rkt+1 (3.21)
In steady state, u = 1, a(1) = 0 and σa ≡ a′′(1)/a′(1).
In equilibrium, aggregate demand for capital goods must be equal to aggregate supply.
Aggregate demand is given by the demand for capital goods by all entrepreneurs, K¯t+1.
7The utilization rate is not indexed by j as it is independent of the entrepreneur’s net worth. This can be
seen below in equation (3.21).
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Aggregate supply is given by the undepreciated capital of all entrepreneurs, (1− δ)K¯t, plus
the new capital goods produced in period t, (1−S(ζI,tIt/It−1))It. Hence the law of motion
for aggregate capital is
K¯t+1 = (1− δ)K¯t + (1− S(ζi,tIt/It−1))It (3.22)
The utilization rate transforms raw capital into effective capital services according to
Kt = utK¯t (3.23)
3.4.7 The Government and The Resource Constraint
A monetary authority sets the nominal interest rate, in linearized form, following the feed-
back rule:
Rt −R = ρp(Rt−1 −R) + (1− ρp)
[
αpi(pit+1 − pitargett ) + α∆y
1
4
(gy,t − µ∗z)
]
+
1
400
pt , (3.24)
where pt is a shock to monetary policy in annual percentage points and ρp is a smoothing
parameter in the policy rule. The monetary authority responds to deviation of expected
inflation from target, pit+1−pitargett , and to deviations of quarterly growth in gross domestic
product from its steady state, gy,t − µ∗z.
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Fiscal policy is fully Ricardian. Government consumption expenditure, Gt, is given by
Gt = z
∗
t gt (3.25)
where gt follows a stationary stochastic process.
Finally, the resource constraint can be written as
Yt = Dt +Gt + Ct +
It
ΥtµΥ,t
+ a(ut)
K¯t
Υt
(3.26)
The last term on the constraint indicates the output cost of adjusting capital utilization.
Dt represents the resource cost associated with liquidation by financial intermediaries
Dt = µtG(ω¯t)R
k
t
Qt−1K¯t
Pt
(3.27)
where, relative to CMR, µt is determined endogenously.
3.4.8 Shocks and Information
The model described above includes 11 aggregate shocks: t, µz,t, λf,t, pi
∗
t , ζc,t, ζI,t, µΥ,t, γt, σt, 
p
t
and gt. Relative to CMR we abstract from modeling long-term interest rates and its as-
sociated shock . Each shock is modeled as a first-order autoregressive process. The au-
tocorrelation of monetary policy and equity shock is set to zero. Following CMR baseline
specification, we allow agents to receive information about the realization of risk shocks
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before innovation is realized. In particular we consider the following representation of the
risk shock:
σt = ρσσt−1 + ξ0,t + ξ1,t−1 + . . .+ ξp,t−p︸ ︷︷ ︸
=ut
(3.28)
The innovation ut is a sum of i.i.d. random variables with zero mean that are orthogonal
to xt−j , j ≥ 1. In period t, agents observe ξj,t, j = 0, 1, . . . , p and we refer to ξj,t, j > 0 as
news shocks. The news shocks exhibit the following correlation:
ρ|i−j|σ,n =
Eξi,tξj,t√
(Eξ2i,t)(Eξ
2
j,t)
, i, j = 0, . . . , p. (3.29)
where −1 ≤ ρ|i−j|σ,n ≤ 1. Under this specification, the parameters associated with the risk
shock are: ρσ, ρσ,n, σσ and σσ,n. The other shocks have only two parameters: an autocorre-
lation and a standard deviation parameter.
3.5 Calibration
Standard Parameters. Our calibration for the standard part of the model follows CMR.
The values for the parameters that are related to the long-run properties of our model are
summarized in Table 3.1. We set the capital’s share, α, to 0.4, the Frisch elasticity of
labor supply, σL to 1, and the depreciation rate for capital to 0.025. The mean growth
rate of the unit root technology, µz, is fixed at 0.41 percent and the rate of investment
specific technological change at 0.42 percent. These values are chosen to be consistent with
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the average growth rate of per capita GDP over the sample period and to account for the
average rate of decline in the price of investment goods. We set the steady state value of
gt so that government expenditure is 20 percent of GDP in steady state, consistent with
the data. Steady-state inflation is fixed at 2.4 percent on an annual basis. The household’s
discount factor is set to 0.9987. As in Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) we set
the steady state markups in the product market λf,t and in the labor market λw to 1.2
and 1.05. The tax rates on consumption, capital income and labor follow CMR. We fix the
habit formation parameter, b, to 0.74, CMR posterior mode.
For the part of the model that relates to financial frictions, we set the steady-state
probability of entrepreneurs exiting business, 1− γ, is set to 1− 0.985. Liquidation costs in
steady state, µ, are set to 0.21 and the steady-state volatility of idiosyncratic productivity
to 0.26. These values imply a steady-state leverage K¯/N of 2.015, an annualized default
probability of 2.24 percent and a value of Rk/R of 1.0073 corresponding to annualized excess
return to capital of 4 percent. Furthermore, our calibration implies a share of consumption
and investment in GDP of 0.52 and 0.27, in line with the data. Note that our modification
to the CMR framework does not affect the steady state of the model but only its dynamics.
The remainder of the parameters affect the model’s dynamics. We calibrate these parame-
ters using CMR’s posterior mode. CMR estimate were pinned down by Bayesian techniques
to match the dynamics of eight macroeconomic series and four financial series. The param-
eter values are summarized in Table 3.2. The persistence parameters tend to be relatively
high for all shocks, except for the persistent component of technology growth, implying that
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log zt follows roughly a random walk. CMR estimates point to sizable nominal rigidities
both in prices and wages. Overall these parameter values are reasonable and in line with
previous research.
Calibrating ϕ. The elasticity of liquidation costs, ϕ, is calibrated using our data on
recovery rates. While our model is parameterized at a quarterly frequency, recovery rates
are only available at annual frequency. We address the issue by constructing in the model
the following moving average that we map directly into the recovery data
Rcτ =
Rct +R
c
t−1 +Rct−2 +Rct−3
4Rc
(3.30)
where τ is a yearly time subscript. We choose a value of ϕ equal to 16, such that the
volatility of recovery rates in the model matches the volatility of recovery rates in the data.
This value of ϕ implies that that if the ratio of sellers to buyers of capital increases by 1
percent, liquidation costs will go up by 2 percentage points. Finally, note that when we set
ϕ equal to zero our model becomes isomorphic to CMR’s.
3.6 Impulse Response Analysis
Figure 3.4 outlines the dynamic effect of a positive entrepreneurial survival shock on the
economy. Following the shock, fewer entrepreneurs exit the economy, which drives aggre-
gate entrepreneurial net worth up and allows entrepreneurs to invest more. Consequently
investment increases, driving asset prices, output and hours upward. Higher asset prices
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boost aggregate returns, which leads to a rise of worth and a decrease in defaults. This is an
example of standard financial accelerator mechanism, and it holds for the basic model and
the extended version with liquidity channel. Despite these similarities two models generate
very different dynamics of recovery rate. While in the basic model recovery rate stays prac-
tically flat, in the model with liquidity channel recovery rate skyrockets by 25 percent. This
spike in recovery follows from the fact that with a higher survival rate fewer entrepreneurs
exit the industry and sell their businesses. In turn, this implies that capital markets are
more liquid, making it much easier for banks to sell seized assets. The surge in recovery
rates decreases the cost of lending, which in turn drives investment, net worth, output and
asset prices further up. As a result, the impact of a survival shock on output is almost twice
as high for the model with liquidity channel.
The dynamic effect of risk shocks on the economy is demonstrated on Figure 3.5. Higher
risk causes the increase in defaults and bankruptcy costs, and as a result investment con-
tracts and drive asset prices down, causing net worth and output to fall. Decrease in asset
prices leads to the decline of recovery rate by 2 percentage point in the basic model and
by 8 percentage point in the model with the liquidity channel. This sharper decrease in
the recovery rate is caused by markets becoming less liquid due to the surge in defaults
and reduction in investment. The fall in recovery rate for the extended model makes cost
of lending higher, and this leads to the next contraction of investment, net worth, price
of capital and output. Overall, the presence of the liquidity channel amplifies the impact
response of output to the risk shock by 25 percent.
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The mechanism is similar for a contractionary monetary shock, illustrated in Figure 3.6.
In the case of the basic model the negative demand shock causes a contraction in investment
and asset prices. This initial effect translates into net worth losses and leads to the next
round of financial tightening, decreasing in investment, prices, and net worth and leading
to a surge in defaults. All of these processes make markets less liquid and, therefore, the
model with the liquidity channel generates a stronger decline in recovery rates relative to
the basic model, where it essentially stays at the steady state level. The additional fall in
recovery rate makes external financing more costly and causes investment and asset prices to
go down, which again leads to the deterioration of net worth and strengthens the recession.
The liquidity channel amplifies shocks for all the cases above. This is not a coincidence,
since investment are procyclical, making capital markets less liquid during a recession and
more liquid during a boom. The illiquidity causes the recovery rates to fall during the
recession, increasing the financial wedge stronger, which, through a deterioration of balance
sheets, has an additional negative impact on the economy. Balance sheet effects work in
a similar way through a procyclicality of investment that causes asset prices and, hence,
net worth to be procyclical as well. Although these two channels are distinct, they tend
to reinforce each other. Lower net worth causes a decline in investment and makes market
less liquid, but the liquidity channel causes recovery rates to go down, reducing lending and
investment, which leads to a drop in asset prices and, consequently, net worth.
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3.7 Conclusion
In this paper we document that recovery rates from default in the United States are very
volatile and strongly pro-cyclical. We demonstrate that current models of financial frictions
significantly understate this volatility by one order of magnitude relative to the data. This
finding suggests that current models may underestimate the severity of frictions in financial
markets. We therefore extend the financial friction model of Christiano, Motto, and Ros-
tagno (2014), allowing liquidation costs for defaulted assets to depend on the liquidity of
the market for these assets. This modification allows us to explain the behavior of standard
business cycle variables as well as recovery rates. Our impulse response analysis suggests
that the effect of financial shocks on output and asset prices is strongly amplified in the
presence of liquidity channel.
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Table 3.1: Calibration - Parameters Related to the Steady State
Name Description Value
β Discount rate 0.9987
σL Inverse Frisch elasticity of labor supply 1
ΨL Disutility weight on labor 0.7705
b Habit formation 0.74
λw Steady-state mark-up for suppliers of labor 1.05
λf Steady-state mark-up for intermediate goods firms 1.2
µz Mean growth rate of unit root technology process 0.41
Υ Steady-state rate of investment-specific technological change 0.42
δ Capital depreciation rate 0.025
α Share of capital in production function 0.4
γ Fraction of entrepreneurial net worth retained 0.985
µ Steady-state monitoring costs 0.21
σ Steady-state standard deviation of idiosyncratic productivity 0.26
W e Transfers received by entrepreneurs 0.005
ηg Share of government spending in GDP in steady state 0.2
pitarget Steady-state inflation rate (APR) 2.43
τ c Tax rate on consumption 0.05
τk Tax rate on capital income 0.32
τ l Tax rate on labor income 0.24
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Table 3.2: Calibration - Other Parameters
Name Description Value
ξw Calvo wage stickiness 0.81
σa Curvature, utilization cost 2.54
S′′ Curvature, investment adjustment cost 10.78
ξp Calvo price stickiness 0.74
αpi Policy weight on inflation 2.4
ρp Policy smoothing parameter 0.85
ι Price indexing weight on inflation target 0.90
ιw Wage indexing weight on inflation target 0.49
Υ Wage indexing weight on technology shock 0.94
α∆y Policy weight on output growth 0.36
ϕ Elasticity of liquidation costs 16
ρσ,n Correlation among signals 0.39
ρλf Autocorrelation, price markup shock 0.91
ρµΥ Autocorrelation, IST shock 0.99
ρg Autocorrelation, government spending shock 0.94
ρµz Autocorrelation, persistent technology 0.15
ρ Autocorrelation, transitory technology 0.81
ρσ Autocorrelation, risk shock 0.97
ρζc Autocorrelation, preference shock 0.90
ρζI Autocorrelation, MEI shock 0.91
Standard deviations
σσ,n Anticipated risk shock 0.028
σσ,0 Unanticipated risk shock 0.07
σλf Price markup shock 0.011
σµΥ IST shock 0.004
σg Government spending shock 0.023
σµz Persistent technology shock 0.0071
σγ Survival probability shock 0.0081
σγ Temporary technology shock 0.0046
σp Monetary policy shock 0.49
σζc Preference shock 0.023
σζI MEI shock 0.055
σζI Measurement error, net worth 0.018
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Figure 3.1: Recovery Rates and U.S. Real GDP Growth
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Notes: Recovery rates (left axis) come from Moody’s “Annual Default Study: Corporate
Default and Recovery Rates”. GDP growth (right axis) comes from the FRED database.
Shaded bars indicate NBER recessions.
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Figure 3.2: Recovery Rates and Business Loan Delinquency Rates
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Notes: Recovery rates (left axis) come from Moody’s “Annual Default Study: Corporate
Default and Recovery Rates”. Business Loan Delinquency Rates (right axis) come from the
FRED database. Shaded bars indicate NBER recessions.
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Figure 3.3: Recovery Rates - Model versus Data
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Notes: The data on recovery rates come from Moody’s “Annual Default Study: Corporate
Default and Recovery Rates”. The implied series from the model comes from the estimated
Christiano, Motto, Rostagno (2014) model, as explained in the main text. Shaded bars
indicate NBER recessions.
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Figure 3.4: Impulse Response to Entrepreneurial Exit Shock
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Notes: The figure depicts the impulse responses of key variables following an entrepreneurial
exit shock for the baseline model (CMR) (blue lines) and for the model with time-varying
liquidation costs (orange lines).
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Figure 3.5: Impulse Response to of Risk Shock
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Notes: The figure depicts the impulse responses of key variables following a risk shock for
the baseline model (CMR) (blue lines) and for the model with time-varying liquidation costs
(orange lines).
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Figure 3.6: Impulse Response to Monetary Shock
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Notes: The figure depicts the impulse responses of key variables following a monetary shock
for the baseline model (CMR) (blue lines) and for the model with time-varying liquidation
costs (orange lines).
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Appendix A
Information Frictions and Real Exchange
Rate Dynamics
A.1 Solution for pHt and pFt
Log-linearizing the FOC, one obtains
pt(h) = Eht(wht − at) (A.1)
Add and subtract pt inside the expectation
pt(h) = Eht(wit − pt + pt − at) (A.2)
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Now substitute wht − pt from the log-linear version of (1.6) to obtain
pt(h) = Eht(σct +
1
ψ
lit + pt − at) (A.3)
Substitute the production function for lit
pt(h) = Eht(σct +
1
ψ
(yit − ait) + pt − at) (A.4)
Now substitute the log-linearized demand for yit
pt(h) = Eht[σct+pt− (1+ 1
ψ
)at+
1
ψ
(−γ(pt(h)−pHt)−ω(pHt−pt)+αct+(1−α)(ωqt+ c∗t )]
Add and subtract pHt and rearrange to obtain
pt(h) =Eht
[
−
(
1 + ψ
γ + ψ
)
at + pHt −
(
ψ + ω
γ + ψ
)
(pHt − pt) + α
(
α+ ψσ
γ + ψ
)
ct
]
+
Eht
[
(1− α)
(
1
γ + ψ
)
(ωqt + c∗t )
]
Now recall that pHt − pt = −(1− α)τt, so
pt(h) =Eit
[
−
(
1 + ψ
γ + ψ
)
at + pHt + (1− α)
(
ψ + ω
γ + ψ
)
τt + α
(
α+ ψσ
γ + ψ
)
ct
]
+
Eht
[
(1− α)
(
1
γ + ψ
)
(ωqt + c∗t )
]
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Recall that qt = (2α− 1)τt, hence
pt(h) = Eht
[
pHt − (γ + ψ)−1[(1 + ψ) at + (1− α) (ψ + ω + ω(2α− 1)) τt + (α+ ψσ) ct + (1− α)c∗t ]
]
pt(h) = Eht
{
pHt + (γ + ψ)
−1[(1− α) (ψ + 2αω) τt + (α+ ψσ) ct + (1− α)c∗t − (1 + ψ) at]
}
(A.5)
A similar equation can be derived for pt(f). Rewrite this as
pt(h) = Eit
{
pHt + (γ + ψ)
−1[(1− α) (ψ + 2αω) τt + (1 + ψσ) ct − (1− α)(ct − c∗t )− (1 + ψ) ait]
}
using the fact that ct − c∗t = (2α− 1)σ−1τt, I can write
pt(h) = Eit
{
pHt + (γ + ψ)
−1[(1− α) (ψ + 2αω − (2α− 1)σ−1) τt + (1 + ψσ) ct − (1 + ψ) ait]}
use the money process and the link between relative prices to write
pt(h) =Eht
{
pHt + (γ + ψ)
−1[(1− α) (ψ + 2αω − (2α− 1)σ−1) τt}+
Eht {(1 + ψσ) (mt − (1− α)τt − pHt)− (1 + ψ) at]}
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and finally
pt(h) = Eht
{(
1− 1 + ψσ
γ + ψ
)
pHt
}
+
Eht
{[
(1− α)(ψ + 2αω − (2α− 1)σ−1 − 1− ψσ)
γ + ψ
]
τt +
(
1 + ψσ
γ + ψ
)
mt −
(
1 + ψ
γ + ψ
)
at
}
Similarly, for the foreign country I have
p∗t (f) = Eft
{(
1− 1 + ψσ
γ + ψ
)
p∗Ft
}
−
Eft
{[
(1− α)(ψ + 2αω − (2α− 1)σ−1 − 1− ψσ)
γ + ψ
]
τt +
(
1 + ψσ
γ + ψ
)
m∗t −
(
1 + ψ
γ + ψ
)
a∗t
}
Notice that the last two equations collapse to (1.17) and (1.18) when σ = 1. By averaging
these two equation over firms one obtains
pHt = E¯
(1)
t
{(
1− 1 + ψσ
γ + ψ
)
pHt
}
+
E¯(1)t
{[
(1− α)(ψ + 2αω − (2α− 1)σ−1 − 1− ψσ)
γ + ψ
]
τt +
(
1 + ψσ
γ + ψ
)
mt −
(
1 + ψ
γ + ψ
)
at
}
and
p∗Ft = E¯
(1)
t
{(
1− 1 + ψσ
γ + ψ
)
p∗Ft
}
−
E¯(1)t
{[
(1− α)(ψ + 2αω − (2α− 1)σ−1 − 1− ψσ)
γ + ψ
]
τt +
(
1 + ψσ
γ + ψ
)
m∗t −
(
1 + ψ
γ + ψ
)
a∗t
}
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When taking the sum of these two equations the terms of trade cancel out
pHt + p
∗
Ft = E¯
(1)
t
{(
1− 1 + ψσ
γ + ψ
)
(pHt + p
∗
Ft) +
(
1 + ψσ
γ + ψ
)
mWt −
(
1 + ψ
γ + ψ
)
aWt
}
Recursively substituting pHt + p
∗
Ft on the right-hand side yields
pHt + p
∗
Ft = ξ˜
∞∑
k=1
(1− ξ˜)k−1E(k)t
(
mWt −
1 + ψ
1 + ψσ
aWt
)
(A.6)
where
ξ˜ =
1 + ψσ
γ + ψ
(A.7)
Taking instead the difference of the average prices equations yields
pHt − p∗Ft = E(1)t
{(
1− 1 + ψσ
γ + ψ
)
(pHt − p∗Ft)+
}
E(1)t
{
2
[
(1− α)(ψ + 2αω − (2α− 1)σ−1 − 1− ψσ)
γ + ψ
]
τt +
(
1 + ψσ
γ + ψ
)
mDt −
(
1 + ψ
γ + ψ
)
aDit
}
Now I need to solve for τt in terms of pHt − p∗Ft and mDt
εt = qt + pt − p∗t = (2α− 1)τt +mDt − cDt (A.8)
= (2α− 1)τt − (2α− 1)σ−1τt +mDt = (2α− 1)(1− σ−1)τt +mDt (A.9)
So
τt = p
∗
Ft − pHt + εt = p∗Ft − pHt + (2α− 1)(1− σ−1)τt +mDt (A.10)
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(1− (2α− 1)(1− σ−1))τt = −(pHt − p∗Ft) +mDt (A.11)
or
τt =
1
(1− (2α− 1)(1− σ−1))(−(pHt − p
∗
Ft) +m
D
t ) (A.12)
Substituting this above
pt(h)− pt(f)∗ = Eit
{(
1− 1 + ψσ
γ + ψ
− 2
[
(1− α)(ψ + 2αω − (2α− 1)σ−1 − 1− ψσ)
(γ + ψ)(1− (2α− 1)(1− σ−1))
])
(pHt − p∗Ft)
}
+
Eit
{(
1 + ψσ
γ + ψ
+ 2
[
(1− α)(ψ + 2αω − (2α− 1)σ−1 − 1− ψσ)
(γ + ψ)(1− (2α− 1)(1− σ−1))
])
mDt −
(
1 + ψ
γ + ψ
)
aDt
}
Hence the solution for the price difference can be expressed as
pHt − p∗Ft = ϕ˜
∞∑
k=1
(1− ϕ˜)k−1E(k)t
(
mDt −
1 + ψ
(γ + ψ)ϕ˜
aDt
)
(A.13)
where
ϕ˜ =
(
1 + ψσ
γ + ψ
+ 2
[
(1− α)(ψ + 2αω − (2α− 1)σ−1 − 1− ψσ)
(γ + ψ)(1− (2α− 1)(1− σ−1))
])
(A.14)
It can be easily verified that if σ = 1, then ξ˜ = ξ and ϕ˜ = ϕ and one goes back to the
equations (1.22) and (1.24) in the main text. The solution for the real exchange rate follows
by using the relationship qt = (2α− 1)tt.
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A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
The random-walk hypothesis implies that mDt = m
D
t−1 + ut, where ut ≡ umt − um
∗
t . The
proof follows the guess-and-verify approach used by Woodford (2002). The guess is that:
pHt − p∗Ft = ν(pHt − p∗Ft) + (1− ν)mDt (A.15)
Denote with i subscript a generic firm in either Home or Foreign. Equation (1.15) shows
that firms in each country receive two signals about the money supplies: one for Home (zmi,t)
and one for Foreign (zm
∗
i,t ). Given the properties of the signals, it is as if firm i received
one signal about the difference in money supplies: si,t = m
D
t + ηi,t with ηi,t = v
m
i,t − vm
∗
i,t .
Writing compactly the process for the money supplies, the guess for the price difference,
and this signal in a state-space representation, we have:
 mDt
pHt − p∗Ft
 =
 1 0
1− ν ν

 mDt−1
pH,t−1 − p∗F,t−1
+
 1
1− ν
ut =⇒ xt = Mxt−1 + dut
(A.16)
si,t =
[
1 0
] mDt
pHt − p∗Ft
+ ηi,t =⇒ si,t = ext + ηi,t (A.17)
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Here I have defined the new vector xt and matrices M,d and e to write the problem as a
state-space system. The Kalman filter implies:
Eit(xt) = Ei,t−1(xt−1) + κ[si,t − eMEi,t−1(xt−1)] (A.18)
with κ = [κ1, κ2]
′ being a 2 × 1 vector of Kalman gains. Given the symmetry of signals
across countries, integrating the last expression over the continuum of Home or Foreign
firms yields:
E¯(1)t (xt) = κeMxt−1 + (M − κeM)E¯(1)t−1(xt−1) + κedut (A.19)
Now note that equation (1.23), absent technology shocks, may be written as:
pHt − p∗Ft = (1− ϕ)E¯(1)t (pHt − p∗Ft) + ϕE¯(1)t (mDt ) (A.20)
On the right-hand side of this expression, the average expectations of mDt and pHt − p∗Ft
can be replaced using equation (A.19) after performing the matrix algebra. This yields:
pHt − p∗Ft = ν(pH,t−1 − p∗F,t−1) + [ϕκ1 + (1− ϕ)κ2]mDt + [(1− ν)− ϕκ1 − (1− ϕ)κ2]E¯(1)t−1(mDt−1)
This verifies the original guess in equation (A.15) and shows that (1−ν) = ϕκ1 +(1−ϕ)κ2.
Now recall that with log utility the real exchange rate is given by qt = (2α− 1)(p∗Ft + εt −
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pHt) = (2α− 1)(mDt − pHt + p∗Ft). Using the solution for the price difference yields:
qt = (2α− 1)[mt−1 + ut − (1− ν)mt−1 − ν(pH,t−1 − p∗F,t−1)− (1− ν)ut]
= νqt−1 + (2α− 1)νut
The expressions for the autocorrelation and the standard deviation of the real exchange
rate immediately follow. 
A.3 Stationarizing the Model
In rewriting the model in a stationary representation, I can exploit the following facts:
• The level of the money supply is nonstationary, but money growth is stationary.
• Price levels and, more generally, higher-order beliefs about money supplies are non-
stationary but deviations of these beliefs from the true levels of the money supplies
are stationary.
The exogenous state variables are Xt = [mt,mt−1,m∗t ,m∗t−1, at, a∗t ]′. The state-transition
equation is given by:
X¯t = B¯X¯t−1 + b¯ut (A.21)
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where
X¯t =

Xt
Fξ,t
Fϕ,t
 B¯ =

B6×6 0 0
Γξ,x6×6 Γ
ξ,ξ
6×6 0
Γϕ,x6×6 0 Γ
ϕ,ϕ
6×6
 b¯ =

b6×4
Γξ,u6×4
Γϕ,u6×4
 ut =

umt
um
∗
t
uat
ua
∗
t

where Fξ,t ≡ ξ
∑∞
k=1(1 − ξ)X(k)t and Fϕ,t ≡ ϕ
∑∞
k=1(1 − ϕ)X(k)t are the weighted averages
of higher-order beliefs that matter for the solution of the model. The matrices B and b
are given exogenously, and the matrices Γ can be found as the solution to the fixed-point
problem. Now define for any exogenous variable, xt, the deviation of the variable itself from
its weighted average of HOEs: x−ξt ≡ xt − ξ
∑∞
k=1(1 − ξ)x(k)t and the similar object for ϕ,
so that in vectors this is X−ξt = Xt − ξ
∑∞
k=1(1 − ξ)X(k)t . Because the weighted average
of HOEs converges in the long run to the respective variables, the dynamics of X−ξt and
X−ϕt will be stationary. Furthermore, notice that the Kalman filter iteration implies that
Γξ,x + Γξ,ξ = Γϕ,x + Γϕ,ϕ = B. Using this fact and equation (A.21), one can show that
X−ξt = Γ
ξ,ξX−ξt−1 + [b− Γξ,u]ut (A.22)
X−ϕt = Γ
ϕ,ϕX−ϕt−1 + [b− Γϕ,u]ut (A.23)
163
Appendix A Information Frictions and Real Exchange Rate Dynamics
Finally, we stationarize the exogenous part of the system by rewriting it in terms of money
growth rates

∆mt
∆m∗t
at
a∗t

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Yt
=

ρm 0 0 0
0 ρm∗ 0 0
0 0 ρa 0
0 0 0 ρa∗

︸ ︷︷ ︸
A

∆mt−1
∆m∗t−1
at−1
a∗t−1

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Yt−1
+

1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1

︸ ︷︷ ︸
a

umt
um
∗
t
uat
ua
∗
t

(A.24)
So finally, our stationary state can be written as

Yt
X−ξt
X−ϕt

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Y¯t
=

A 0 0
0 Γξ,ξ 0
0 0 Γϕ,ϕ

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Φ

Yt−1
X−ξt−1
X−ϕt−1
+

a
b− Γξ,u
b− Γϕ,u

︸ ︷︷ ︸
C
ut (A.25)
Define the stationary variables: mpt ≡ mt − pHt and mp∗t = m∗t − p∗Ft. The solution for
these variables can be written as
mpt = ehY¯t (A.26)
mp∗t = ef Y¯t (A.27)
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The other model equations can be written as
τt = [1− (2α− 1)(1− σ−1)]−1(mpt −mp∗t ) (A.28)
ct = mpt − (1− α)τt (A.29)
c∗t = mp
∗
t + (1− α)τt (A.30)
yHt = ω(1− α)τt + αct + (1− α)(ωqt + c∗t ) (A.31)
yf = −ω(1− α)τt + (1− α)(ct − ωqt) + αc∗t (A.32)
qt = σ(ct − c∗t ) (A.33)
piHt = ∆mt −mpt +mpt−1 (A.34)
piFt = ∆m
∗
t −mp∗t +mp∗t−1 (A.35)
pi = αpiHt + (1− α)(∆εt + piFt ) (A.36)
pi∗ = (1− α)(piHt −∆εt) + αpiFt (A.37)
∆εt = ∆mt −∆m∗t + (2α− 1)(1− σ−1)(τt − τt−1) (A.38)
∆mt = ρm∆mt−1 + umt (A.39)
∆mt = ρ
∗
m∆mt−1 + u
m∗
t (A.40)
at = ρaat−1 + uat (A.41)
a∗t = ρ
∗
aa
∗
t−1 + u
a∗
t (A.42)
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These equations can be written compactly as
Zt = ΞY¯t (A.43)
Equations (A.25) and (A.43) form the stationary state-space representation of the model.
A.4 Simulating Firms’ Prices
Consider the nonstationary system as defined above
X¯t = B¯X¯t−1 + b¯ut (A.44)
Recall that the prices solutions are equations (A.6) and (A.13), which can be solved to get
the individual prices as a function of the state
pHt =
(mξt +m
∗ξ
t +m
ϕ
t −m∗ϕt )− (χw(aξt + a∗ξt ) + χd(aϕt − a∗ϕt ))
2
(A.45)
p∗Ft =
[mξt +m
∗ξ
t − (mϕt −m∗ϕt )]− [χw(aξt + a∗ξt )− χd(aϕt − a∗ϕt )]
2
(A.46)
where I defined χw =
1+ψ
(γ+ψ)ξ˜
and χd =
1+ψ
(γ+ψ)ϕ˜ and
τt =
1
(1− (2α− 1)(1− σ−1)) [mt −m
∗
t − (mϕt −m∗ϕt ) + χd(aϕt − a∗ϕt )] (A.47)
166
Appendix A Information Frictions and Real Exchange Rate Dynamics
Define two vectors vh and vf and vτ such that pHt = v1X¯t and τt = v2X¯t. So
vh = 1/2[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0− χw,−χw, 1, 0,−1, 0,−χd,+χd] (A.48)
vτ =
1
(1− (2α− 1)(1− σ−1)) [1, 0,−1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,−1, 0, 1, 0, χd,−χd] (A.49)
vf = 1/2[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0− χw,−χw,−1, 0, 1, 0, χd,−χd] (A.50)
Recall that the home price was
pt(h) = Eit
{(
1− 1 + ψσ
γ + ψ
)
pHt
}
+ (A.51)
Eit
{[
(1− α)(ψ + 2αω − (2α− 1)σ−1 − 1− ψσ)
γ + ψ
]
τt +
(
1 + ψσ
γ + ψ
)
mt −
(
1 + ψ
γ + ψ
)
ait
}
(A.52)
or
pt(h) = Eit
{(
1− 1 + ψσ
γ + ψ
)
v1X¯t
}
+ (A.53)
Eit
{[
(1− α)(ψ + 2αω − (2α− 1)σ−1 − 1− ψσ)
γ + ψ
]
v2X¯t +
(
1 + ψσ
γ + ψ
)
e1X¯t −
(
1 + ψ
γ + ψ
)
e5X¯t
}
(A.54)
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For foreign prices
p∗t (f) = Eit
{(
1− 1 + ψσ
γ + ψ
)
p∗Ft
}
−
Eit
{[
(1− α)(ψ + 2αω − (2α− 1)σ−1 − 1− ψσ)
γ + ψ
]
τt +
(
1 + ψσ
γ + ψ
)
m∗t −
(
1 + ψ
γ + ψ
)
a∗it
}
or
p∗t (f) = Eit
{(
1− 1 + ψσ
γ + ψ
)
vf X¯t
}
−
Eit
{[
(1− α)(ψ + 2αω − (2α− 1)σ−1 − 1− ψσ)
γ + ψ
]
vτ X¯t +
(
1 + ψσ
γ + ψ
)
e3X¯t −
(
1 + ψ
γ + ψ
)
e6X¯t
}
So you can write it as
pt(h) = PhX¯
(1)
t|t (h) p
∗
t (f) = Pf X¯
(1)
t|t (f) (A.55)
where P are the appropriate matrices. The state space for the firm h is given by
X¯t = B¯X¯t−1 + b¯ut (A.56)
zit = DX¯t + vit (A.57)
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where
D =

1 0 0 0 0 0 01×12
0 0 1 0 0 0 01×12
0 0 0 0 1 0 01×12
0 0 0 0 0 1 01×12

(A.58)
Beliefs about the state evolve according to
X¯
(1)
t|t (i) = B¯X¯
(1)
t−1|t−1(i) +K[zit −DB¯X¯
(1)
t−1|t−1(i)] (A.59)
where K = ΣD′(DΣD′ + Σv)−1 and
Σ = B¯ΣB¯ − B¯ΣD′(DΣD′ + Σv)−1DΣB¯′ + b¯Σub¯′ (A.60)
These are the same matrices K,Σ that one finds with the model solution.
A.5 Calculating Profit Losses
Profit Losses in the Dispersed-information Model
Modeling imperfect information with noisy signals is a simple way of formalizing the idea
that a cost is associated with gathering and processing the information that is relevant
for firms’ optimal pricing decisions. In the context of the present model, that information
consists of aggregate economic conditions and the prices set by domestic and foreign com-
petitors. One way to evaluate the plausibility of the estimated signal-to-noise ratios is to
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consider the individual profit loss that a firm incurs when they observe signals only with
finite precision. Indeed, one may argue that if paying limited attention to macroeconomic
conditions leads to high profit losses, a firm should pay more attention to those conditions.
On the other hand, if profit losses are small, then a firm’s cost of acquiring more information
would outweigh the gain in profits that derive from obtaining more information.
I here explore this reasoning in the context of my model estimates. Recall that the price
set by firm h in the home country in the model with dispersed information is given by
equation (1.19). Instead, the price that a firm would set under full information, expressed
in log-deviations from the steady state, is
pt (h) = (1− ξ)pHt +
2α(1− α)(ω − 1)
(γ + ψ)
tt + ξ(mt − at) (A.61)
Firm’s h expected per-period profit loss due to imperfect information is then given by
E [Πh,t(P t (h), ·)−Πh,t(Pt(h), ·)]
After taking a log-quadratic approximation to the profit function, this expression simplifies
to
−Π11
2
E
[
(pt (h)− pt(h))2
]
where Π11 is the curvature of the profit function with respect to the firm’s own price. As
shown in the Appendix, the expression (pt (h)− pt(h))2 can be computed analytically once
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the model is solved, using the matrices from the firm’s signal-extraction problem. Using
the posterior mode, I find that the expected profit loss from imperfect tracking of economic
conditions is 0.5% of steady-state revenue for a US firm and 0.8% for a European firm.1
These numbers suggest that the profit losses from imperfect information are small and
plausible. Empirical evidence on the cost of price adjustment indicates that the cost of
price adjustment in US industrial manufacturing is 1.22% of a firm’s steady-state revenues
(Zbaracki et al., 2004). The figure implied by the estimated model is well below the empirical
value, suggesting that it is rational for firms to settle on an equilibrium with imperfect
information, as the cost of being fully informed would outweigh the profit gain.
Profit Losses in the Calvo Model
The presence of nominal rigidities in the Calvo model implies that generally, firms do not
set their prices to the level that would maximize their profits. Firms are thus subject to
profit losses that can be compared to the losses in the dispersed-information model.
The profit-maximizing price, P t (h), or the price that a firm would set under flexible
prices, taking as given the level of demand and the level of aggregate prices, is given in
equation (A.61), because the structure of the economy is the same as in the dispersed
information model. Instead, the price that a firm in the Home country sets if subject to
the Calvo friction, PCt (h), is the optimal reset price if it has a chance to update its price,
or its old price otherwise. That is, PCt (h) = (1 − θ)PRt (h) + θPCt−1(h). The optimal reset
1Virtually all the expected profit loss comes from the imperfect tracking of monetary shocks. Specifically,
the expected profit loss due to imperfect tracking of monetary shocks for a US firm is 0.33% of steady-state
revenues. The profit loss due to imperfect tracking of technology shocks is only 0.006% of steady-state
revenues.
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price, in log-linear terms, is given by
pRt (h)− pH,t = (1− θβ)mct(h) + θβEt{(pRt+1(h)− pH,t+1) + piHt+1} (A.62)
where mct(h) =
[
σψ+1
γ+ψ yH,t − 2(1−α)αψ(σω−1)γ+ψ τt − 1+ψγ+ψat
]
. In this case there is no closed-form
solution for the expected profit-loss expression, but the model can be simulated to compute
the expectation.
To make the profit losses comparable across models, I use the following calibration. For
the parameters that are common across models, I calibrate the Calvo model using the
median estimates from the dispersed-information model. This set of parameters includes
the volatility and persistence of shocks. This choice keeps the models comparable, as the
profit losses, calculated with a quadratic approximation, are affected by the size of the
shocks. As evident from the Phillips Curves equations, the sticky-price model additionally
requires to calibrate the discount factor, β, and for the probability of non-price adjustment,
θ. I set β to 0.99, the standard value in the literature. For θ, I search for the value that allows
me to match the impulse response of the real exchange rate from the two models following
a home monetary shock. I find that value to be θ = 0.86, which implies a median price
duration of 7 quarters. Empirical estimates of the median price duration range between
4 months and 8-10 months (Bils and Klenow, 2004; Nakamura and Steinsson, 2008). In
this sense, the sticky-price model requires “too much price stickiness” to explain the real
exchange rate persistence, even in the presence of strategic complementarities that flatten
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the Phillips Curve for a given degree of nominal rigidities. This confirms the intuition of
Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2002) mentioned in the introduction.
Using this calibration, I find that the Calvo friction delivers an expected per-quarter
profit loss of 5.11% and 7.77% of steady-state revenue for a US firm and European firm, re-
spectively. These losses are one order of magnitude larger than in the dispersed-information
model and quite substantial. In particular, they are greater than the estimated cost of price
adjustment in Zbaracki et al. (2004).
Why are the differences so large? Recall the expression for the profit-maximizing price
in (A.61). This equation makes clear the role of strategic complementarities. The stronger
the strategic complementarities, the larger (1 − ξ), and the more the optimal price of a
particular firm depends on the aggregate price level. In the dispersed-information model,
large strategic complementarities imply that firms place large weights on higher-order beliefs
relative to lower-order beliefs. Because higher-order beliefs adjust more sluggishly, all prices
in equilibrium adjust sluggishly and they tend to be close together. At the same time,
high strategic complementarity implies that the profit-maximizing price is also close to
the average price in the economy. As a result, the difference between a particular firm’s
equilibrium price and its profit-maximizing price tends to be small, implying small profit
losses.
In the Calvo model, while strategic complementarity still requires the profit-maximizing
price to be close to the average price, an individual firm’s price may be arbitrarily far away
from the average if the firm did not have the chance to reset the price for a long time. Thus,
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expected profit losses increase rapidly with the probability of non-price adjustment. In this
case, with the value of θ required to match the persistence in the real exchange rate, the
losses are substantial.
A.6 Solving the Model with Endogenous Signals
This algorithm is an adaptation of Lorenzoni (2009)’s solution method.
Law of Motion For The State
Define the vectors zt = [mt,mt, at, a
∗
t , pHt, p
∗
Ft]
′ and zt = [zt, zt−1, zt−2, ...]. We are looking
for a linear equilibrium of the form:
zt = Azt−1 + But (A.63)
where ut = [e
m
t , e
m∗
t , e
a
t , e
a∗
t ]. The matrices A and B are given by
A =

Am
Am∗
Aa
Aa∗
ApH
Ap∗F

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B =

Bm
Bm∗
Ba
Ba∗
BpH
Bp∗F

whereAm, Am∗ , Aa, Aa∗ , Bm, Bm∗ , Ba, Ba∗ are known exogenous vectors andApH , Ap∗F , BpH , Bp
∗
F
are to be determined. The pricing equations can be written as
pHt = ΨHEt[zt] (A.64)
pFt = ΨFEt[zt] (A.65)
for known selector vectors ΨH ,ΨF .
Individual Inference
We can write the vector of signals for a Home firm as
sHt = Fzt + Gvt (A.66)
Bayesian updating requires
Eh,t[zt] = Eh,t−1[zt] + C(sHt − Eh,t−1[sHt ]) (A.67)
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Define Ω = V arh,t−1[zt]. The Kalman gain C and the matrix Ω must satisfy
C = ΩF′(FΩF′ + GVG′)−1 (A.68)
Ω = A(Ω−CFΩ)A′ + BΣB′ (A.69)
Fixed Point
The average first-order beliefs can be expressed as a function of the state as
zt|t = ΞHzt (A.70)
Using the updating equation and aggregating across home firms
zt|t = (I −CF)Azt−1|t−1 + CFzt (A.71)
So the matrix ΞH must satisfy
ΞHzt = (I −CF)AΞHzt−1 + CFzt (A.72)
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A similar matrix ΞF is defined for foreign firms’ first-order beliefs. These matrices allow
me to rewrite equations (95) and (96) as
pH,t = Ξ
Hzt (A.73)
pF,t = Ξ
Fzt (A.74)
The equilibrium is characterized by the vectors ApH , Ap∗F , BpH , Bp
∗
F
and matrices ΞH,ΞF
which are consistent with the law of motion of the state equation and with the signal-
extraction problem of the firms. The equilibrium can be computed iterating over the relevant
equations until convergence is achieved. The convergence criterion is given by the quadratic
distance of the impulse-response functions of pH and p
∗
F to the exogenous shocks in ut, with
weights given by the variances of the shocks.
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Risk Aversion and the Financial
Accelerator
B.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The proof follows Tamayo (2014). First, note that when the report is not verified (ω /∈ ΩV )
the repayment function must only depend on the report ω˜, i.e. we have R(ω˜). Therefore,
the entrepreneur will choose ω∗ = arg minω˜ R(ω˜) so the contract may as well set R(ω˜) = R¯.
Second, under the optimal contract, in the verification region R(ω) ≤ R¯ because otherwise
the contract would not be incentive compatible. Specifically, the entrepreneur would prefer
to misreport ω /∈ ΩV and pay R¯. Finally, it can also be shown that ΩV must be a lower
interval (for the proof see Lemma 3 in Tamayo (2014)). These findings can be summarized
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by saying that the optimal repayment function follows:
R(ω) =

R(ω) ≤ R¯, if ω ≤ ω¯
R¯, if ω > ω¯
(B.1)
Now let us rewrite the contracting problem using the above results as
max
∫ ω¯
0
(
κ
Rk
R
)1−ρ
[ω −R(ω)]1−ρdΦ(ω) +
∫ ∞
ω¯
(
κ
Rk
R
)1−ρ
[ω − R¯]1−ρdΦ(ω) (B.2)
s.t. κ
Rk
R
(∫ ω¯
0
R(ω)dΦ(ω) +R[1− Φ(ω¯)]− µΦ(ω¯)
)
≥ (κ− 1) (B.3)
R¯ ≤ ω¯ (B.4)
R(ω) ≤ ω ∀ω ≤ ω¯ (B.5)
R(ω) ≥ 0 ∀ω ≤ ω¯ (B.6)
where we have plugged in the constraint (2.3), used the definition of leverage κ = QKN
and rescaled the objective function and constraints by the exogenous parameters N and R.
Assign the multipliers λ, ξ, γ1(ω) and γ2(ω) to the constraints. The Lagrangian reads:
179
Appendix B Risk Aversion and the Financial Accelerator
max
∫ ω¯
0
(
κ
Rk
R
)1−ρ
[ω −R(ω)]1−ρdΦ(ω) +
∫ ∞
ω¯
(
κ
Rk
R
)1−ρ
[ω − R¯]1−ρdΦ(ω)+ (B.7)
λ
[
κ
Rk
R
(∫ ω¯
0
R(ω)dΦ(ω) +R[1− Φ(ω¯)]− µΦ(ω¯)
)
− (κ− 1)
]
+ (B.8)
ξ(ω¯ − R¯) +
∫ ω¯
0
γ1(ω)(ω −R(ω))φ(ω)dω +
∫ ω¯
0
γ2(ω)(R(ω))φ(ω)dω (B.9)
The first order necessary conditions with respect to R(ω), R¯, ω¯ after appropriate rescaling
of the multipliers can be written as1:
− γ1(ω)φ(ω)−
(
κ
RK
R
)1−ρ
{[ω −R(ω)]−ρφ(ω) + λ
(
κ
RK
R
)
φ(ω) + γ2(ω)φ(ω) = 0 for every ω ≤ ω¯
(B.10)
− ξ −
(
κ
RK
R
)1−ρ ∫ ∞
ω¯
[ω − R¯]−ρdΦ(ω) + λ
(
κ
RK
R
)
[1− Φ(ω¯)] = 0 (B.11)
− ξ
φ(ω¯)
−
(
κ
RK
R
)1−ρ
[ω¯ −R(ω¯)]1−ρ +
(
κ
RK
R
)1−ρ
[ω¯ − R¯]1−ρ − λ
(
κ
RK
R
)
[R(ω¯)− R¯− µ] = 0
(B.12)
1We do not need the first-order condition with respect to κ to prove the proposition.
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and the complementary slackness conditions:
0 = λ
{
κ
Rk
R
(∫ ω¯
0
R¯(ω)dΦ(ω) +R[1− Φ(ω¯)]− µΦ(ω¯)
)
− (κ− 1)
}
(B.13)
0 = ξ[ω¯ − R¯] (B.14)
0 = γ1(ω)[ω −R(ω)] (B.15)
0 = γ2(ω)R(ω) (B.16)
Suppose that γ1(ω) > 0 for all ω < ω¯. Then it must be that γ2(ω) = 0, from the comple-
mentary slackness conditions. Then equation (75) would imply that λ >
(
κR
K
R
)−ρ
(0)−ρ
which is not possible. Hence it must be true that γ1(ω) = 0 for all ω ≤ ω¯ and a standard
debt contract is not optimal. We know from (75) that γ1(ω) = 0 ⇐⇒ (ω − R(ω))−ρ ≥ λ.
Now there are two possible cases. Suppose γ2(ω) = 0 for all ω ≤ ω¯. Then the contract
specifies that R(ω) = ω − λ−1/ρ ( R
RKκ
)
. By complementary slackness it should be the case
that R(ω) > 0 for all ω, which is not possible because if ω = 0, R(ω) > 0 would not be
feasible. Then it must be the case that γ2(ω) > 0 for some ω which implies R(ω) = 0
and ω ≤ λ−1/ρ ( R
RKκ
)
for the same ω. Hence there is a lower interval where R(ω) = 0.
Call the upper bound of this interval ω ≡ λ−1/ρ ( R
RKκ
)
. Therefore R(ω) = 0 if ω ≤ ω and
R(ω) = ω − ω if ω ≤ ω ≤ ω¯.
181
Appendix B Risk Aversion and the Financial Accelerator
B.2 FOCs for the Dynamic Contract and Proof of
Proposition 2
The Lagrangian is
L = Et
{
(κtR
k
t+1)
1−ρg(ω¯t+1, ωt+1, R¯t+1, σω,t)Ψt+1
1− ρ + λt+1
(
κtR
k
t+1h(ω¯t+1, ωt+1, R¯t+1, σω,t)− (κt − 1)Rt
)}
The first order conditions are
∂L
∂kt
= Et
{
(κtR
k
t+1)
1−ρgt+1Ψt+1 − λt+1Rt
}
= 0 (B.17)
∂L
∂ω¯
=
(κtR
k
t+1)
1−ρgω¯,t+1Ψt+1
1− ρ + λt+1κtR
k
t+1hω¯,t+1 = 0 (B.18)
∂L
∂ω
=
(κtR
k
t+1)
1−ρgω,t+1Ψt+1
1− ρ + λt+1κtR
k
t+1hω,t+1 = 0 (B.19)
∂L
∂R¯
=
(κtR
k
t+1)
1−ρgR¯,t+1Ψt+1
1− ρ + λt+1κtR
k
t+1hR¯,t+1 = 0 (B.20)
Now we can express λt+1 from
∂L
∂ω¯ = 0
λt+1 = −
(κtR
k
t+1)
1−ρgω¯,t+1Ψt+1
1− ρ
1
κtRkt+1hω¯,t+1
(B.21)
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Now we plug this condition into the three other equations and obtain
∂L
∂kt
= Et
{
(κtR
k
t+1)
1−ρgt+1Ψt+1 +
(κtR
k
t+1)
1−ρgω¯,t+1Ψt+1
1− ρ
1
κtRkt+1hω¯,t+1
Rt
}
= 0 (B.22)
∂L
∂ω
=
(κtR
k
t+1)
1−ρgω,t+1Ψt+1
1− ρ −
(κtR
k
t+1)
1−ρgω¯,t+1Ψt+1
1− ρ
1
κtRkt+1hω¯,t+1
κtR
k
t+1hω,t+1 = 0
(B.23)
∂L
∂R¯
=
(κtR
k
t+1)
1−ρgR¯,t+1Ψt+1
1− ρ −
(κtR
k
t+1)
1−ρgω¯,t+1Ψt+1
1− ρ
1
κtRkt+1hω¯,t+1
κtR
k
t+1hR¯,t+1 = 0
(B.24)
we can transform this system to
∂L
∂kt
= Et
{
(Rkt+1)
1−ρΨt+1
(
gt+1 +
gω¯,t+1
(1− ρ)κtRkt+1hω¯,t+1
Rt
)}
= 0 (B.25)
∂L
∂ω
= gω,t+1 − gω¯,t+1hω,t+1
hω¯,t+1
= 0 (B.26)
∂L
∂R¯
= gR¯,t+1 −
gω¯,t+1
hω¯,t+1
hR¯,t+1 = 0 (B.27)
Since in the equation (B.25) Ψt+1 and Rˆk,t+1 enter as multiplicative terms and the term
gt+1 +
gω¯,t+1
(1−ρ)κtRkt+1hω¯,t+1
Rt is equal to zero in the steady state, Ψt+1 and Rˆk,t+1 have no effect
in the first order approximation. Therefore, to find the approximate solution it is sufficient
to consider the following system:
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κtR
k
t+1h(ω¯t+1, ωt+1, R¯t+1, σω,t) = (κt − 1)Rt (B.28)
Et
{
gt+1 +
gω¯,t+1
(1− ρ)κtRkt+1hω¯,t+1
Rt
}
= 0 (B.29)
gω¯,t+1
hω¯,t+1
=
gR¯,t+1
hR¯,t+1
(B.30)
gω¯,t+1
hω¯,t+1
=
gω,t+1
hω,t+1
(B.31)
We can substitute kt and obtain
Et
[
gω¯Rt+1
(1−ρ)Rk,t+1hω,t+1
]
Etgt+1
=
1
1− Rk,t+1Rt ht+1
(B.32)
gω¯,t+1
hω¯,t+1
=
gR¯,t+1
hR¯,t+1
(B.33)
gω¯,t+1
hω¯,t+1
=
gω,t+1
hω,t+1
(B.34)
Whenever the gradient of this system has full rank at the steady state, we will be able to
find an approximate solution of ˆ¯ωt+1, ωˆt+1,
ˆ¯Rt+1 as functions of EtRˆk,t+1 − Rˆt, Rˆk,t+1 − Rˆt
and σˆω,t. Using this fact and log-linearizing equation (B.28) will give us
kˆt = νp(EtRˆk,t+1 − Rˆt) + νσσˆω,t (B.35)
184
Appendix C
Implications of Default Recovery Rates
for Aggregate Fluctuations
C.1 Expression for Recovery Rates
In keeping with the data, we measure recovery rates in the model as the market value of
defaulted debt as a percentage of its face value (or par). In the financial accelerator model
of BGG, there is a continuum of borrowers (or entrepreneurs), indexed by (j) who purchase
raw capital, K¯, at a unit price of Q. The entrepreneur j uses his net worth, N(j), and a
one-period loan B(j) from a financial intermediary to purchase his desired level of capital.
The entrepreneur is subject to an aggregate return, Rk, and an idiosyncratic return, ω,
where log(ω) ∼ N (−12σ2ω, σ2ω) so that the mean of ω is equal to 1. We denote by f(ω)
and by F (ω) the probability density function and cumulative distribution function of ω,
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respectively. Thus, the value of the entrepreneur’s assets ex-post is QK¯(j)Rkω. The loan
obtained by the entrepreneur takes the form of a standard debt contract, where Z denotes
the promised gross rate of return on the loan. Let, ω¯, be the value of ω below which an
entrepreneur is not able to repay the principal and the interest on the loan. This cutoff is
defined by
B(j)Z = QK¯(j)Rkω¯ (C.1)
Entrepreneurs with ω < ω¯ are not able to refinance and, hence, declare bankruptcy. Due to
bankruptcy costs, the financial intermediary is only able to recover a fraction (1−µ) of the
entrepreneur’s asset. Thus the average recovery rate, conditional on default is given by:
Rc =
∫ 1
0
∫ ∞
0
(1− µ)ωQK¯(j)Rk
F (ω¯)B(j)Z
dF (ω¯)dj (C.2)
Now multiply both the numerator and denominator by ω¯, and substitute out for B(j)Z
using (C.1) to obtain
Rc =
∫ 1
0
∫ ∞
0
(1− µ)ω
F (ω¯)ω¯
dF (ω¯)dj =
(1− µ)G(ω¯)
F (ω¯)ω¯
(C.3)
where G(ω¯) ≡ ∫∞0 ωdF (ω).
186
Appendix C Implications of Default Recovery Rates for Aggregate Fluctuations
C.2 Derivation of θt
Here we derive an analytical expression for θ. Consider an entrepreneur with net worth
Nt(j) His returns are given by
Nt(j) = [ωtR
k
tNt−1(j)κt−1 − (κt−1 − 1)Zt] (C.4)
where κ is the common leverage across entrepreneurs. The new amount of capital chosen
by the entrepreneur is K¯t+1(j) = Nt(j)κt/Qt, so we have
K¯t+1 = [ωtR
k
tNt−1(j)κt−1 −Nt−1(j)(κt−1 − 1)Zt]
κt
Qt
(C.5)
and K¯t(j) = Nt−1(j)kt−1/Qt−1. Thus, net purchases or sales of capital for entrepreneur j
are equal to
K¯t+1(j)− K¯t(j) = [ωtRktNt−1(j)kt−1 −Nt−1(j)(kt−1 − 1)Zt]
κt
Qt
−Nt−1(j) κt−1
Qt−1
(C.6)
Define ω˜ as the value of ω for which an entrepreneur neither buys nor sells capital. ω˜ is
pinned down by
0 = [ω˜tR
k
tNt−1(j)κt−1 −Nt−1(j)(κt−1 − 1)Zt]
κt
Qt
−Nt−1(j)κt−1
qt−1
(C.7)
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Then
ω˜tR
k
tNt−1(j)kt−1 = (Nt−1(j)(kt−1 − 1)Zt)
κt
Qt
+Nt−1(j)
κt−1
Qt−1
(C.8)
Using this last expression, we can rewrite (C.6) as
K¯t+1(j)− K¯t(j) = RktNt−1(j)κt−1(ωt − ω˜t) (C.9)
Summing across all entrepreneurs and taking into account the the new entrants as well as
those who leave business we can write
θt =
∫ 1
0 max[K¯t(j)− K¯t+1(j), 0]dj∫ 1
0 max[K¯t+1(j)− K¯t(j), 0]dj
(C.10)
=
−γtRktNt−1κt−1 κtQt
∫ ω˜t
0 (ω − ω˜t)dF (ω) + (1− γt)Nt−1κt−1Rkt κtQt
γtRktNt−1κt−1
κt
Qt
∫∞
ω˜t
(ω − ω˜t)dF (ω) +W et κtQt
(C.11)
=
−γtRktNt−1κt−1
∫ ω˜t
0 (ω − ω˜t)dF (ω) + (1− γt)Nt−1κt−1Rkt
γtRktNt−1κt−1
∫∞
ω˜t
(ω − ω˜t)dF (ω) +W et
(C.12)
=
−γt
∫ ω˜t
0 (ω − ω˜t)dF (ω) + (1− γt)
γt
∫∞
ω˜t
(ω − ω˜t)dF (ω) + W
e
t
RktNt−1κt−1
(C.13)
=
−γt(Γt(ω˜t)− ω˜) + 1− γt
γt(1− Γ(ω˜t)) + W
e
t
RktNt−1κt−1
(C.14)
where
ω˜t =
κt−1
κt
Qt
Qt−1 + (κt−1 − 1)Zt
Rkt κt−1
= ω¯t +
1
κt
Qt
Qt−1Rkt
(C.15)
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and
Γ(ω˜) =
∫ ω˜
0
ωf(ω˜)dω + ω˜(1− F (ω˜)) (C.16)
= Φ
(
log(ω˜)
σ
− σ
2
)
+ ω˜
[
1− Φ
(
log(ω˜)
σ
+
σ
2
)]
(C.17)
where Φ(·) is the cumulative density function of the standard normal distribution.
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